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his research report examines three questions that are central to IFPRI research: How
do property-rights institutions affect efficiency and equity? How are resources allo-
cated within households? Why does this matter from a policy perspective? As part of
a larger multicountry study on property rights to land and trees,this study focuses on the evo-
lution from customary land tenure with communal ownership toward individualized rights,
and how this shift affects women and men differently.
Changes in property-rights institutions have the potential to affect the distribution of re-
sources among and within households. While individualization of land-tenure institutions
has been shown to improve management efficiency in many settings, concerns have been
raised about the equity implications of such changes. In particular, it is often argued that in-
dividualization of land tenure leads to the deterioration of women’s customary property
rights to land.
This study’s key contribution is its multilevel econometric analysis of efficiency and eq-
uity issues. Using a combination of community, village, and household surveys in Western
Ghana and Sumatra, two areas with traditional matrilineal inheritance systems, the authors
and their collaborators analyze the effectiveness of village-, household-, and parcel-level
property-rights institutions and arrangements.
This study challenges the conventional wisdom that communal tenure systems do not pro-
vide adequate incentives for permanent improvements in land. In fact, whether on private or
on communally owned land, agroforestry has a positive, indirect effect on equity. This is be-
cause agroforestry is more profitable than food crops in poor marginal areas, so systems that
encourage their development also contribute to reducing the welfare gap between the rela-
tively wealthy and the poor rural population.
Agroforestry systems can also be consistent with gender equity. In Ghana and Sumatra,
there are no significant gender differences in the efficiency of managing cropped fields. Land
inheritance systems in these areas are evolving to provide incentives consistent with the rel-
ative intensity of male and female labor in various crops. The increase in demand for female
labor in cocoa has led to stronger land rights for women in Ghana, while the labor require-
ments in agroforestry have strengthened land rights for men in matrilineal Sumatra. In both
cases, land tenure systems have evolved toward increased efficiency and equity.
To promote gender equity while providing incentives for efficient natural resource man-
agement, any program that changes the distribution of property rights must be checked for
overt or implicit barriers to women’s obtaining rights. Implementation of titling programs, in
particular, must pay special attention to women’s rights. Technology development and trans-fer programs must also consider the needs of women farmers, who have often been neglected
by male-dominated extension systems. Finally, concern about women’s land rights should not
blind policymakers to the importance of investing in the education of both girls and boys. In-
creasing women’s educational attainment will increase their opportunities in the nonfarm sec-
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idespread deforestation in many developing countries has contributed to ecologi-
cal deterioration, particularly in marginal areas. Agroforestry has the potential to
halt this decline and improve the livelihoods of poor inhabitants of these areas.
Yet agroforestry depends on people’s rights to plant and use trees, rights established by pre-
vailing systems of land and tree tenure. Without clear property rights, there are few incen-
tives to invest in trees because future benefits would not accrue to those who manage them.
Understanding land tenure institutions and their effect upon agroforestry practices is there-
fore critical in improving natural resource management and reducing poverty. While indi-
vidualization of land tenure institutions encourages the adoption of agroforestry, there is a
concern that women may lose out in this process. In many parts of the world, women’s rights
to land are weaker than men’s, and it is often argued that the shift from customary to indi-
vidualized tenure may weaken them further.
Land, Trees, and Women examines the evolution of customary land tenure institutions in
areas of Western Ghana and Western Sumatra where traditional matrilineal inheritance sys-
tems have been changing. Though the cultural, natural, and policy environments of the two
regions differ, most of the study sites are within agriculturally marginal, less favored areas
with a high incidence of poverty. Communities with contrasting land tenure institutions,
farming systems, and natural resources were included in the study.
The study has three objectives: (1) to quantify the effects of various land tenure institu-
tions on the efficiency of agroforestry and cropland management and on investments; (2) to
identify factors affecting the evolution of customary land tenure institutions; and (3) to as-
sess the implications of land tenure institutions for gender equity and the preservation of the
natural resource base. Several different, but complementary, methodologies were employed
to analyze evolutionary change from the community or village level down to the level of the
individual and the plot. Three sets of analyses were used. The first was an extensive study of
communities located over wide areas, with a range of natural, socioeconomic, and policy en-
vironments. The second was an intensive study of households in selected communities,where
differing land tenure institutions and farming systems coexist. The third was a study of in-
trahousehold and gender issues, based on a detailed retrospective survey of land inheritance
and educational investment in individuals within households.
The study found that population pressure is the major factor accounting for the decrease in
forestland. Under the communal tenure system, population pressure has led to the privatization
of land rights, the clearing of forest areas, and the erosion of traditional land acquisition meth-
ods. Since the effort of clearing forests is rewarded by strong individual land rights, reversingthe trend of deforestation will not be simple.
Also,there is no strong statistical evidence to
support popular arguments that customary
land tenure in Ghana and Sumatra discour-
ages commercial agroforestry. Indeed, com-
mercial trees have been planted under
communal ownership systems as widely and
actively as under the private ownership sys-
tems. Even where land rights are relatively
weak, the expectation of strengthened indi-
vidual land rights stimulates tree planting.
However, once trees are planted, the com-
munal land ownership system is converted
de facto to private ownership. Agroforestry
systems,whether on privately or on commu-
nally owned land, have a positive, indirect
effect on equity because agroforestry is more
profitable than food crops in marginal areas
where poverty levels are high. To improve
the efficiency of natural resource manage-
ment, promote gender equity, and dissemi-
nate best agroforestry practices, public
policies should harness the profit incentives
that underlie institutional change in land
ownership systems. Three issues must be




Property rights institutions are moving to-
ward providing proper incentives for effi-
cient natural resource management. Though
improved management will take place when
there is a closer match between those who
control and those who use resources, direct
intervention in gender-based property rights
policy has proven to be extremely difficult.
Any program or legal framework that as-
signs rights to resources must be evaluated
for barriers to women’s participation. In ad-
dition, the twin forces of commercialization
and individualization of land rights should
lead to a more widespread demand for titling
over time by smallholder farmers. Thus,
land-titling programs will be feasible once
communal land tenure institutions become
sufficiently individualized. Yet such pro-
grams are costly and there is always the dan-
ger that the rich and the political elite will
seize large areas of titled land. Efforts to
strengthen women’s land rights through
legal reform must go hand in hand with ed-
ucation of women,which will enable them to




Since there are strong incentives to manage
agroforestry plots on sloping lands under
communal ownership, improving profitabil-
ity of agroforestry systems, whether through
dissemination of improved germplasm or
through better cultivation practices, is
needed. In developing technology transfer
programs, care must be taken to include
women farmers,who have traditionally been
neglected by male-dominated extension sys-
tems, and who may prefer to plant different
tree species than men.
Market Development
and Other Policy Issues
Market development is critical in generating
the degree of intensification required to en-
able rural people to lift themselves from
poverty without undermining their re-
sources. Increased rural road construction is
key to such development. While the expan-
sion of roads may hasten deforestation by
enhancing the profitability of timber har-
vesting, it will also accelerate the develop-
ment of agroforestry where primary forests
have already been cleared.
The establishment of equitable, prof-
itable, and sustainable agroforestry systems
can contribute significantly to the reduction
of poverty in marginal areas, help pre-
vent soil erosion, and create tree biomass.
Moreover, profitable agroforestry can help
strengthen individual land rights. Thus, the
development of agroforestry is conducive to
efficiency and equity from both private and
social viewpoints.
xiv SUMMARYFinally,investing in the education of both
sons and daughters should be part of
a long-term solution to rural poverty and
environmental sustainability. Increasing
women’s educational attainment will not
only increase their opportunities in the non-
farm sector, it will also contribute to smaller
family sizes and reduced population pres-





his comparative study of customary land tenure institutions in western Ghana and
western Sumatra is part of a larger multi-country study on property rights to land and
trees (Otsuka and Place 2001). Its main purpose is to explore the causes and conse-
quences of the choice of land tenure institutions in the management of land and trees, with
special emphasis on agroforestry.1 Speciﬁcally, the study provides information on the effec-
tiveness of village, household, and even parcel-level property rights institutions and arrange-
ments. Unlike the other studies, however, its speciﬁc focus is the gender-differentiated impact
of the evolution of customary land tenure towards individualized rights.
Since gender is the main focus of the study, we selected two areas where traditional matri-
lineal inheritance systems have undergone evolutionary changes. Interestingly enough, the
matrilineal systems in each of the study areas are very different. Under the Akan matrilineal
system in Ghana, land is transferred from the deceased man to his brother or nephew (sister’s
son) in accordance with the decision of the extended family or matriclan. Although kinship
is reckoned through the uterine line, transmission of land is through males, and women have
relatively weak land rights. In matrilineal Sumatra, on the other hand, descent and inheritance,
as exempliﬁed by the Minangkabau, occur through the female line, and women have strong
land rights, especially to paddy land. Sumatran society, similar to other Southeast Asian
societies, also has a strong egalitarian ethic and a relative absence of gender discrimination,
in contrast to western Ghana. It is no surprise that the process of individualization of land
tenure institutions is quite different in these two markedly different matrilineal cultures.
The methodology for analyzing the evolution of land tenure institutions and its efﬁciency
implications is based upon a synthesis of the evolutionary model of farming systems developed
by Boserup (1965), Ruthenberg (1980), Pingali, Bigot, and Binswanger (1987), and McIntire,
Bourzat, and Pingali (1992); a theory of property rights developed by Demsetz (1967) and
Alchian and Demsetz (1973); and a theory of induced innovation developed by Hayami and
Ruttan (1985) and Hayami (1997). The ﬁrst two models can be considered as applications of
the induced innovation model. Boserup’s study is concerned with the evolution of farming
1 The other countries in the larger study are Malawi, Uganda, Vietnam, Nepal, and Japan.systems from land-using shifting cultivation
to land-saving intensive farming when pop-
ulation increases over time, whereas Alchian
and Demsetz’s study focuses on the evolution
of property rights institutions from loosely
administered open access to private owner-
ship when natural resources become scarce.
The analysis of gender differences in land
rights, however, draws from theories of inter-
generational transfers (Becker and Tomes
1986; Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1982)
and models of intrahousehold allocation (see
Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997 for
a review). These different but complemen-
tary methodologies enable us to analyze
evolutionary change at many levels—from
the community or village level down to the
level of the individual and the plot. Linking
changes in property rights institutions and
other social institutions for the transmission
of wealth across generations is an innova-
tion in studies of this kind. Unlike previous
studies that have only theorized about the
possible direction of change, we are able to
carry out rigorous statistical testing of hy-
potheses for different units of observation.
The quantiﬁcation of information is im-
portant in informing the debate on the impact
of individualization of land tenure systems
on women. This issue, although controver-
sial, has rarely been informed by systematic
tests of hypotheses at different levels. Con-
ventional wisdom tends to view the process
of individualization as a product of colo-
nization or commercialization, rather than as
the product of evolutionary processes. If in-
dividualization were only the product of col-
onization, it would be easy to ascribe it to an
external intervention or an exogenous shock
deﬁned by historical events. However, view-
ing individualization of land rights as part
of an evolutionary process or as an institu-
tional innovation would enable researchers
and policymakers to understand better the
tradeoffs—for example, between efﬁciency
and equity—involved in this process. More-
over, by identifying the factors that affect
the evolution of land tenure institutions at the
village and household levels, this study helps
to identify critical points for policy interven-
tion. Finally, the comparison between two
types of matrilineal systems in two continents
enabled us to include a variety of property
rights institutions and dynamics, basic agro-
ecological conditions, and natural resource
management strategies. Without this com-
parison, it would have been easy to arrive at
simplistic conclusions about the effects of the
individualization of land rights on gender.
Research Objectives
This study has three basic research objectives.
The ﬁrst objective is to explore quanti-
tatively the effects of various land tenure
institutions on investments in and the efﬁ-
ciency of agroforestry and cropland man-
agement. Despite the widely recognized
importance of land tenure institutions in the
management of natural resources, the extent
and ways in which the former affect the lat-
ter are not well understood, especially outside
of agriculture. To the extent possible, this
study attempts to assess quantitatively the
efﬁciency of natural resource management.
Note that the term “efﬁciency” is used
broadly throughout this study to encompass
technical or production efﬁciency, the al-
locative efﬁciency of variable inputs, and the
efﬁciency of investments from the viewpoint
of local communities and households. Re-
gional, national, or global externalities asso-
ciated with natural resource management are
not explicitly analyzed.
The second objective of this study is to
identify major factors affecting the evolution
of customary land tenure institutions. Cus-
tomary or communal land tenure institutions
are dynamic. Recent research suggests that
the system of communal or family land
rights on cultivated agricultural ﬁelds tends
to evolve toward greater privatization with
population growth and increasing commer-
cialization in many parts of Sub-Saharan
Africa (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994).
Very little rigorous statistical analysis, how-
ever, has been attempted.
If land tenure institutions evolve toward
their social optimum with population growth
2 CHAPTER 1and the commercialization of agriculture,
there will be little need for policy interven-
tions in land rights systems. On the other
hand, if inappropriate land rights institutions
tend to persist, or if they move in the wrong
direction, effective policy options must be
sought.
The third objective of this study is to
assess the implications of land tenure insti-
tutions for equity, particularly with respect
to gender, and for the natural resource base.
Most of the study sites lie within agricultur-
ally marginal, less favored, or low-potential
areas, where the incidence of poverty is gen-
erally high. The ultimate purpose of this study
is to seek effective ways to reduce poverty
by increasing the efﬁciency of land use and
management in such areas based on a proper
understanding of the nature and role of land
tenure institutions. The study will also ana-
lyze how changes in land tenure institutions
affect women’s status, and how women’s
status, the wealth of farm households re-
flected in farm size, and the gender compo-
sition of family labor affect investment in
trees and the management efﬁciency of peren-
nial and annual crop farming. Finally, it will
consider how changes in land tenure institu-
tions affect the natural resource base and en-
vironmental beneﬁts through their effects on
the management of land and trees.
Links between Land Tenure,
Agroforestry, and Gender:
A Review
Although communal tenure systems tend to
grant different rights to different persons for
a single plot of land, more private and indi-
vidualized tenure systems concentrate exclu-
sive and absolute rights to a plot of land to
a single individual. Individualization of land
tenure systems is inevitable as population
pressure increases. It is important to exam-
ine its impact on efﬁciency and equity—
particularly gender equity. In most custom-
ary regimes, women gain access to land indi-
rectly through male relatives, which makes
their land rights under communal tenure
weaker than men’s. Many have suggested
that, as tenure is privatized, that position
becomes even weaker (Fortmann 1981;
Agarwal 1994; Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997).
Modern legal reforms attempting to formal-
ize customary tenure systems have often
contributed to the erosion of women’s cus-
tomary rights (see Rocheleau 1988 for a re-
view). In other cases, the erosion has been
imposed on ethnic minorities by colonial
powers or by national governments.
Despite the importance of this issue, very
few studies systematically identify the con-
ditions under which women gain or lose as
communal systems are privatized. Indeed, it
is only relatively recently that gender roles in
agriculture have been analyzed, starting with
Boserup’s work on farming systems (1970),
and the literature on gender differences in
land and tree tenure is much more recent
(Fortmann 1988; Rocheleau 1988; Rocheleau
and Edmunds 1997). However, it may be un-
wise to generalize that women have always
lost out in the process of privatization. Roche-
leau (1988) points out that there are examples
of women gaining more secure rights to land
after privatization, as in the recognition of
women’s ownership of commercial tree crop
plots (usually cocoa) in Nigeria and Ghana
(Afonja 1981). Moreover, some recent land
reform programs, such as those in Cuba 
and Nicaragua, have explicit provisions for
women as beneﬁciaries (Deere 1985). With-
out information regarding the underlying dis-
tribution of property rights between men and
women, it is difﬁcult to ascertain the impact
of the privatization of communal tenure on
the gender distribution of property rights.
The Critical Role of Property Rights
in Agroforestry
Property rights institutions and land tenure
systems govern the use and allocation of
forestlands, woodlands, rangelands, and
croplands. These land tenure systems range
from communal ownership of land to state
ownership, common property, and private
ownership. Overlapping these systems of
land tenure are separate, though often com-
plementary, systems regarding property rights
ISSUES AND MOTIVATION FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 3on trees. The overlap between land tenure and
tree tenure becomes especially important in
the context of agroforestry, which is the in-
corporation of trees into a farming system
(Bruce and Fortmann 1989).
Individual land rights under the commu-
nal system are restricted. Although the usu-
fruct right of individual members of the
community is usually well established, the
rights to transfer, including sales and leasing,
are vested in the extended family, clan, or
community. Individual land rights are gener-
ally more restricted under state ownership,
where nobody has clear rights to use the
state-owned land, unless the state grants clear
property rights to individuals, such as through
a leasehold arrangement.
Agroforestry, in turn, depends on people’s
rights to plant and use trees, rights that de-
pend on the prevailing systems of land tenure
and tree tenure (Fortmann 1988). Tree tenure
consists of the rights to own or inherit, the
right to plant, the right to use, and the right
of disposal. Although tree tenure systems
do not always coincide with land tenure sys-
tems, each affects the other (Fortmann 1988:
21). Traditionally, systems of customary
tenure have recognized rights of use of the
products of managed trees that are inde-
pendent of usufruct rights to use the land
(Fortmann 1987). However, as customary
tenure holdings become more individualized,
distinctions between land tenure and tree
tenure may decline (Warner 1995). Where
land tenure is communal and tree rights are
strong, tree planters are advantaged in their
rights to trees; where private rights to land
are strong, the strength of one’s rights to trees
may well depend on the strength of one’s
rights to land (Fortmann 1988: 21–22).
Incentives to preserve natural resources
and to invest in trees and other land improve-
ments for future beneﬁts will be thwarted
without clear property rights—whether indi-
vidual, family, or group ownership—simply
because future beneﬁts will not accrue to
those who manage them (Mendelsohn 1994).
Therefore, as populations grow and markets
penetrate into rural areas and, hence, land be-
comes more scarce, the communal and state
ownership systems face serious difﬁculties.
This does not necessarily imply that a
private ownership system with clear land
title is socially most desirable (Feder and
Noronha 1987; Feder and Feeny 1993). For
example, the private ownership system may
lead to negative externalities, such as soil
erosion, when forestlands are opened up and
newly brought into cultivation. Private own-
ership may create an inequitable distribution
of the beneﬁts from natural resources. Fur-
thermore, farmers may not be able to protect
their own property if it is costly to exclude
other users. In such cases, common property
regimes with communal rules and regula-
tions on the use and extraction of natural
resources may be socially more desirable
(Ostrom 1990; Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker
1990).
Property Rights and Gender
The issue of security of property rights is
especially relevant with respect to women,
land, and agroforestry. In both matri-
lineal and patrilineal societies in Africa,
land is predominantly allocated to males and
transferred intergenerationally to males—to
nephews in matrilineage and to sons in pa-
trilineage (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997). Women
gain access and use rights to land indirectly
through males: in patrilineal communities
through a husband, and in matrilineal com-
munities through their father, uncle, or, some-
times, a husband.
Whereas land tenure may appear more
clear-cut, being two-dimensional, tree tenure
is characterized by nested and overlapping
rights, which are products of social and eco-
logical diversity as well as the relationships
between various groups of people and their
rights to resources (Rocheleau and Edmunds
1997). Similar to property rights in land,
women’s rights to trees and forest products
are affected by the difference between cus-
tomary and statutory law, the difference be-
tween de jure and de facto rights, and the
spatial distribution of women’s rights (Roche-
leau 1988).
4 CHAPTER 1Land Tenure, Agroforestry,
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This study focuses on the overlap of land
tenure institutions and tree tenure—the in-
teraction between land rights and the right to
plant trees—and men’s and women’s rights
over both land and tree resources. Whereas
investment-incentive models of tenure secu-
rity would argue that secure tenure motivates
tree-planting, there is also evidence that, in
certain circumstances, tree-planting can in-
crease security of tenure in land. Tree-planting
may actually give rise to land rights under
customary tenure systems, because the plant-
ing of trees is seen as tantamount to owner-
ship; it is proof of an intention to assert a
right, which, if unchallenged, ripens into con-
clusive proof of right (Bruce and Fortmann
1989: 6). Forest clearance is another way to
secure land rights under customary law. It
requires much effort, which is rewarded by
relatively strong individual rights to land.
However, it is almost exclusively a male task
in most societies. In contrast, women often
engage in tree-planting. Gender differences
in work effort to clear forests and to plant
trees would therefore result in differences in
the degree of tenure security on cleared
forestland and agroforestry plots between
men and women. Whether or not such dif-
ferences in land rights and tenure security
affect the comparative efﬁciency of agro-
forestry management by men and women is
an important empirical question.
Organization of the Report
The remainder of this report is organized as
follows. In Chapter 2 we present the theo-
retical framework, formulate the major hy-
potheses, and describe the quantitative
methodology and survey design. After de-
scribing the survey areas, the prevailing land
tenure institutions are characterized in Chap-
ter 3. The following three chapters are de-
voted to statistical testing. Chapter 4 analyzes
the impacts of population growth and other
exogenous factors on land tenure choice and
the manner of land acquisition; Chapter 5 ex-
amines the effects of land tenure institutions
on tree-planting and farm management efﬁ-
ciency; and Chapter 6 explores gender dif-
ferences in land inheritance and schooling
investments. Chapter 7 presents the conclu-
sions and policy recommendations.





he purposes of this chapter are threefold. First, based on an evolutionary view of
farming systems and the induced innovation model, we set up a theoretical framework
explaining the intensiﬁcation of land use and the evolution of property rights systems.
Second, based on the theoretical framework, we formulate four testable hypotheses. Third,
we develop empirical methodologies to test those hypotheses.
Theoretical Framework
Characteristics of Communal Land Tenure Institutions
In our empirical research, land property rights are classiﬁed into bundles of rights encom-
passing use, investment, exclusion, and transfer rights with and without permission from
chief, family head, community organizations, and outside authorities. Our study is designed
to explore the perception of these rights by community members, as distinct from externally
created legal rights.
A communal land tenure system may be conceptualized as a set of tenures rather than a
single tenure type. Under the communal ownership regime, primary forests and uncultivated
woodlands are owned communally and controlled by an authority such as a village chief,
whereas rights to the exclusive use of cultivated land are assigned to individual households
of the community and rights to the ownership of cultivated land are held traditionally by the
extended family. Furthermore, the ownership of cultivated land has evolved toward more
individualized ownership over time. This whole system is also called the customary land
tenure system. Land tenure institutions that are observed in the Sumatra and Ghana sites fall
in this category.
Open-access is considered to be a category of land tenure institutions by Feder and
Noronha (1987), Bromley (1992), and Feder and Feeny (1993). It is more appropriate to re-
gard open-access as an extreme outcome of land management rules, which can theoretically
occur under any land tenure regime. Field observations suggest that communal forest area is
characterized by open-access for the community members almost without exception.An Evolutionary Model of Property
Rights Institutions
Following Hayami (1997), a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of the theoretical framework can be il-
lustrated by assuming that there are only two
factors of production, that is, land and labor.
Land represents natural resources and could
be cropland (with or without irrigation),
rangeland, woodland, or forestland. Under
shifting cultivation, food crops are typically
grown for a couple of years after forest clear-
ance, and a fallow period of variable length
follows until the next period of cultivation.
As Boserup (1965) emphasizes, fallow land
is not “unused” land; fallowing is a labor-
saving method for restoring soil fertility.
Under sedentary farming, either annual food
crops or perennial tree crops are grown with-
out long fallow periods.
If initially population is scarce and land
is abundant with vast areas of virgin forests,
people have little incentive to claim individ-
ual property rights in land and, hence, the use
of forest areas is unrestricted except for the
exclusion of outsiders by groups. Whereas
the usufruct rights of individual members of
the community are well established for cul-
tivated ﬁelds, the usufruct rights to fallow
land are less clear and the leader of the ex-
tended family or chief of the community
sometimes determines its allocation to mem-
bers of the group. Usually, usufruct rights
are transferred from one generation to an-
other in accordance with traditional inheri-
tance rules.
Since land is abundant, it is cost effective
to practice shifting cultivation with sufﬁ-
ciently long fallow periods, which ensures
complete restoration of soil fertility. Curve
I0I0 in Figure 2.1 portrays the unit isoquant
for an individual farmer to produce US$1
worth of food crops by using land and labor
under shifting cultivation in period 0. Here
land input is measured in terms of area “used”
for cultivation, including fallow land, some
of which may be secondary forest or wood-
lands. It is assumed for simplicity that the
production function is subject to constant
returns to scale, so that each technology or
farming system is characterized by a single
unit isoquant. The relative factor scarcity may
be indicated by relative factor price line, P 0.2
Then the optimum production point is given
by E0, where production is sustainable, that
is, production can continue to take place at
this point with unchanged soil fertility.
As population increases, however, land
becomes scarce relative to labor. The grow-
ing population will require increasing area
for agricultural production. Larger areas of
forestland are thus opened up, but the rate
of area expansion eventually falls short of
the growth rate of population. As a result, the
scarcity value of land increases relative to
labor, which is reﬂected in changes in the
relative factor price ratio from P 0to P 1in pe-
riod 1. Accordingly, the optimum produc-
tion point changes to E′ 0, so long as shifting
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Figure 2.1 A model of induced institutional innovation
2 Although a straight factor price line indicates the existence of perfect factor markets, such an assumption is unneces-
sary for the substance of the argument. A critical assumption is that the slope of the factor price curve becomes ﬂatter
as population pressure increases.cultivation continues to be practiced. The
fallow period at E′ 0 tends to be shorter than
at E0.
Owing to the shorter fallow cycle, soil
fertility declines and farming becomes un-
sustainable at E′ 0, resulting in the shift of the
unit isoquant from I0I0 to  I1I1. Thus, the
equilibrium point moves to E1. If shifting
cultivation continues with shortened fallow
periods under increasing population pressure,
production efﬁciency will further decline
over time. Note that a large area of land is
under fallow at E0but that more and less fer-
tile land is cultivated at E1.
The commercialization of agriculture
may accelerate the process of change. Be-
cause commercialization increases crop
prices at the local level, demands for factors
of production will increase, with the greatest
increases in the prices of those factors whose
supply is less elastic. To the extent that the
supply of land is less elastic than the supply
of labor, which is likely to be the case when
virgin forests have been cleared, the relative
price of land will increase. Commercializa-
tion will also increase the proﬁtability of
cultivation compared with fallow, thereby
shortening the fallow period and reducing
sustainability under shifting cultivation.
During the processes of population ex-
pansion and increasing commercialization,
deforestation continues to take place, cor-
responding to an increasing demand for
cultivated land. Thus, the stock of natural re-
sources, for example biomass and timber
volume, continues to be depleted in this
process.
An alternative to unsustainable farming
under shifting cultivation and continued
deforestation is to improve land quality by
investing in land (for example, the construc-
tion of irrigation facilities or terracing) or by
investing in trees (for example, commercial
trees such as cocoa, rubber, coffee, and cin-
namon). To maintain soil fertility under
continuous cropping of annual crops, new
farming systems may be adopted involving
the application of compost made from
grasses and leaf litter collected from the
forest and woodland, as well as manure.3
Relative to pure cropping systems, the pro-
ductivity of tree farming systems can be sus-
tained for longer periods of time with lower
applications of organic or inorganic fertilizer,
primarily owing to their deeper and denser
rooting systems. Because of the increasing
use of labor and continuous cropping, new
farming systems are labor using and land
saving. The unit isoquant corresponding to
this farming system is depicted by curve I2I2
in Figure 2.1.
Crops grown under the new farming sys-
tem are likely to be different from crops
grown under shifting cultivation. Figure 2.1
compares the efﬁciency of producing differ-
ent crops, where the unit isoquant is deﬁned
in terms of the combination of inputs neces-
sary to produce US$1 worth of output, re-
gardless of which crops are grown. What
types of crops will be grown will depend,
among other things, on the natural environ-
ment and access to markets. For example, if
an area is mountainous and sloping, tree
crops are likely to have comparative advan-
tage over food crops. If the area has good
access to urban markets, the production of
fresh vegetables and fruits may have com-
parative advantage over storable products
such as grain, cocoa, and coffee.
Given a relative factor price of P 1, the op-
timum is attained at E2 in Figure 2.1 under
the new farming system, at which produc-
tion is assumed to be more proﬁtable than at
E1, and possibly at E′ 0as well. The shift from
E1 to E2, however, is not costless. As was
mentioned earlier, physical investment, such
as terracing and tree-planting, is required to
adopt the new farming system. Thus, it does
not pay to adopt the new farming system
unless the difference in the short-run prof-
itability between the old and new systems
warrants the cost of long-term investment.
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3 The application of commercial fertilizer can also be considered. To do so, however, requires an extension of the model
to the case with more than two inputs, which is straightforward but cumbersome.Furthermore, land tenure institutions must
change in order to encourage investments.
Since usufruct rights are not totally secure
and transfer rights are restricted under tradi-
tional land tenure institutions, the expected
returns to investment may be depressed.
Those who plant trees may not be able to
reap the beneﬁts owing to an inability to be-
queath the property to desired heirs or to sell
the land freely if the need arises (Besley
1995). It is hypothesized that, in order to pro-
vide appropriate incentives to invest in land
and trees, land rights institutions for culti-
vated land are induced to change toward
greater individualization.
Among the factors inﬂuencing the choice
of property rights institution and its evolu-
tion, in-migration seems to have played a
signiﬁcant role. First, by accelerating the rate
of population growth, migration has placed
more pressure on local institutions to adapt
to changing factor scarcities. Second, mi-
grants often bring with them different knowl-
edge of resource management and this will
create the need for local institutions to facil-
itate or restrict these new practices accord-
ingly. Finally, migrants may come with their
own unique property rights institutions, such
as inheritance rules, and these must somehow
become integrated with local rules. Thus,
there is potential for increased conﬂict with
the inﬂux of migrants. However, there are also
great opportunities for institutional change
as the migrants bring with them knowledge
of alternative institutions.
In short, it is hypothesized that new land
tenure institutions are induced to develop
when the expected beneﬁts of institutional
change exceed the costs thereof. The ex-
pected beneﬁts are assumed to be determined
by efﬁciency gains associated with the insti-
tutional change; hence they are determined
by, among other things, population pressure
and the commercialization of agriculture.
On the other hand, the costs are assumed to
consist of reaching and enforcing new agree-
ments among community members. To the
extent that the new institutional rules reduce
social equity and stability, the cost associ-
ated with such institutional transformation
needs to be duly taken into account as well.
Land Tenure Institutions and Equity
What would be the effects on equity of the
evolution of property rights institutions?
Speciﬁcally, would individualization of land
rights create a larger disparity of access to
land among community members? What will
happen to women’s rights and welfare when
property rights are individualized? This study
attempts to address these major analytical
issues about equity.
It can be assumed that asset distribution
is fairly equitable when land is abundant and
investment in both physical and human cap-
ital is minimal. In fact, the per capita distri-
bution of land among households under the
communal ownership system is generally
equal (Otsuka and Place 2001). As land be-
comes scarce and valuable with population
growth and commercialization, however,
the distribution of land may become more
skewed. It can be postulated that whether or
not the individualization of land rights cre-
ates signiﬁcant inequity through the accumu-
lation of land by a small number of people
depends on the existence of scale economies.
If signiﬁcant scale economies do not exist,
the incentives for selected individuals to ac-
cumulate large areas of land will be weak. In
contrast, if large scale economies exist, land
may be accumulated by a few and, hence,
large income disparities may emerge with
changes in farming systems associated with
the individualization of land rights. Better
access to credit and technology by a few will
also confer scale advantages. In addition, land
may be accumulated by politically inﬂuen-
tial and wealthy farmers, particularly when
a land titling program is implemented (Bin-
swanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995). This
point is empirically investigated by estimat-
ing a proﬁt function in which farm size is an
explanatory variable.
Another important factor affecting equity
is the factor-use bias of new farming sys-
tems. Since nearly all rural households have
access to labor, changes in the production
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scribed in Figure 2.1, will promote equity.
Thus, the extent to which changes in prop-
erty rights institutions and farming systems
increase labor demand is an important issue
for social equity. In order to assess this effect,
a labor-use function is estimated in which
property rights institutions are included as
explanatory variables. Whether new farming
systems use male or female labor more in-
tensively will also affect the distribution of
beneﬁts of new farming systems by gender.
When land is abundant, migrants can
“purchase” uncultivated village land by mak-
ing small gifts to the community chief as a
token of appreciation. Since migrants are
generally poor, their acquisition of land be-
comes more difﬁcult once land becomes
scarce and more valuable. Indeed, in many
cases migrants acquire cultivation rights by
renting in land. In areas where land rights,
including rights to rent out, are weak, how-
ever, migrants may not ﬁnd opportunities to
rent in land. One question that arises is to what
extent the individualization of land rights
promotes tenancy contracts. Another ques-
tion is the extent to which tenancy contracts
contribute to the reallocation of land from
land-rich households to labor-rich house-
holds, given the inherent imperfection of
agricultural labor markets owing to asym-
metric information (Hayami and Otsuka
1993). Tenancy markets, if they work efﬁ-
ciently, will be conducive to both efﬁciency
and equity as tenancy transactions tend to
equate operational land–labor ratios across
farms. The efﬁciency of land tenancy mar-
kets, as well as other factor markets, will be
tested by assessing the effects of factor en-
dowment on the labor inputs and proﬁts of
farm operations per unit of land.
The individualization of land rights may
change the relative strength of land rights be-
tween husbands and wives. In western Ghana,
for example, where women traditionally were
not allowed to own land, they began to ac-
quire land ownership rights when they helped
their husbands plant and manage cocoa
trees. It may well be that, when demand for
women’s labor in planting trees increases,
greater land rights are given to them to en-
hance their work incentives. In areas where
men do not have rights to own land, as in ma-
trilineal Sumatra, men’s land rights appear to
increase when they plant trees. This study is
one of the ﬁrst attempts to explore rigorously
the intrahousehold issues associated with the
evolution of property rights.
Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical framework devel-
oped in the previous section, the following
hypotheses can be postulated.
Hypothesis 1: More secure land
tenure institutions will develop in
response to increasing scarcity of
land relative to labor in order to
reap the beneﬁts from investing in
the establishment of agroforestry
In order to realize higher proﬁts from tree
crop cultivation, the individualization of land
tenure must take place to provide sufﬁcient
incentives to invest in trees. One might think
that strong and secure individual rights in
trees, if they existed, would reduce the pres-
sure for the individualization of land tenure.
In our research sites, however, land and tree
rights tend to be inseparably and positively
associated.
The individualization of land tenure in-
stitutions, however, is less likely to occur if
proﬁtable investment opportunities are lim-
ited. This is the case for paddy ﬁelds in
Sumatra, where only minor investments in
the maintenance of traditional and simple
gravity irrigation systems are required, and
for food crop ﬁelds under shifting cultivation
in Ghana. The empirical study therefore com-
pares the difference in land tenure institutions
among food crop ﬁelds, bush/fallow areas,
and tree plot ﬁelds.
Hypothesis 2: The demographic
characteristics of a household
affect its choices among forest
clearance, family allocation, and
market forms of acquisition
Forests have been cleared on a ﬁrst-come/
ﬁrst-served basis, which has led to the rapid
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cropland (including agroforest areas) in many
locations. Since forests are likely to have been
more abundant in earlier years, older house-
hold heads are more likely to have had better
access to forestland in their youth. It can thus
be hypothesized that older household heads
have larger areas of land acquired through
forest clearance. Moreover, because forest
clearance involves strenuous tasks that are
usually performed by males, families with
larger endowments of male family labor will
have acquired larger areas of forestland.
Female-headed households would be handi-
capped in acquiring land through rental
contracts if they require tree-planting, as in
the case of cocoa in Ghana, because tree-
planting is also a strenuous task. If extended
families are concerned about ensuring the
livelihood of clan members, however, female
heads of households may be less disadvan-
taged with respect to land transfers acquired
through family allocation and inheritance.
Hypothesis 3: Given the expected
increase in individual land rights
from tree-planting, such tree-
planting and the management
efﬁciency of agroforestry are not
related to initial tenure security
levels under different land tenure
institutions
If trees are planted, individual tenure secu-
rity is enhanced and rights to give land to de-
sired heirs are strengthened. This is because
the work effort for planting trees is rewarded
by strong individual land rights under cus-
tomary land tenure rules (see, for example,
Shepherd 1991; Otsuka et al. 2001). If tree-
planting enhances tenure security, the incen-
tives to carry out subsequent management of
trees through such activities as weeding and
pruning may be high. In particular, weeding
when trees are young has a pervasive long-
term impact on the growth and future produc-
tivity of cocoa trees in Ghana. This hypothesis
can be tested by estimating tree-planting and
proﬁt functions.
On the other hand, tenure security may
affect the choice of fallow periods, which do
not involve explicit efforts to invest. In areas
of tenure insecurity, farmers will be reluctant
to leave land in fallow for long, for fear that
others will begin to cultivate it. The most
feasible strategy to guarantee use rights is to
use the land continuously.
Lastly, it is widely believed that the indi-
vidualization of land rights results in the ero-
sion of women’s land rights. This assertion
can be tested by examining the intrahouse-
hold distribution of different types of land:
cropland, agroforestry land, and bush/fallow
land. It can be argued that gender differences
in land bequests reﬂect gender differences in
labor use, so as to provide appropriate work
and investment incentives. Even in Ghana,
where women do not traditionally inherit
land from their husbands upon the latter’s
death, wives have gradually been acquiring
land from their husbands as the demand for
female labor in agroforestry management
has increased.
Hypothesis 4: If gender differences
in labor use among different types
of land exist, the distribution of
land among sons and daughters
within families tends to become
egalitarian, for example with sons
inheriting one type of land and
daughters others
Because it is possible that parents transfer
wealth to their children using different types
of assets, whether physical or human, and
because human capital is becoming increas-
ingly essential to movement into nonfarm
jobs, the gender difference in education may
also change as the distribution of land own-
ership between men and women changes.
Thus, we also examine the issue of the gen-
der difference in both land inheritance and
education.
Analytical Methodology
We propose three sets of analyses based on
two different types of surveys, focusing on
different aspects of the causal relationships
illustrated in Figure 2.2, and map them on to
the conceptual framework in Figure 2.3. The
first analysis may be termed an extensive
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endowed with different natural, social, mar-
ket, and policy environments and different
human and natural resources. The second
analysis is an intensive study of households
in selected communities where different land
tenure institutions and farming systems co-
exist. The third analysis is a study of intra-
household and gender issues, based on a
detailed retrospective survey of land inheri-
tance and educational investment in indi-
viduals within households.
Since we are interested in evolutionary
changes in land tenure institutions, it is de-
sirable to use data both from the past and from
the present to analyze changes. Data from the
sufﬁciently distant past (for example, a decade
or two), however, are not available. In order
to obtain information on changes in land
tenure and land use over time, we conducted
brief individual surveys of selected house-
holds to collect information on changes in the
manner of land acquisition. We do not expect,
however, that the arguments about path de-
pendency in the evolution of institutions pro-
posed by North (1991) have much relevance
for our study, because initial conditions were
similar across sites—our sites were all cov-
ered by dense forests with few inhabitants
at the beginning of the twentieth century—
and property rights institutions in these areas
all have evolved in the same direction.
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Figure 2.2 Property rights, collective action, and natural resource management:
a conceptual frameworkExtensive Study
Hypothesis 1 posits that land tenure institu-
tions will evolve in response to changing rel-
ative factor scarcities, which are affected by
population pressure and the commercializa-
tion of agriculture. The function explaining
the incidence of land tenure (LT) institutions
can be estimated using the extensive com-
munity survey data:
LT = F(Natural environment, Population
pressure, Policy, Commercialization,
Social environment), (1)
where LT may be measured by the propor-
tion of area under different land tenure insti-
tutions. In traditional areas characterized by
communal ownership, the agreement of the
community must be obtained in order to con-
vey individualized rights. Thus, the inci-
dence of different forms of land tenure is
determined by the characteristics of the com-
munity, making it appropriate to test the
hypotheses using village-level data. We con-
structed estimates of the proportions of land
under different degrees of individualized
rights at the village level, and estimated the
following reduced-form functions explain-
ing the incidence of the various land tenure
institutions using a common set of explana-
tory variables:
Si = a0i + a1i (population pressure
indicators)
+ a2i (proportion of migrant
population)
+ a3i (a vector of other village
characteristics)
+ a4i (regional and area dummies)
+eij (error term) (2)
where Si stands for the proportion of the ith
type of land, a1i are parameters, and all ex-
planatory variables are village speciﬁc, ex-
cept for the regional dummies.4 Land tenure
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Figure 2.3 Linkages among the conceptual framework, main hypotheses, and survey design
4 Since the sum of Si is unity, it is redundant to estimate the four share functions except to show the signiﬁcance of co-
efﬁcients directly.types are indexed by i; they cover the range
from communal to individualized forms of
land tenure and usually correspond to the
mode of acquisition.5 Indicators of popula-
tion pressure include the person–land ratio
as a proxy for population density and the
population growth rate. Other explanatory
variables include the proportion of migrants
or other ethnic groups in the population and
other village characteristics such as distance
or walking time to the forest or nearest mar-
ket town, the proportion of nonfarm house-
holds, and school attendance ratios. Note that
the proportion of migrant population may be
endogenous to the extent that migrants move
depending on the availability of land. Con-
sistent with Hypothesis 1, we expect that the
person–land ratio or population density has
a positive effect on the incidence of individ-
ualized forms of land tenure. Hypothesis 1 is
tested in Chapter 4 using village-level data.
In both the Ghana and Sumatra sites,
community-level indicators of natural re-
source management, such as the proportions
of forest and agroforest lands in the com-
munity, are not available. We therefore use
retrospective household-level data from the
brief individual household surveys that com-
plemented the extensive community survey.
The brief individual household survey asked
respondents about the manner of land acqui-
sition in the past and was used to construct a
data set that traced out historical changes in
the relative importance of various modes of
land acquisition.
Information on household processes of
land acquisition throughout the life cycle
was then used to formulate the appropriate
model of household decision-making for test-
ing Hypothesis 2—that is, the demographic
characteristics of the household affect choices
among modes of land acquisition. We as-
sume that, whereas the acquisition or clear-
ance of forestland, the rental and purchase
of land, and the development of agroforests
reﬂect choices made by an individual house-
hold, the acquisition of land through inheri-
tance and family allocations is determined
primarily by the extended family. In our
model, we propose that a person, usually a
man, follows a sequential decision-making
process with respect to land acquisition over
his life cycle. If forestland is available, he ac-
quires such land through clearance when he
is young, receives the family’s land through
inheritance, temporary allocation, or gifts ei-
ther when he gets married or upon the death
of a parent, and then acquires additional land
through renting and private purchase. The
sequence will vary across cultures and may,
of course, reﬂect idiosyncratic variation. In
some societies (for example, in Ghana), for-
est clearance occurs as a rite of passage for
young males, and family allocations may then
be made at the time of marriage or upon the
death of a parent. In Sumatra, on the other
hand, inheritance occurs only upon a par-
ent’s death. If potential inheritance or family
allocation is correctly anticipated, young
farmers may adjust their land acquisition be-
havior accordingly.
It would be reasonable to specify a re-
cursive system of equations in which, ﬁrst,
the acquisition of forestland is determined
by exogenous forces, second, the acquisition
of family land is explained by the amount of
forestland acquired during one’s youth as well
as exogenous forces, and, ﬁnally, the acqui-
sition of land through market transactions is
explained by the predetermined forest and
family land areas and other exogenous fac-
tors.6 That is:
Forestland acquired by farmer = b0 + B1
(vector of exogenous variables) + e1 (3)
Transfers of family land or inheritance =
c0 + C1 (vector of exogenous variables) +
γ (forestland acquired by farmer in his
youth) + e2 (4)
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5 In Ghana, the land tenure types are: family land, gift, village forestland, and acquired non-forestland. In Sumatra, the
categories are: joint family land, single family land, land cleared from forests, and purchased land.
6 If inheritance is accurately anticipated, the order of the equations may be reversed.Purchased or rented land = d0 + D1 (vector
of exogenous variables)
+δ 1 (forestland acquired in youth)
+δ 2 (transfers of family land) + e3 (5)
The exogenous variables in the estima-
tion include characteristics of the household
head (such as age, gender, years of school-
ing, and place of origin), measures of initial
wealth, and measures of family labor endow-
ments. If extended families operate to equal-
ize wealth among heirs, inter vivos transfers
by the extended family may be negatively
correlated with the initial wealth of the
household. If land acquired through forest
clearance and transfer of family land is in-
sufﬁcient for the family’s subsistence, addi-
tional land will be acquired through renting
and purchase. Population pressure will also
affect inherited land per household: as popu-
lation pressure increases, the size of inherited
land per household decreases, and farmers
purchase and rent more land. In other words,
increased scarcity of land induces the devel-
opment of land rental and sale markets. To
test whether women are disadvantaged in
terms of land acquisition, whether by clear-
ance, family allocation, or participation in
the land sale or rental market, the gender of
the household head is included among the
regressors.
Hypothesis 2 is tested in Chapter 4 using
household-level data from the extensive sur-
vey. Two speciﬁcations are tested: in the ﬁrst,
current holdings of forest- and family land are
regressors in the subsequent equations; in the
second, the regressors are forest- and family
land acquired prior to the ﬁrst date of acqui-
sition of family land and acquired non-forest-
land, respectively. The second speciﬁcation
imposes a more rigorous deﬁnition of prede-
termined forest and family landholdings.
Intensive Study
Although the analysis of the extensive sur-
vey data is expected to provide an overview
of the evolutionary process of land tenure in-
stitutions and their consequences, it does not
provide a clear picture of how users of natu-
ral resources manage them. Furthermore, in
analyzing extensive survey data, the impact
of household characteristics is taken into ac-
count only by using “aggregate” social vari-
ables for each community (for example, the
proportion of minority ethnic groups with dif-
ferent inheritance rules). In order to examine
how land tenure institutions and household
characteristics affect natural resource man-
agement practices, as speciﬁed in Hypoth-
esis 3, detailed household surveys were
conducted in selected communities where
different land tenure institutions coexist.
As already argued, it may be reasonable to
assume that land tenure institutions are ex-
ogenous or predetermined in the analysis of
household data, so long as they are deter-
mined by the community or the large ex-
tended family. If, however, the strength of
land rights can be changed by individual
farmers, for example by investing in land
using their own resources and labor, they
must be regarded as endogenous. In such
cases, either a simultaneous equations sys-
tem must be formulated or pre-existing land
tenure institutions, rather than ex post land
rights, must be used as explanatory variables.
First of all, using household survey data,
the impact of land rights on investment in
land and trees can be assessed using plot-
level data:
INVESTMENT = H (LT, characteristics
of plots and household). (6)
Since land tenure institutions are often dif-
ferent on different plots of land, it is desir-
able to estimate equation (6) at the plot level.
Accordingly, we use the land rights of plot
managers as explanatory variables in the plot-
level regressions. Characteristics of house-
holds should include variables related to both
human and physical capital endowments.
Particularly important will be variables rep-
resenting wealth, such as the size of land
ownership, and the gender of plot managers
if men and women own or operate differ-
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whether or not the rich invest more resources
per hectare and whether or not the strength-
ening of women’s land rights promotes in-
vestment in land improvements.
In order to isolate the effect of the plot-
level tenure variable, whenever possible we
use the household-level ﬁxed-effects model
to control for the effects of unobservable
household characteristics when estimating
equation (6), as well as equation (7) speci-
ﬁed below. Earlier applications of the ﬁxed-
effects model in similar contexts are found in
Place and Hazell (1993) and Place, Roth, and
Hazell (1994). Alternative speciﬁcations are
also used to test the effect of key household-
level variables that are noted above. Further-
more, to test whether plot-level heterogeneity
is important relative to the effect of un-
observable household characteristics, we es-
timate a random-effects model and test
whether ﬁxed or random effects is the ap-
propriate speciﬁcation.
Clearance of virgin forest is one form of
investment for future beneﬁts and, accord-
ingly, the dependent variable in equation (6)
may be the area acquired by clearing un-
claimed forest. In this case, household data
will be more appropriate for the analysis,
simply because the decision to acquire new
land is made by households. This creates
the need to develop household-level tenure
variables.
Second, it is desirable to assess the rel-
ative proﬁtability of different farming sys-
tems, for example shifting cultivation versus
sedentary food crop production or tree crop
production, which correspond to unit iso-
quants of I0I0, I1I1, and I2I2, respectively, in
Figure 2.1. For this purpose, the proﬁt func-
tion can be estimated:
PROFIT = I(LT, characteristics of 
plots and household), (7)
where proﬁt may be measured by the residual
proﬁt per hectare, which can be obtained by
subtracting the costs of non-land inputs (in-
cluding the imputed value of labor) from the
value of outputs. The proﬁt thus computed is
supposed to correspond to returns to land and
management effort and efﬁciency. Prices are
not used as explanatory variables, because
they do not vary within a community. If
perennial crops are grown, the age of trees
must be included as an explanatory factor.
In equation (7), characteristics of plots
should include variables representing the
history of cropping patterns, which can be
used to assess the sustainability of various
farming systems. Important variables to be
included in the household characteristics are
farm size, the endowment of land relative to
family labor, and the gender of the cultivator
possessing use or ownership rights. Farm
size is used to assess the signiﬁcance of scale
economies or diseconomies. The land–labor
ratio is used to examine the efﬁciency of fac-
tor markets, because factor endowments will
not affect the efﬁciency of production if
competitive factor markets operate so as to
equalize land–labor ratios across different
plots. Whether ownership by gender has any
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the proﬁtability of
farming has important implications for the
intrahousehold allocation of land rights.
The analysis of proﬁtability is comple-
mentary to the analyses of the evolution of
land tenure institutions and investment be-
havior. If it is observed that land tenure insti-
tutions evolve toward individualized tenure
and that such change promotes investment
in land and trees, the new farming systems
that required prior investment may be more
proﬁtable.
Similarly to equation (7), we would like
to estimate the impact of land rights institu-
tions on labor use per unit of land under dif-
ferent farming systems:
LABOR = J(LT, characteristics of 
plots and household). (8)
Acritical question is the impact of new farm-
ing systems on the demand for labor, which
may be differentiated by gender.
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Hypothesis 4 links changes in the demand
for labor to intergenerational transfers of land
and education. It posits that the distribution
of land among sons and daughters within
families tends to become egalitarian to re-
ward the differential work effort of sons and
daughters in agroforestry. In order to exam-
ine the effects of the shift from communal to
individual tenure on gender equity, it will be
instructive to analyze the intrahousehold
distribution of wealth transfers from parents,
that is, transfers of land and human capital.
Suppose that parents can transfer either
assets (land) or human capital (education) to
their children. If parental investments in chil-
dren are motivated by the goal of maximizing
lifetime welfare, as suggested by the wealth
model of intergenerational transfers (Becker
1974; Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1982),
parents may give more of one resource to the
child who will derive higher returns from
that resource. For example, if agriculture is
more intensive in men’s labor, parents may
preferentially allocate land to sons. The
model also predicts that parents’investment
strategies will change if there are changes in
the relative returns to investments in children
owing to agricultural development, the ex-
pansion of nonfarm employment opportuni-
ties, or changes in the demand for male and
female labor, as in the case of agroforestry.
This study uses data from the inheritance
retrospective administered to households in
the intensive survey to test Hypothesis 4. Re-
sults are presented in Chapter 6. To investi-
gate the determinants of the distribution of
education and land among sons and daugh-
ters, the following transfers equation is esti-
mated:
T*
ij = β β0 + β β1Xcij + β β2Xfj + β β3Xmj
+ β β4Gij × Xfj + β β5Gij × Xmj + eij, (9)
where T*






ij is the level of education of child i
in family j and l*
kij is the area of land of type
k given to child i in family j. In Ghana, one
can distinguish between gift, allocated, and
inherited land, owing to differences in land
rights associated with the manner of acquisi-
tion. In the Sumatran case, the distinction is
between paddy land, agroforestry land, and
bush/fallow land.  is a vector of coefﬁcients
for each type of transfer; Xc is a vector of
child characteristics such as birth year and
dummies for the eldest and youngest chil-
dren;  G is the daughter dummy; Xf and
Xm are vectors of exogenous father’s and
mother’s human and physical wealth, re-
spectively; and eij is the error term in each
equation. To account for the possibility that
the husband and wife do not have identical
preferences regarding bestowals to children,
an empirical speciﬁcation consistent with a
collective model of the household is used.7
Thus, father’s and mother’s wealth at the
time of marriage, which are exogenous to
decisions made within marriage, enter sepa-
rately into the regressions. Parental wealth
at marriage is deﬁned as human capital, as
proxied by years of schooling, and landhold-
ings, whether inherited or given at the time
of marriage.
Equations (4) and (9) are related, even
though the speciﬁcations are different. The
difference is that, whereas equation (4) ana-
lyzes the acquisition of total family land
consisting of both men’s and women’s plots
acrossdifferent families, equation (9) pertains
to various types of family land transferred to
son and daughters separately withina family.
For the latter analysis, the characteristics of
the father and mother are expected to exert
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7 For a review of collective models of the household, see Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1997). This formulation
draws from McElroy and Horney’s (1981) and McElroy’s (1990) specification of the Nash bargaining model and is
similar to Thomas (1990, 1994). It was applied to the analysis of inheritance decisions in the Philippines in Quisumbing
(1994).major inﬂuences; for the former analysis,
household characteristics, such as the dis-
tinctions between migrant and indigene
households, patrilineal and matrilineal in-
heritance, and the gender of the household
head, are expected to be relevant.8
Parental land and education are interacted
with child gender to test whether fathers or
mothers with more physical and human cap-
ital treat children of different genders differ-
entially, that is, to test for gender preference
with respect to the inﬂuence of parental re-
sources.9 Note that, since parents decide on
both types of transfers to children, the trans-
fer equations for education and land are
interdependent. Although Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) is equivalent to Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SURE), if all the
right-hand-side variables are the same, we
cannot implement SURE because some of
the independent variables (for example, land)
are censored and because no tractable sys-
tems Tobit estimator exists.
Equation (9) is estimated both in levels
and with family ﬁxed effects. Since land
transfers are subject to censoring (many
children do not receive any land), a Tobit
procedure is used for the land regressions in
levels. However, it is possible that omitted
family-level variables are correlated with re-
gressors, and thus their estimated effects on
transfers may be biased. For those families
with at least two children, the within-family
allocation can be used as the source of vari-
ation in the sample from which to estimate
intrahousehold differences in transfers.10 A
fixed-effects estimation procedure could con-
trol for these unobservables using family-
speciﬁc dummy variables.11 In this speciﬁc
application, only the child’s sex, birth year,
the eldest and youngest dummies, and inter-
action between child sex and parent char-
acteristics remain as explanatory variables.
Although the effects of variables that do not
vary across children cannot be identiﬁed, their
gender implications may be investigated to
the extent that they have a different impact
on children of different sex. A Lagrange
multiplier test allows us to verify the impor-
tance of individual heterogeneity, while a
Hausman test is used to assess the impor-
tance of family-level unobservables (ﬁxed
effects) relative to individual heterogeneity
(random effects). Both levels and ﬁxed-effects
estimates of education and land transfers
are presented in Chapter 6.
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8 The time required to collect detailed information on the respondents’parents is another consideration, which affected
the speciﬁcation of variables. Unlike equation (4), we did not include the amount of acquired forestland in equation
(9), because we intend to model parents’lifetime decision in the latter before their children decide how much forest-
land they want to acquire.
9 For example, Thomas (1990, 1994) ﬁnds that maternal education and nonlabor income have a bigger impact on the
height of a daughter, relative to a son, and that paternal education has a bigger impact on a son, relative to a daughter.
10 Families with at least two children are included so that birth order and sex dummies are relevant in the family ﬁxed-
effects speciﬁcation. The ﬁxed-effects procedure eliminates selectivity bias since family size, which affects selection
into the sample, is a family-speciﬁc variable (Heckman and MaCurdy 1980; Pitt and Rosenzweig 1990).
11 That is, the observed transfer, T ij, to child i in family j would be given by:T ij = tj +β Xij +µ ij, where the family-speciﬁc
effect is a dummy variable, tj, which is taken to be constant for a family. However, this speciﬁcation, although con-
trolling for additive unobservables, does not consider interactions between observables and unobservables (Hsiao
1986).CHAPTER 3
Survey Areas and Sampling Strategies
Survey Areas and Land Tenure
Ghana Site12
Cocoa plays a major role in the Ghanaian economy.13Although cocoa production and cocoa
prices in the world market have been declining over the past two decades, the sector remains
important. It contributes 24 percent of foreign exchange earnings (Institute of Statistical,
Social, and Economic Research 1995) and employs 18 percent of the country’s population
(Ghana Statistical Service 1995). For most households in southwestern Ghana, it is the main
if not the only source of livelihood.
For these cocoa-growing farmers, the indigenous method of cocoa production has re-
mained essentially unchanged. Although new hybrid varieties are being introduced, cultiva-
tion is still based on extensive use of land with no application of chemical fertilizer and
minimal use of pesticides. Since the soil of the natural forest is inherently fertile, farmers
have cleared forests for cultivation over the past hundred years. This has resulted in a de-
crease in Ghana’s rainforest area from 8.2 million hectares to 2.1 million hectares (Ortsin
1998), of which 1.7 million hectares are reserve forest areas. It will not be long before the re-
maining forests outside the reserves disappear altogether. Given the high population growth
rate and declining trend of cocoa production, the improvement of land-use practices to sus-
tain the cocoa industry is becoming an increasingly important issue.
Population pressure on limited land resources has resulted in shorter fallow periods under
shifting cultivation, which has reduced soil fertility and, hence, the sustainability of shifting
cultivation. In the case of cocoa production, cocoa and food crops are intercropped for the
ﬁrst few years and, once the cocoa trees mature, only cocoa is cultivated on the land. In con-
sequence, if the total area under cultivation is ﬁxed, the expansion of cocoa area implies the
reduction of food cultivation area. Whether the expansion of cocoa area at the expense of the
area devoted to food crops is desirable for farmers remains to be veriﬁed.
12 This section draws from Quisumbing et al. (2001b).
13 Agriculture is important in the Ghanaian economy. In the 1990s, the agricultural sector accounted for about 44 percent
of the gross domestic product and employed about 59 percent of the labor force (World Bank 1998).All land used for cocoa cultivation in
Ghana is under customary land ownership,
in which land-use rights have traditionally
been granted to the extended family, even
though the ultimate ownership rights were
vested in the village chief. Tenure arrange-
ments, however, have been evolving toward
individualized ownership over time. When
population density was low and virgin forests
were abundant, migrants were allowed to
clear forests for cultivation and this process
resulted in the rapid reduction of forest areas,
as vividly described by Hill (1963). With the
disappearance of virgin forests, migrants lost
such opportunities and instead sought tenancy
and caretaker (or labor) arrangements (Ben-
neh 1989). Meanwhile, land tenure arrange-
ments for the indigenous population have also
undergone substantial changes, from owner-
ship by the extended family under the uter-
ine matrilineal inheritance system to more
individualized ownership systems.
Under communal land tenure, the village
chief serves as the custodian of community-
owned forest area. In reality, when forestland
was abundant, village forest was open access
for the community members, as well as for
migrants (Berry 1963; Hill 1963; Robertson
1982). Forest clearance requires much effort
and, thus, those who clear forests are re-
warded by relatively strong individual rights
to land. Such individually rewarded land
rights are further strengthened if land con-
verters make long-term or permanent im-
provements in the land, such as tree-planting.
Land rights, however, tend to become weaker
if land is put into fallow over extended peri-
ods. In particular, individual rights to trans-
fer and inheritance are limited and controlled
by leaders of the extended family or village
(Shepherd 1991; Bassett 1993). It is gener-
ally accepted that incentives to invest in land
and tree resources under such land tenure
rules will be thwarted owing to unclear and
uncertain individual land rights (Johnson
1972; Besley 1995).
Although the evolution toward more in-
dividualized systems may be conducive to
more efﬁcient agroforestry management, the
impact on women’s land rights is often cause
for concern, since there is a possibility that
individualization would erode women’s
customary rights to land. This concern has
often been raised in the context of matrilin-
eal inheritance systems (Agarwal 1994). The
Akan ethnic group, to which the majority of
the population in western Ghana belongs, has
traditionally practiced matrilineal inheritance,
whereas a number of inhabitants in migrant
villages, who belong to non-Akan ethnic
groups, are generally subject to the patrilineal
inheritance system.14 Although inheritance
among the Akans is through the uterine line,
women’s land rights are not strong. In the
uterine matrilineal system, land is transferred
from the deceased man to his brother or
nephew (sister’s son) in accordance with the
decision of the extended family or matriclan
(Awusabo-Asare 1990).15Wives and children
were left with no rights to a man’s property
if he died intestate (Brydon 1987) nor was
the wife provided for in case of divorce.
The mode of land transfer in this region
has been evolving over time. When virgin
forests were abundant, young unmarried
males would appropriate areas from the
forest, mainly for food crop production. In-
heritance of these land rights, however, de-
pended on the lineage system. Uncultivated
fallow land was often allocated temporarily
to members of the extended family who pos-
sessed small landholdings. More recently, ap-
propriated village land is increasingly being
transferred directly to one’s wife and chil-
dren, and even land that would technically
belong to the matriclan is often transferred to
them with the consent of family members,
particularly after the land was planted either
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14 Migrants to the study area consist both of Akans, who migrate for relatively short distances, and of non-Akans, who
tend to be long-distance migrants.
15 The preferred order of inheritance if a man dies intestate is, ﬁrst, his uterine brother; second, if there is no uterine
brother, the son of a uterine sister; third, one of the sons of the deceased mother’s sisters.totally or partially with cocoa trees. Such
inter vivostransfers are termed “gifts” in the
study areas, and individual rights on such
land are ﬁrmly established.16 It is believed
that gifts are used to circumvent existing ma-
trilineal rules so that children may become
heirs to their parents’land (Migot-Adholla et
al. 1994). In other words, gifts can be con-
sidered an institutional innovation, which is
designed to provide incentive mechanisms
to stimulate tree-planting.
Property rights of wives and children
were strengthened even further by the
passing of the Intestate Succession Law
(PNDCL111) in 1985 (henceforth ISL). The
ISL provides for the following division of
the farm: three-sixteenths to the surviving
spouse, nine-sixteenths to the surviving chil-
dren, one-eighth to the surviving parent, and
one-eighth in accordance with customary in-
heritance law. Thus, the law allows children
and wives to gain access to land that they were
previously denied under traditional law.17
The extent to which the law is practiced,
however, is not uniform, as will be shown
subsequently.
Land rights have also been more clearly
individualized among migrants, who either
have nuclear families or practice patrilineal
inheritance in which a relatively small num-
ber of sons within a single family are qualiﬁed
to inherit their father’s land. In contrast, under
uterine matrilineal systems, a large number
of heirs, including brothers and nephews of
the deceased, are qualiﬁed for inheritance.
Individualization or privatization of land
rights amounts to the demise of traditional
matrilineal inheritance. Instead, land will be
transferred to the most preferred persons at
will by the landowner. Individualization,
along with greater scarcity of land, may also
promote the development of land rental and
sale markets. It remains to be tested whether
such market transfers of land may con-
tribute to production efﬁciency. Whether
women are equally capable of acquiring land
through market transactions also remains to
be veriﬁed.
Sumatra Site18
In Sumatra, both deforestation and individu-
alization of land rights in response to popu-
lation pressure have occurred in the context
of a matrilineal inheritance system. Defor-
estation is a serious problem in Indonesia as
a whole, but is especially acute in Sumatra,
where the rate of reduction in forest area is
the highest in the nation (Dick 1991).19With
the closing of the land frontier, the traditional
form of shifting cultivation with a long fal-
low period has become unsustainable. Thus,
the prevalent farming system in Sumatra has
changed from shifting cultivation to more
land-saving tree-based farming systems. In
this respect, the Sumatra case is similar to
the case of Ghana.
Unlike the matrilineal inheritance system
in Ghana, women have stronger land rights
in matrilineal Sumatra. Traditionally, descent
and inheritance occur through the female
line, as exempliﬁed by the Minangkabau.
Except for the special case of adoption, chil-
dren take the sublineage (paruik), lineage
(payung), and clan (suku) of their mother,
and remain with these groups throughout
their lives (Kato 1982: 51). Unmarried men
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16 Such inter vivos gifts are formalized by the recipient’s presenting ritual drinks to family elders and other witnesses in
the aseda (thanksgiving) ceremony. The drink is the physical expression of appreciation for the gift, and is crucial so
that the transfer of land rights by gift will not be contested in the future. When a husband gives land to his wife and
children, it is their responsibility to provide the drinks, although a husband may secretly do so if the recipients cannot
afford it.
17 Interestingly enough, the common interpretation of the ISL is one-third each among spouse, children, and maternal
family. This is remarkably similar to the abusa share tenancy arrangement, to be discussed subsequently.
18 This section draws from Otsuka et al. (2001).
19 In Indonesia as a whole, the FAO (1990) estimates that the forest cover of the country had declined from 74 percent
to 56 percent during the previous 30 to 40 years. The World Bank (1990) reports that the estimated deforestation rate
was 1 million hectares per year in 1990, which is 67 percent higher than in 1981. The forest cover in Sumatra decreased
from 72 percent in 1950 to 48 percent in 1985 (Fraser 1998). Owing to rapid population growth, population density
increased from 17 persons per square kilometer in 1930 to 85 persons per square kilometer in 1995.typically work as farm laborers or emigrate
to other areas to accumulate funds or estab-
lish a trade (Errington 1984), and they cul-
tivate their wives’ land upon marriage.20
Residential patterns are also extended and
uxorilocal, although Kato (1982) argues that
it is, strictly speaking, duolocal. Sons-in-law,
who belong to a different matrilineal line,
have rights only to visit their wives, and tra-
ditionally do not live with her in the wife’s
natalhome, or rumah gadang.21Major deci-
sions are vested in the lineage head (mamak),
a maternal uncle. Traditionally, the tie be-
tween a maternal uncle and his nieces or
nephews (children of his sister) was stronger
than the tie between a man and his children.
Classiﬁcation of property and its trans-
mission across generations occur along
gender-differentiated lines. Minangkabau
society classiﬁes property into two types:
harto pusako, or “ancestral property,” and
harto pancarianor “earned property” (Kahn
1980: 26).22 Ancestral property belongs to
the lineage, whereas earned property can be
obtained or purchased with one’s own ef-
forts. For example, irrigated rice land
(sawah), the ancestral homestead, gold, and
water buffaloes are classiﬁed as ancestral
property, whereas tools and workshops are
“earned property.”
These two forms of property are subject
to different systems of inheritance. Ances-
tral property is always inherited by women,
and almost always passes from mother to
daughters. In contrast, rules of inheritance
for earned or acquired property are relatively
ﬂexible. The owner is free to sell, mortgage,
or give away acquired property. Earned prop-
erty can also be passed on to either sex, but
reverts to ancestral property in the next gen-
eration.23The same tendency is also observed
in the Ghana site, where cleared forestland
and tree-planted cocoa plots can be consid-
ered as earned property.
The growing importance of earned prop-
erty has had major implications for the indi-
vidualization of property systems in Sumatra.
Aside from its association with commercial
and artisanal activities, earned property also
pertained to newly opened agricultural land,
particularly a shifting cultivation area (Kato
1982: 169). Newly opened land that became
wet rice ﬁelds had the potential of becoming
ancestral land in the next generation, par-
ticularly if it required sizable investments of
manpower and material from the developer’s
lineage. Newly opened land for shifting cul-
tivation was, prior to the advent of commer-
cial agroforestry, of a rather impermanent
nature. The clearing of upland ﬁelds was not
a major operation like creating new sawah,
and shifting cultivation’s impermanent nature
made the lineage of its developer less likely
to control it. Since shifting cultivation area
was considered earned property, its rules of
disposal were relatively ﬂexible (Kato 1982:
169). The anthropological studies, however,
do not indicate whether shifting cultivation
area remains earned property if it is under
fallow for many years, probably because this
type of earned property did not have much
economic signiﬁcance until the growth of the
cash economy and the advent of commercial
tree crops, namely coffee, in the nineteenth
century. More recently, our ﬁeld interviews
indicate that rights of disposal of cleared
land are preserved only if the land is kept in
continuous cultivation.
The rise in signiﬁcance of the nuclear
family was accompanied by the growing
prevalence of hibah (gift), a speciﬁc type 
of transfer of earned property that generally
takes place between a father and his children.
If a man wishes to make sure that his indi-
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20 Indeed, emigration of single men to work abroad—sending them on a rantau—is a long-standing practice among the
Minang of West Sumatra, and is considered part of the coming of age process of young men (Errington 1984).
21 Also called an adat house, the rumah gadang is supposed to house one sublineage or saparuik, which literally means
“people of one womb.”
22 This discussion of inheritance of different types of property is from Kahn (1980) and Kato (1982).
23 In some villages, earned property owned by women is passed on to their daughters; that owned by men is passed on
to sons.vidually earned property goes to his children
rather than to the children of his sisters, he
may arrange a transfer through hibah while
he is alive.24 Education offers another way
for a father to invest his earned property: in-
vestment in one’s children produces fruits of
earned property, which cannot be contested
by one’s matrilineal relatives after one’s death
(Kato 1982: 183).
As in Ghana, this summary of the anthro-
pological and ethnographic evidence strongly
suggests that inheritance regimes are not
static.25 The inheritance system appears to
have evolved in parallel to the changes in
communal land tenure institutions toward
individualized ownership in response to pop-
ulation pressure.
Traditionally, the major ethnic groups—
Minangkabau, Kerinci, and Melayu Jambi—
have commonly relied upon wet rice culti-
vation and, hence, areas along streams and
rivers are predominantly used as paddy
fields. Paddy ﬁelds are surrounded by agro-
forestry plots, including both mature trees
and newly planted trees intercropped with
annuals, and by shifting cultivation with bush/
fallow. Natural forests typically are located
in the mountainous terrain further away from
village centers. The bush/fallow area origi-
nally was converted from primary forests
and is planted with food crops periodically
for a season or two followed by another fal-
low period. The most common ownership
system used to be ownership by lineage,
which typically consists of three generations.
Field interviews indicate that husbands
usually make most of the farm management
decisions, even though they do not have
customary land rights. So it is puzzling that
women rather than men traditionally own
land. In our view, the choice of matrilineal
inheritance system was made in the distant
past when land was abundant. Traditionally,
no single member of the lineage has owner-
ship rights and sale is strictly prohibited. Al-
though formally the approval of the lineage
or community head is required for clearing
community-owned forests, approval is easily
granted. Women are the custodians of lineage
and family land and are expected to oppose
the transfer of land to non-family members.
Lineage land, however, occupies small areas
in our sample villages at present.
Land under joint family ownership, which
is inherited and owned jointly by daughters,
is much more common than lineage owner-
ship. The major difference from lineage land
tenure is the ownership of land by a smaller
number of family members. To prevent frag-
mentation of land beyond the minimum ef-
ﬁcient size, cultivation of wet rice land is
rotated among sisters’families. All types of
decisions regarding land use, inheritance,
renting, and pawning are made jointly by sis-
ters and their husbands without intervention
of other lineage members.
Joint family land tenure has developed
in two ways. First, lineage members agree
to divide lineage land into joint family land,
usually at the time of inheritance. Second,
daughters jointly inherit private land, which
was acquired either by opening up forestland
or by purchasing already exploited bush/
fallow areas. Although the sale of lineage
and family land has traditionally been pro-
hibited, such land has actually been sold with
the consent of group members. There have
been cases in certain areas where sons, in
addition to daughters, have jointly inherited
land. Traditionally, sons participate in forest
clearance and tree-planting but do not in-
herit. This new land tenure institution repre-
sents a break from the traditional rule of
matrilineal inheritance.
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24 This is surprisingly similar to the transfer of land as a gift among the matrilineal Akan in western Ghana (see Quisumb-
ing et al. 2001a). Similar to the ceremonies surrounding gift transfers, hibah requires the agreement of all parties con-
cerned, including one’s matrilineal relatives, as well as expensive feasts.
25 The Minang themselves do not consider their culture to be static, and take pride in the ﬂexibility of adat (customary
law). Continuous discussions and reinterpretation of adat help the community make judgments that allow both conti-
nuity and development in theiradat(Errington 1984: 99–100). Although some laws are unchangeable (thecupak usali,
or original measure), the cupak buatan (the constructed measure) is subject to change through consensus, provided
that it does not contradict or threaten the core cupak cusali.Single family ownership, which has
evolved from joint family ownership, is an
emerging land tenure category. It is similar
to joint family ownership, in that daughters
inherit land, but ownership rights are more
individualized. More recently, inheritance
by sons has also been permitted. Single
family ownership could also have evolved
from the inheritance of private land.
Survey Design
Similar survey design and data collection
methods were used in the Ghana and Suma-
tra sites. The ﬁrst task in the data collection
phase was to identify major issues in the
management of land and trees in a particular
region through literature review, examination
of secondary data, and informal exploratory
surveys. Informal surveys were particularly
useful because good prior studies on prop-
erty rights and collective action were often
unavailable or, if available, were sometimes
obsolete. Since it was necessary to obtain a
variety of information through questionnaire
surveys, the pre-testing of survey question-
naires through an informal survey was essen-
tial. We all participated in the extensive
pre-tests of the survey instruments.
Extensive Survey
In the extensive study, either random sam-
pling of communities located over wide areas
or stratiﬁed random sampling with stratiﬁ-
cation based on demographic factors was
applied. A community is deﬁned as a single
village. In both Ghana and Sumatra, 60 com-
munities were randomly selected for the ex-
tensive survey (described in detail by Otsuka
et al. 2001 and Quisumbing et al. 2001a).
Various data sources and data collection
methods were used in the extensive survey
study. These included (1) secondary data on
demographic variables and farming prac-
tices, (2) community survey data obtained
from group interviews of key informants on
socioeconomic variables, such as land rights,
rules of resource use, access to markets, agri-
cultural practices, and the development of
credit, labor, and land markets, and (3) brief
household survey data on the history of use
of natural resources (farmland, forestlands,
and woodlands) and their acquisition. The
supplementary brief household surveys
were conducted in the Ghana and Sumatra
sites where village-level data on land use,
land area, and/or inheritance practice were
either unavailable or unreliable. The brief in-
dividual surveys were of ﬁve households per
village in Sumatra and seven households
per village in Ghana. As much as possible,
both husbands and wives were interviewed.
This was particularly important in Ghana, be-
causehusbands often do not know the size of
land owned or managed by their wives.
Intensive Survey
Selection of appropriate communities for the
intensive household survey was based on the
results of the extensive survey. One criterion
was to ensure representation of communities
with contrasting characteristics in terms of
prevailing land tenure institutions, farming
systems, and degradation or protection of
natural resources. Four villages were chosen
for the household survey in Sumatra, and 10
were selected in Ghana. Sample sizes de-
pended not only on the complexity of issues
but also on the accuracy and coverage of the
data necessary for our statistical analyses.
Since our methodology required the estima-
tion of tree-planting, proﬁt, and labor-use
functions, questionnaires and the timing of
survey rounds were designed to obtain ac-
curate labor and wage data. Data were also
obtained on family composition, inventory
of assets, histories of acquisition of assets
and land use, current production and non-
labor input use, and property rights.
In Ghana, the intensive survey was con-
ducted in 1996/97 in 10 villages in the Wassa
area of western Ghana, an area previously
surveyed by the World Bank (Migot-Adholla
et al. 1994). Although the original intent was
to create a panel data set, the coverage of ma-
ture cocoa ﬁelds was limited in the earlier
survey and parcels owned or managed by
women in male-headed households were not
included. Given the objective of the current
24 CHAPTER 3study to examine land tenure—and gender
differences therein—in greater detail, the
original sample size was deemed insufﬁcient.
The authors of the present study conducted
a census of 1,878 households in the survey
villages, after which 281 households were
chosen based on stratiﬁed random sampling
among various tenure categories. Sample
sizes were allocated to the 10 villages in pro-
portion to village population, and an attempt
was made to include respondents from the
earlier study.
In Sumatra, the intensive survey was car-
ried out in two sites in Jambi Province: Ker-
inci District, which is a cinnamon-growing
area, and the Rantau Pandan Subdistrict,
where the dominant agroforestry crop is rub-
ber. In Kerinci, a random sample survey of
50 households in each of two contiguous
villages was conducted. The three survey
rounds took place in August/September 1996,
February/March 1997, and August 1997. In
Rantau Pandan, the sample consisted of 122
households from one village and 40 house-
holds from a contiguous village. In this re-
search report, we present only the analysis of
the efﬁciency of rubber production; a similar
analysis of cinnamon production is found in
Suyanto, Tomich, and Otsuka (2001b).
Inheritance Survey
To investigate whether broad changes in land
tenure patterns due to the process of individ-
ualization have affected the distribution of
land rights by gender, a retrospective survey
of inheritance and education was also imple-
mented in both the Ghana and Sumatra sites.
In the Ghana site, the inheritance and educa-
tion retrospective was administered to all in-
tensive survey households; in Sumatra, it was
administered to a subsample of 60 house-
holds in both the rubber and cinnamon sites
randomly selected from the intensive survey
respondents. The retrospective survey on in-
heritance was patterned after a similar survey
in the Philippines (Quisumbing 1994), and
included questions on the parents, siblings,
and children of the respondents, yielding in-
formation on three generations—called the
parents’, respondents, and children’s gener-
ations.26 The respondents were asked about
the pre-marriage wealth (education and
landownership) of their parents and in-laws
(and other familial sources of inheritance),
the education and inheritance of their spouses,
and the schooling of their children and pro-
posed bequests to them. Each respondent
was also asked to list all of his or her siblings,
their dates of birth, their educational attain-
ment, and the areas of different types of land
that they had received or expected to receive
from their parents or other relatives. In many
cases, respondents received land at marriage,
but stood to inherit more land after their
parents’deaths.
In the Ghana study, since one can inherit
from the matriclan as well as from one’s
own parents, inheritance was distinguished
according to its source. The survey in Ghana
was administered only to the head of house-
hold (usually male), because low levels of
literacy among wives made it difﬁcult for
them to answer questions that involved the
recall of events in the past (for example, dates
or years of birth).
In the Sumatra case, higher levels of
schooling of survey respondents, both male
and female, made administration of the in-
heritance retrospective much easier. To make
sure that the sample was balanced in terms
of male and female respondents, husbands
were interviewed in half of the sample, while
wives were interviewed in the other half. In
many cases, however, both wives and hus-
bands joined the interviews.
Basic Extensive Survey Data
Ghana Site
An extensive survey was conducted in the
most active cocoa-growing regions in
Ghana: the Western Region, the Brong-Ahafo
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26 The grandchild generation is called the child generation for brevity.Region, and the Ashanti Region (Figure 3.1).
In the Western Region, two areas were sur-
veyed covering two districts each, the Wassa
area and the Sefwi area. Sefwi and Wassa
have different migration and settlement his-
tories and are administratively and linguis-
tically distinct, although the languages are
related. Cocoa cultivation historically spread
from the Eastern Region toward the Ashanti
and Brong-Ahafo regions in the 1940s and
1950s and further toward the frontier area
of the Western Region during the 1950s and
1960s (Berry 1963). The diffusion of cocoa 
to Wassa and Sefwi continued in the 1970s
and 1980s.
We randomly selected 15 villages each
in the Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti regions, and
15 each were chosen in Wassa and Sefwi, of
which 9 were predetermined to be indigenous
villages and 6 were migrant villages. The
dominant ethnic group in these villages is the
Akan (87 percent of our sample households);
also present, although in smaller numbers, are
the Ewe (2.7 percent), Ga-Adange (5.4 per-
cent), and Northerners and other non-Akans
(4.9 percent). Agroup interview with village
leaders and other members was conducted to
obtain information about land rights under
different land tenure institutions, among other
things.27Population census data collected in
1984, which we use to avoid the endogene-
ity of current population growth rates to mi-
gration, were also obtained for 58 villages.28
Unless otherwise indicated, the extensive
survey data used in this chapter come from
the survey of seven households in each of the
60 villages.
The study area is characterized by undu-
lating land, and cocoa is the dominant crop
grown mainly on mildly sloping parcels (Ben-
neh 1987). Virgin forests have largely disap-
peared, but annual crop ﬁelds and fallow
areas under shifting cultivation, including
secondary forests, coexist with cocoa ﬁelds.
Table 3.1 summarizes the land-use patterns,
average farm size, man–land ratio, and gen-
der of the household head in Akan and non-
Akan households.29 The majority belong to
the Akan ethnic group, which has tradition-
ally practiced uterine matrilineal inheritance,
although a number of inhabitants in migrant
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Figure 3.1 Map of survey area, Ghana
Source: Quisumbing et al. (2001b: 58). 
27 Since people seldom consider the land rights under different land tenure institutions explicitly and systematically, it
took considerable time to arrive at consensus on each question. This casts doubt on the feasibility of obtaining accu-
rate information on land rights from interviews with individual households.
28 As the migrant population increased, migrants, who tend to live on the periphery of indigenous villages, eventually
formed new villages. Two of the migrant villages in the extensive survey sample had not yet been established by 1984.
Owing to the establishment of new villages and associated changes in village land areas, it was not possible to com-
pute the population growth rate at the village level from 1970 to 1984.
29 Aself-declared headship deﬁnition was used.villages belong to non-Akan ethnic groups,
which are generally subject to the patrilineal
inheritance system.30 The correspondence
between Akan ethnicity and matrilineal in-
heritance is not one-to-one, however, as will
be shown in Table 3.2.
Akan households tend to have larger farm
sizes, a lower person–land ratio, and a large
area devoted to bush/fallow land. Cocoa area
per farm is also slightly higher among Akan
households. A slightly higher percentage of
Akan households (14.1 percent) are headed
by women, compared with non-Akans (11.3
percent). Aﬁfth of total parcels (21.1 percent)
are owned by women in Akan households,
compared with only 11.7 percent among non-
Akans. As will be discussed later, women
acquired land ownership primarily through
gift, which is characterized by strong indi-
vidualized land rights. Such differences may
be attributed to the difference in inheritance
systems and associated differences in land
tenure security between Akan and non-Akan
households.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of cur-
rently adopted inheritance rules by Akans
and non-Akans, by gender of the household
head. Among the traditionally matrilineal
Akans, the percentage of households re-
porting that they follow the ISLis quite high
(about 40 percent) although some Akan
households report the practice of patrilineal
inheritance. Matrilineal inheritance and the
ISL are equally important modes of inheri-
tance. Among non-Akans, in contrast, the pre-
dominant pattern of inheritance is patrilineal
(81.1 percent). On the aggregate, only a small
proportion (13.2 percent) of non-Akan house-
holds follow the ISL, since land tenure sys-
tems are inherently more individualized in
patrilineal systems. Among the small num-
ber of female-headed non-Akan households,
however, the ISL is the predominant means
for inheriting land.
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Table 3.1 Land-use pattern, farm size, and person–land ratio in 1997 in selected villages in Ghana
Bush/fallow
cum forest Cocoa area Total
area per farm per farm farm size
Ethnic group Number Person–land % female- % female-
of head of of house- % of total % of total ratio headed held
household holds ha farm area ha farm area ha % (persons/ha) households parcels
Akan 355 4.92 42.2 5.24 52.2 11.47 100.0 1.13 14.1 21.1
Non-Akan 53 2.62 39.0 4.57 57.7 7.42 100.0 1.84 11.3 11.7
Table 3.2 Distribution of currently adopted inheritance rules by gender of head of household,
Akan and non-Akan households in Ghana
Gender of Number of Intestate
head of sample Matrilineal Succession Patrilineal
household households (%) Lawa (%) (%)
Akan households 355 43.9 40.6 16.5
Male 305 43.0 39.3 17.7
Female 50 50.0 48.0 2.0
Non-Akan households 53 5.7 13.2 81.1
Male 47 4.3 8.5 87.2
Female 6 16.7 50.0 33.3
a One-third equal sharing among spouse, children, and maternal family.
30 We omitted 12 observations owing to incomplete and unreliable answers.Table 3.3 presents the distribution of land
by manner of acquisition in Akan and non-
Akan households, by gender of the house-
hold head. There are two general modes of
acquisition: the primary mode, in which land
is acquired from outside the family, and the
secondary mode, which involves decisions
made by family members. Secondary modes
of acquisition are more important for Akans
than for non-Akans in aggregate, but for fe-
male heads of households the reverse is true.
For both Akans and non-Akans, land re-
ceived as a gift accounts for the largest pro-
portion of land acquired, larger even than
inherited land, but the processes of land
transfer differ by ethnic group. Transfer of
land to sons as a gift has been practiced his-
torically (Hill 1963), but the incidence of gifts
to wives seems to have increased in recent
periods. In matrilineal areas, the larger share
of gift land would reﬂect a shift to individ-
ualized property rights, reducing the matri-
clan’s control over land.31 Among Akan
female-headed households, gifts are the most
important manner of acquiring land. In Akan
households, the share of temporarily allo-
cated family land is also larger than inher-
ited land; temporary allocation is the sec-
ond most important mode of acquisition by
female heads. This suggests that family allo-
cations are more important than postmortem
inheritance.
Appropriated village forestland is more
important among non-Akan than among
Akan households: the dominant categories
for non-Akans, after gifts, are current rental
agreements and appropriation of village
forestland. Hill (1963) observed that the
chiefs were glad to seize the opportunity of
selling land outright to enterprising migrants.
As uncultivated forestland has disappeared,
however, renting land under share tenancy
arrangements, called abusa (one-third of
cocoa output for tenant) and abunu (50:50),
has become the major means for migrants
to acquire access to land (Robertson 1982;
Boadu 1992). In these tenancy contracts,
tenants are requested to plant cocoa trees,
typically on bush land, and to manage cocoa
trees until the whole ﬁeld is planted to cocoa,
at which time land ownership, rather than
output, is usually divided between tenant and
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Table 3.3 Distribution of area under different land tenure regimes by gender of head of
household, Akan and non-Akan households in Ghana (percent in relation to category)
Akan Non-Akan
Land tenure regime Male Female Total Male Female Total
Primary modes of acquisition
Appropriated village forestland 14.5 0.4 14.9 18.3 . . . 18.3
Purchased village forestland 4.1 0.5 4.6 1.4 1.7 3.1
Privately purchased 3.1 0.3 3.4 10.8 2.5 13.3
Acquired through renting 1.0 0.2 1.2 8.4 . . . 8.4
Currently renting 7.9 0.8 8.7 18.7 1.3 20.0
Subtotal 30.6 2.2 32.8 57.6 5.5 63.1
Secondary modes of acquisition
Allocated family land 15.9 3.1 19.0 3.3 . . . 3.3
Inherited family land 14.4 1.6 16.0 3.6 . . . 3.6
Received as gift  23.5 7.2 30.7 26.3 2.2 28.5
Subtotal 53.8 11.9 65.7 33.2 2.2 35.4
Others 1.4 0.2 1.6 1.3 0.2 1.5
Total 85.7 14.3 100.0 92.1 7.9 100.0
31 According to Benneh (1987: 73), migrants may also obtain access to land through gift grants if the farmer can prove
that he belongs to the same clan as the villagers where he has gone in search of land. Migrant farmers may also receive
a free grant of land from their wives’family lands upon marriage.landowner (Asenso-Okyere, Atsu, and Obeng
1993).32 The fact that renting is widely
practiced, with the ultimate division of land
ownership between the contracting parties,
suggests that land ownership rights have
been strongly individualized so as to allow
for the alienation of land that was formerly
to be transferred to other family members.
This inference is reinforced by the non-
negligible incidence of private land purchase,
which has traditionally been prohibited.33
Female heads of Akan households re-
ceive a larger proportion of area from family
allocations, whereas female heads in non-
Akan households are more likely to have
acquired land through purchase. Non-Akan
females are excluded from family allocation
and inheritance under existing rules. Thus,
although the ISL was intended to protect
women’s rights in matrilineal groups, it may
well become more important in guaranteeing
women’s land rights in non-Akan groups.
In order to measure the strength of indi-
vidualization of land rights under different
land tenure institutions, farmers were asked
during group interviews about the following
six rights: (1) to plant and replant trees; (2) to
rent out land; (3) to pawn land; (4) to bequeath
land; (5) to give land; and (6) to sell land.
The numbers in Table 3.4 show the average
number of cases in which farmers have rights
without approval from family members or
the village chief. Note that the land rights
index is not a cardinal number but an ordinal
number, because it is absurd to assume that
each right has equal weight. Since the exis-
tence of stronger rights (for example, the
right to sell) implies that weaker rights (for
example, the right to plant trees) also exist,
the index number is useful in ranking the
strength of land rights under different land
tenure regimes. Moreover, land rights are
likely to be more endogenous than land
tenure (as represented by the mode of acqui-
sition), because rights can change after tree-
planting. For these reasons, we actually used
land tenure dummies, rather than the land
rights index, as explanatory variables in the
regression analyses.
The percentage of Akans in the popula-
tion is used to proxy the range of inheritance
regimes, with matrilineal inheritance more
widely practiced the larger the proportion of
Akans in the population. The weakest land
rights are observed in temporarily allocated
family land, on which even tree-planting is
not allowed. Thus, if land tenure security at
the time of tree-planting determines invest-
ment incentives, one would expect to observe
that cocoa trees are seldom planted on allo-
cated family land. Land rights are also weak
in inherited land among matrilineal Akan
households, which is in contrast to the case
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32 The major harvesting season of cocoa extends from October to January. Perhaps the main reason for dividing land
rather than sharing output is the difﬁculty for the owner to check cocoa output accurately. If output cannot be meas-
ured accurately, the tenant may be able to cheat the owner. Moreover, the division of land rather than of output seems
to indicate that the study area is still in a relatively land-surplus situation. See Hayami and Otsuka (1993) and Otsuka,
Chuma, and Hayami (1992) for surveys of the share tenancy literature.
33 Since the authors did not anticipate the prevalence of private land purchase, the formal group interviews did not ask
about land rights on privately purchased land. However, informal interviews suggest that strong rights, comparable to
those of gifts, are conferred to individuals who purchase land using their own funds. If purchase is ﬁnanced by a group
of extended family members, individual land rights are rather weak.
Table 3.4 Index of individual land rights under different land tenure
regimes by percentage of Akans in population in Ghana
Less than 50–80% 80% Akan
Land tenure regime 50% Akan Akan or higher
Temporarily allocated family land
Food crop land from father 0.33 0.06 0.05
Food crop land from family 0.50 0.13 0.53
Inherited family land
Akan inheritance 0.83 1.06 1.08
Non-Akan inheritancea 5.67 4.63 2.32
Village forestland
Appropriated by indigenes 3.67 3.38 3.00
Purchased by migrants 5.17 3.19 3.16
Tree-planted land transferred as gifts
Gift from father 6.00 5.00 4.97
Notes: Six rights are considered: to plant or replant trees, to rent out, to pawn, to bequeath,
to give, and to sell. The numbers in this table are based on group interviews and show the
average number of cases in which farmers have rights without approval from family mem-
bers or village chief.
a Equal division among all heirs.of non-Akan patrilineal households bestowed
with fairly strong rights in inherited land. It
seems that land rights are more easily indi-
vidualized in patrilineal society, because the
interests in the same piece of land are shared
by only a small circle of individuals, con-
sisting of a father and his sons.
Strong land rights are also observed in
formerly village forestland, both appropriated
by indigenes and purchased by migrants. The
rights are somewhat stronger for land pur-
chased by migrants, presumably because
migrants are less subject to the tradition of
the family ownership of land. Strong land
rights accrue on cleared forestland, because
efforts to clear forests are rewarded by strong
individual land rights.
The strongest land rights are observed in
tree-planted land received as a gift. After
seeking the consent of members of the ex-
tended family, fathers typically give gifts to
their sons, and occasionally to their wives.
The strong rights are conferred as rewards
for the effort to plant and grow trees. This
observation clearly indicates that incentives
to plant trees on allocated family land and
inherited land may be strong if individual
land rights are strengthened by tree-planting.
Sumatra Site
The extensive survey villages were randomly
selected with probability proportional to
village population from four districts in
Sumatra located along the buffer zone of the
Kerinci Seblat National Park (Figure 3.2).34
These were: Solok in West Sumatra Province,
and Kerinci, Bungo Tebo, and Bangko in
Jambi Province. The study sites are classi-
ﬁed into three regions depending on altitude.
Solok, which is classiﬁed as the High Re-
gion, is located at an altitude of more than
1,000 meters above sea level; the major tree
crop is coffee (Coffea canephora), although
the area planted to cinnamon has been in-
creasing. Cinnamon (Cinnamomum bur-
manii) is the major tree crop in the Kerinci
district, which is classiﬁed as the Middle Re-
gion. Bungo Tebo and Bangko are adjacent
districts in a low-lying area where rubber
(Hevea braziliansis) is the major tree crop.
Since the sites in these two districts are sim-
ilar in terms of ethnic composition, climate,
and topography, they are classiﬁed into a sin-
gle geographical area, or the Low Region.35
Table 3.5 presents land-use patterns and
population statistics from selected villages
in each of the three regions in 1995. Villages
in the High Region have 31 percent of their
exploited land in paddy, compared with only
9 percent for villages in the Low Region.
Population density is highest in the Middle
Region and lowest in the Low Region. Ac-
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34 The village-level results draw heavily on Otsuka et al. (2001) and Suyanto, Tomich, and Otsuka (2001a).
35 For more information on the dominant farming systems in Sumatra, see Angelsen (1994, 1995, 1999) for shifting cul-
tivation, Tomich et al. (2000) on highland coffee, Aumeeruddy (1994) on cinnamon, and Barlow and Muharminto
(1982), Barlow and Jayasuriya (1984), Gouyon, de Foresta, and Levang (1993), and Penot (1997) on rubber.
Figure 3.2 Map of survey area, Indonesia
Source: Suyanto et al. (2001c: 99). cordingly, the bush/fallow area is smallest in
the Middle Region, whereas large tracts of
bush/fallow land remain in the Low Region.
Low population density in the Low Region
can be explained by the paucity of paddy
ﬁelds in this area. In contrast, the rich en-
dowment of ﬂat fertile area suitable for rice
cultivation and the high proﬁtability of cin-
namon would explain the highest population
density in the Middle Region.
Although population density may appear
much lower in Sumatra than in Ghana, the
ratio of population to cultivated area is much
larger in Sumatra. Since the topography in
Sumatra is much more mountainous, the pro-
portion of cultivable area is smaller. Thus,
the average farm size in our rubber-growing
villages in the Lower Region, where popula-
tion density is lowest among three regions, is
4 hectares, which is about half of the average
farm size in Ghana (see Table 3.1). Such
differences in farm size may explain why the
land ownership system is more individual-
ized in Sumatra than in Ghana.
Estimates of the percentage of land under
different land tenure institutions by type of
land use were obtained through group inter-
views. To reduce measurement errors asso-
ciated with the ﬁner classiﬁcation of land
tenure categories, similar land tenure cate-
gories—such as single family ownership by
daughters or by daughters and sons—have
been combined. It must be pointed out, how-
ever, that ownership by women dominates
that of men in most areas.
Some patterns can be observed in
Table 3.6. First, the traditional system (joint
ownership and lineage land) is dominant for
paddy ﬁelds in the Middle and Low Regions,
but accounts for only about one-fourth of
bush/fallow and smaller portions of tree crop
plots in all regions. Second, single family
ownership is more important than joint own-
ership except for paddy ﬁelds. Third, private
ownership tends to dominate in tree crop
plots and accounts for a sizable portion of
bush/fallow.
As in the case of Ghana, private owner-
ship rights are granted to those who have
cleared forestland, which requires a large
amount of family labor. Those who have
purchased land have even clearer individual
land rights. If the matrilineal rule of inheri-
tance to daughters is strictly followed, the
acquired land ought to become joint family
land in the next generation and lineage land
after two generations. Yet the area under joint
family cum lineage ownership is small in all
the regions, which indicates the erosion of the
traditional matrilineal inheritance system.
Primary forests are, in practice, character-
ized by open access, and any member of the
community can open the forest for cultiva-
tion. Tacitly, however, ownership of cleared
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Table 3.5 Land-use pattern in 1995 and size of population in 1993 in selected villages in Sumatra
Exploited area in 1995a
Agroforestry
Paddy ﬁelds plots Bush/fallow
Total Primary
% of % of % of village forest Population
Sample exploited exploited exploited area area Population density
Region size ha area ha area ha area (ha)b (ha)c in 1993b in 1993d
High Region 24 259 31  377 45 204 24 5,143 4,303 1,764 34
Middle Region 19 151 19 526 66 125 16 3,173 2,371 1,340 42
Low Region 17 102 19 594 55 385 36 6,735 5,654 772 11
a Based on community survey.
b Based on Agricultural Census (Bureau of Statistics).
c Estimated by subtracting total exploited area from total village area.
d Population divided by village area.land is subject to community regulation if it
is left fallow for long periods. More often
than not, lineage or family members claim
use rights on such land, which originally be-
longed to the community. Since continuous
cropping of annuals is infeasible owing to
rapid fertility loss, trees must be planted to
secure land rights. This practice is similar
to that in Ghana. Efforts to plant and manage
trees confer strong individual land rights.
This explains why joint family ownership is
uncommon for the tree crop area.
To assess the strength of property rights
under different land tenure institutions, a
group of knowledgeable farmers in each vil-
lage was asked whether households possess
rights to (1) rent out land under a share ten-
ancy, (2) rent out land under a ﬁxed-rent lease-
hold tenancy, (3) pawn land, and (4) sell land
with and without the approval of family and/
or lineage leaders for the various tenure cat-
egories. The right to rent out under a share
tenancy is the weakest right, followed closely
by the right to rent out under a leasehold
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Table 3.6 Distribution of area under different land tenure regimes by land-use type 
in Sumatra (percent)
Joint Single Private Private
Lineage family family ownership ownership
Land use ownership ownership ownership (purchase) (clearance)
Paddy ﬁeld
High Region 2.2 9.0 75.7 7.9 4.1
Middle Region 10.4 63.9 6.3 5.5 7.8
Low Region 0.0 64.6 29.2 6.1 0.1
Tree plots
High Region 3.1 5.2 41.8 10.4 37.1
Middle Region 4.7 1.5 61.7 13.5 18.5
Low Region 0.0 3.0 45.6 12.4 38.7
Bush/fallow area
High Region 15.5 8.5 36.3 5.2 32.6
Middle Region 10.3 19.4 43.1 14.3 12.5
Low Region 22.5 3.1 41.7 5.7 27.0
Notes: Based on community survey. Numbers in some rows do not add up to 100% because of the small area of land under
state ownership.
Table 3.7 Index of individual land rights under different land tenure regimes in Sumatra
Single family Private
Joint Single family ownership ownership
Lineage family ownership (daughters (purchased
Land use land ownership (daughters) and sons) and cleared)
Paddy ﬁeld
High Region 0.5 0.8 1.6 3.2 3.6
Middle Region 0.8 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.9
Low Region n.a. 2.7 2.0 n.a. 3.8
Upland ﬁelda
High Region 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.0 3.1
Middle Region 0.8 0.9 1.9 2.9 3.8
Low Region 0.0 1.0 1.9 2.8 3.8
Notes: Four rights are considered: to rent out under share tenancy, to rent out under leasehold tenancy, to pawn, and to
sell. Numbers refer to the average number of rights without obtaining approval from the family and/or lineage members.
n.a. = not available.
a Upland ﬁeld refers to both agroforestry plots and bush/fallow.tenancy (Hayami and Otsuka 1993), whereas
the strongest right rests in the right to sell
without approval. Pawning is problem-ridden
for family members who own land collec-
tively, because if a pawner cannot repay the
loan the land will eventually be conﬁscated
by a pawnee. Except for the case of lineage-
owned paddy ﬁelds, in which there is no in-
dividual right to sell at all, farmers’answers
about the right to sell were either “yes with-
out approval” or “yes with approval.” Since
there is no difference in land rights between
bush/fallow and tree plots for any plots of the
same tenure category, these two types of land
are combined under the category of upland
ﬁelds (see Table 3.7).
Individual land rights under lineage own-
ership are very weak, amounting at best to
the right to rent out under a share tenancy. It
is interesting to observe that individual land
rights for paddy ﬁelds under joint family
ownership in the Middle and Low Regions
are comparatively strong, even stronger than
land rights under single family ownership by
daughters in these two regions. It appears
that individual land rights under joint family
ownership have been strengthened by de-
liberate agreement of the family members.
Except for this somewhat anomalous phe-
nomenon, land rights are stronger under
single family ownership than under joint
family ownership and, within single family
ownership, the rights are stronger in the case
of ownership by daughters and sons. But even
under single family ownership by daughters
and sons, there is no right to sell without the
approval of family members.
The right to sell without approval is
granted only to land acquired by clearing
forest or by purchase. There is practically
no difference in land rights between cleared
land and land purchased at the time of ac-
quisition. Particularly in the Middle and Low
Regions, land rights in privately acquired
land are close to perfect private ownership.
Even in the High Region, where individuals’
rights over cleared and purchased land are
weaker, it does not seem too difﬁcult to ob-
tain approval from family members in order
to sell land. The major difference between
private ownership in Sumatra and in the
Western world is the lack of ofﬁcial registra-
tion, so that land cannot be used as collateral
for loans from banks. It is important to note,
as was pointed out earlier, that land rights
acquired by clearing forests tend to decline
if plots are left fallow. The extent of this de-
cline, however, is difﬁcult to quantify. If a
bush/fallow area is sold, the land remains
private. But if private land is bequeathed, it
is likely to become single family land after
inheritance.
The data in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 for Suma-
tra, as well as the data in Tables 3.3 and 3.4
for Ghana, seem consistent with the hypoth-
esis that land tenure institutions have
evolved toward individualized tenure in
order to enhance the incentives to invest in
commercial trees. Such incentives are criti-
cally important, because planting, pruning,
weeding, and thinning require large efforts.
If secure individual ownership cannot be
acquired, those who plant and grow trees
may not be able to reap the future beneﬁts.
On the other hand, traditional irrigation works
for paddy production, which are simple,
small-scale facilities in Sumatra, require a
minimum of effort to maintain and repair.
Thus, less individualized land tenure for
paddy ﬁelds is not so much of a problem
from the standpoint of the investment incen-
tives required. If population pressure is the
driving force toward individualization of
land tenure institutions, one would expect
to observe a predominance of more individ-
ualized tenure on tree crop plots in areas
where population density and population
growth rates are high in both the Ghana and
Sumatra sites.
The next three chapters test the main hy-
potheses presented in Chapter 2 at the village,
household, and intrahousehold levels.
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Population Pressure, Land Tenure,
and Land Acquisition
T
his chapter examines the impact of population pressure on the evolution of land tenure
institutions at the village level, and of demographic characteristics on land acquisi-
tion behavior at the household level. The analysis draws on the extensive surveys in
both sites, since these issues are better analyzed with data from a larger geographic area with
greater diversity of land tenure institutions. More speciﬁcally, using community-level data
from the extensive survey, we investigate whether more secure tenure institutions develop in
response to increasing population pressure. Then, using household data from the brief house-
hold survey, we examine the impacts of the demographic characteristics of households on the
manner of land acquisition, including forest clearance, purchase, inheritance, family alloca-
tion, and renting. In the ﬁnal section, we draw a comparative perspective from the Ghana and
Sumatra sites.
Determinants of Land Tenure: Village-Level Estimation
Ghana Case
In order to analyze the determinants of land tenure institutions at the village level (equation
(1) in Chapter 2), using the extensive survey data we estimated regressions on the propor-
tions of land (1) under family ownership (that is, allocated and inherited land), (2) under in-
dividualized ownership acquired by gift, (3) acquired by forest clearance, and (4) acquired
by private purchase and renting. Reduced-form functions explaining the incidence of the
four types of land tenure institutions were estimated using a common set of explanatory vari-
ables.36 The person–land ratio, which is supposed to reﬂect population pressure, is hypothe-
sized to have a positive effect on the incidence of gifts.
The proportion in various land tenure categories would be bounded upwards by 100 and
downwards by zero, since some categories were non-existent in some villages. Results from
the two-limit Tobit estimation method are exhibited in Table 4.1. The percentage of female-
headed households and the percentage of Akan households in each village were initially
36 Since the sum of the proportions in all categories is unity, it is redundant to estimate the four share equations except
to show the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients directly.included among the regressors, but none of
these variables was signiﬁcant and regres-
sions with these variables are not reported. It
is possible that there is not much variation
in these variables across villages; gender
differences in household structure and in-
heritance practices are more likely to affect
household-level outcomes.37
The coefﬁcient of the person–land ratio
is positive and highly signiﬁcant in the gift
equation, which supports Hypothesis 1, that
is, that population pressure induced institu-
tional innovation toward individualized land
tenure. As expected, the proportion of mi-
grant population is negatively associated
with the share of family land. Because mi-
grants have less access to village forestland,
they acquired cultivation rights mainly by
renting in land or sometimes purchasing land
from indigenes, as is indicated by the posi-
tive coefﬁcient of the proportion of migrant
population in the acquired non-forestland
equation.
Other variables are insigniﬁcant except
in a few cases. First, distance to town has a
positive effect on the proportion of forest-
land and a negative effect on the proportion of
family land, which indicates that remaining
forests are largely concentrated in areas quite
remote from roads and urban centers. Sec-
ond, the Brong-Ahafo dummy has a negative
effect on the proportion of family land and a
positive effect on acquired non-forestland,
suggesting that land tenure institutions have
evolved toward market-based transactions
in this region. This is not surprising since
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Table 4.1 Determinants of the proportion of areas under different land tenure institutions at the
village level in Ghana: Tobit regression
Family Village Acquired
landa Gift forestland non
forestlandb
Intercept 0.476 0.197 0.041 0.044
(3.856)*** (1.989)** (0.324) (0.505)
Person–land ratio –0.070 0.183 –0.009 –0.073
(–0.710) (2.332)*** (–0.086) (–1.045)
Proportion of migrant population –0.001 0.0003 –0.0003 0.001
(–2.468)*** (0.623) (–0.426) (2.656)***
Distance to town –0.003 –0.002 0.006 –0.0001
(–1.704)** (–1.399)* (2.985)*** (–0.059)
Proportion of nonfarm households –0.002 0.002 0.0002 –0.001
(–1.458)* (2.422)*** (0.204) (–0.944)
School attendance ratio in 1984 0.348 –0.313 0.243 0.222
(1.460)* (–1.638)* (0.974) (1.334)
Wassa dummy –0.065 –0.038 0.090 0.002
(–1.138) (–0.844) (1.566)* (0.058)
Sefwi dummy –0.096 0.030 0.084 –0.011
(–1.545)* (0.608) (1.342)* (–0.245)
Brong-Ahafo dummy –0.147 0.017 0.018 0.101
(–2.618)*** (0.375) (0.321) (2.572)***
Log-likelihood 32.06 44.95 26.64 43.02
Chi-square 20.05 16.31 17.75 29.21
p-value .01 .04 .02 .0003
Number of observations 58 58 58 58
Notes: Two-limit Tobit estimates; ancillary parameter σ not reported. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level; one-tailed tests.
a The sum of inherited and allocated family land areas.
b The sum of areas purchased, rented, and acquired through past renting.
37 The indigenous village dummy was not included because it is highly correlated with the proportion of migrants in the
population (r = .70). Note that Akan people also migrate from one village to another, so that ethnicity is not directly
associated with the length of settlement.Brong-Ahafo was one of the earlier destina-
tions of the westward geographical move-
ment of the cocoa area from the Eastern
Region (Hill 1963).
Recall that the person–land ratio and the
shares of land areas under different land
tenure institutions were estimated from
data obtained from interviews with seven
households in each village. In all likeli-
hood, owing to the small number of obser-
vations per village, they are subject to
measurement errors. Nonetheless, it is re-
markable to ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects of pop-
ulation pressure on the emergence and
widespread adoption of gifts in customary
land areas.
Sumatra Case
We estimated regressions explaining the
proportion of land under lineage, joint and
single family ownership, and the two types
of private ownership (purchased and cleared
land) separately for paddy ﬁelds and tree
crop plots, using a common set of explana-
tory variables. Results from eight regression
functions estimated using the Tobit method
are shown in Table 4.2.
Hypothesis 1 can be tested by examining
whether higher population density and greater
population growth rates are associated with
a greater incidence of private ownership
and a smaller incidence of lineage and joint
family ownership.38 Consistent with this
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Table 4.2 Determinants of the proportion of village land area under different land tenure by land-use type in Sumatra: 
Tobit regression
Paddy ﬁelds Agroforestry plots
Joint Single Joint Single
family family Purchased Cleared family family Purchased Cleared
Intercept 21.29 75.29 3.54 5.73 –0.74 56.58 7.44 27.74
(0.29) (8.46)*** (1.31) (4.48)*** (–0.06) (7.09)*** (1.46) (3.41)***
Population density –0.20 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.22 –0.47 0.07 0.27
(–1.67)* (1.82)* (2.75)*** (0.42) (1.00) (–3.13)*** (0.70) (1.80)*
Population growth 0.39 –3.16 –0.32 4.07 –3.74 –4.88 –2.45 6.36
(0.19) (–1.34) (–0.41) (1.13) (–1.06) (–2.23)** (–1.74)* (2.83)**
% paddy area 0.28 –0.27 0.00 –7.73 –1.45 2.11 –0.85 –1.35
(0.47) (–0.31) (0.00) (–2.29)** (–1.11) (2.48)** (–1.52) (–2.01)**
% outsiders –7.04 –0.16 0.04 3.45 0.47 –0.49 0.26 0.23
(–4.22)*** (–0.21) (0.17) (3.03)*** (0.90) (–1.32) (1.08) (0.56)
Travel time to town –0.10 –0.07 0.02 –0.24 –0.14 –0.05 0.15 –0.02
(–0.91) (–0.58) (0.50) (–1.41) (–0.78) (–0.56) (2.56)** (–0.20)
Travel time to forest 0.11 0.37 –0.29 –1.10 –0.14 –0.47 1.15 –1.73
(0.17) (0.37) (–0.91) (–0.35) (–0.08) (–0.53) (2.09)** (–1.12)
Middle Region 75.09 –87.38 –4.20 –7.76 –30.44 29.90 –0.77 –25.99
(8.79)*** (–8.65)*** (–1.43) (–0.55) (–1.89)* (3.61)*** (–0.15) (–3.03)***
Low Region 51.28 –45.34 0.85 –35.40 –18.31 0.47 –2.03 8.19
(6.39)*** (–5.02)*** (0.29) (–1.85)* (–1.31) (0.06) (–0.39) (0.96)
Log-likelihood –221.57 –204.45 –171.51 –67.40 –80.53 –257.83 –207.60 –232.10
Sample size 55 55 55 55 58 58 58 58
Notes: Two-limit Tobit estimates; ancillary parameter σ and village ﬁxed effects not reported. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level; two-tailed tests.
38 Population pressure can be represented by past population density and the expected population growth rate, even
though the expected value is replaced by the actual growth rate. Note, however, that this statistical test may be biased
to the extent that population variables, particularly the population growth rate, are endogenous. Owing to the paucity
of data on exogenous variables and the similarity of population growth rates among the three regions (approximately
1 percent per year in each region, on the average), it was not feasible to apply the instrumental variables method. We
believe, however, that the difference in land quality is well controlled for by regional dummies and the proportion of
paddy area, since differences in land quality are primarily due to regional differences, and favorable agricultural land
is fully devoted to paddy ﬁelds without exception in the study sites.hypothesis, population density has a positive
and signiﬁcant effect on the incidence of pri-
vate ownership through purchase in the case
of paddy ﬁelds. Population density also re-
duces the proportion of paddy ﬁelds under
joint family ownership, but this effect is only
weakly significant. Since all forest areas
suitable for conversion to paddy cultivation
have been exhausted, individualization took
the form of replacing collective ownership
by single family ownership and inducing
market transactions in land. Note that the
Middle and Low Region dummies have pos-
itive effects on the proportion of joint family
ownership and negative effects on the pro-
portion of single family ownership in the
paddy ﬁeld equations. These results are con-
sistent with the observation from Table 3.7
that the land rights of joint family tenure in
the Middle and Low Regions were similar
to or even stronger than the land rights of
single family ownership. According to the
regressions on the determinants of land tenure
in agroforestry plots, higher population den-
sity reduced the incidence of single family
ownership and stimulated forest clearance.
The effect of population density on joint
family ownership, however, is insigniﬁcant,
presumably because of the small area re-
maining under this type of ownership (see
Table 3.6). Note that the Middle Region
dummy has negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cients in the joint family and cleared land
regressions and a positive and signiﬁcant co-
efﬁcient in the single family land regression.
These results indicate that, in the regions
where uncultivated forestland was available
(that is, the High and Low Regions), popu-
lation pressure led to forest clearance,
whereas in the region with limited forestland
(that is, the Middle Region) single family
ownership was created at the expense of
joint family ownership.
Population growth has a signiﬁcant im-
pact on land tenure distribution only in agro-
forestry plots. Similar to population density,
higher population growth resulted in a
lower incidence of single family ownership
and a higher incidence of private ownership
through forest clearance. Counteracting the
effect of the population variables is the neg-
ative effect of the proportion of paddy area on
forest clearance. A larger per capita endow-
ment of paddy ﬁelds, which produce more
grain per unit of area than do upland ﬁelds,
lessens the population pressure on land.
The proportion of outsiders is associated
negatively with the incidence of joint family
ownership of paddy ﬁelds, suggesting that
the inﬂow of outsiders helped undermine the
traditional family ownership system of the
matrilineal society.39 Most of the outsiders
in the Middle Region, for example, are mi-
grants from Java, who do not practice matri-
lineal inheritance. Outsiders seem to have
acquired paddy land in the past by clearing
forest areas suitable for paddy cultivation,
which is reﬂected in its positive coefﬁcient
in the cleared area regression for paddy
ﬁelds.
By and large, both travel time to the sub-
district town and walking time to forests have
no signiﬁcant effects on the distribution of
land ownership, with the exceptions of pos-
itive effects of both variables on the incidence
of purchased agroforestry plots. The former
result—that poorer access to local markets
stimulates the transaction of agroforestry
plots—is difﬁcult to interpret. The latter re-
sult, which points to a high incidence of pur-
chase of existing agroforestry plots in areas
where there is little forest near the village, is
tenable.
Amajor question is the relative speed with
which primary forest and bush/fallow areas
have been converted to commercial tree plots
planted to rubber, cinnamon, and coffee under
different land tenure institutions. If the major
source of tree plots is primary forest, agro-
forestry development comes at the expense
of the natural environment. On the other
hand, if tree plots were primarily converted
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39 The proportion of outsiders, however, may be regarded as endogenous if they were attracted by the ease of obtaining






In this section, household-level data are used
to analyze the behavior of households re-
garding the acquisition of land. Whereas it is
reasonable to assume that the acquisition of
village forestland, rented land, and purchased
land reﬂects choices made by an individual
household, the acquisition of land through
inheritance, allocation, and gifts is deter-
mined primarily by the extended family.
Table 4.3 shows the average year of land
acquisition by land tenure, together with the
proportion of area planted to cocoa trees both
before acquisition and in 1997, disaggregated
by the gender of the head of household.40
Several important observations can be made.
First, village forestland was acquired in the
earliest years. This is partly because village
forestland was acquired primarily by young
unmarried males and partly because forest-
land had mostly been exhausted in the
1970s.41 Clearing forestland to establish
one’s own farm is a rite of passage for young
Ghanaian males. Among our respondents,
the average age at marriage was 25 years,
and they would have cleared forestland be-
fore marriage. The last time forestland was
acquired from the chief or through the pur-
chase of village land was in 1989. Second,
the transfer of family land through inheri-
tance, allocation, and gift took place more or
less a decade later in the early 1980s. Third,
except for the case of land acquisition through
land rental in migrant villages, where mi-
grants acquired cultivation rights in earlier
years, the acquisition of land through rent-
ing and private purchase generally occurred
later.42 The sequential pattern of acquisition
of different types of land provides support
for the recursive model discussed in Chap-
ter 2.
Thus, functions explaining the area of land
acquired through forest clearance, through
allocations from the extended family, and
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Table 4.3 Average year of land acquisition by land tenure type 
in Ghana and proportion of area planted to cocoa trees before




Land tenure land acquisition Before acquisition 1997
Acquired village forestland
Akan Male 1970 0.0 64.3
Female 1965 0.0 60.6
Non-Akan Male 1974 0.0 78.3
Female 1950 0.0 50.0
Inherited land
Akan Male 1980 37.9 44.1
Female 1971 7.0 17.0
Non-Akan Male 1985 56.0 44.2
Allocated family land
Akan Male 1985 19.0 43.3
Female 1984 13.3 36.2
Non-Akan Male 1982 28.0 47.6
Land received as gifts
Akan Male 1982 20.3 52.8
Female 1981 41.1 68.9
Non-Akan Male 1982 22.7 67.2
Female 1991 51.7 87.8
Acquired land though renting
Akan Male 1980 13.7 62.3
Female 1989 27.0 60.3
Non-Akan Male 1976 3.3 84.8
Rented-in land
Akan Male 1989 1.9 52.1
Female 1990 0.0 70.1
Non-Akan Male 1991 5.4 50.3
Female 1991 0.0 66.7
Purchased land from nonfamily
Akan Male 1983 4.0 54.4
Female 1996 0.0 62.5
Non-Akan Male 1982 4.3 60.3
40 Note that it is possible to have female parcel owners in male-headed households.
41 Some female parcel owners do report having acquired village forestland, but it is unlikely that they undertook land
clearing themselves.
42 Renting-in land is a traditional practice for migrant households; the proportion of rental in indigene villages may be
due to migrant households who have moved to predominantly indigene villages. Many early migrants who could not
afford to purchase land engaged in share tenancy contracts; the recent increase of renting among indigene farmers may
indicate the exhaustion of other traditional modes of acquiring land.through renting or purchase were estimated
as a recursive system. The exogenous vari-
ables include the gender of the household
head, the age of the household head, the year
of marriage (a proxy for the start of own
farming), years of schooling, a dummy for
patrilineal household, and a dummy for hav-
ing been born outside the village (or being a
migrant to the village).43
Since certain types of land are not ob-
served in a number of sample households
and, because unobservable characteristics
of villages may affect land acquisition deci-
sions, Honoré’s (1992) least absolute devia-
tions Tobit estimation method with village
ﬁxed effects was used.44 The results are
shown in Table 4.4.45The ﬁrst column shows
the determinants of forest area acquisition.
The age of the household head has a posi-
tive and highly signiﬁcant effect, which in-
dicates that cultivable primary forests have
largely disappeared in recent years owing to
the clearance of primary forests on a ﬁrst-
come/ﬁrst-served basis. The dummy for a
household head born outside the village has
a positive effect on acquired forestland,46
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Table 4.4 Determinants of land acquisition at the household level in Ghana: Tobit regression with village ﬁxed effects
Acquired Acquired
All family land All family land non-forestland non-forestland
Forestland (speciﬁcation 1)a (speciﬁcation 2)a (speciﬁcation 1) (speciﬁcation 2)
Forestland (current holdings) . . . –0.09 . . . –0.41 . . .
(–0.44) (–1.84)**
Forestland (predetermined)b . . . . . . . . .c . . . –0.37
(–2.76)***
Family land (current holdings) . . . . . . . . . –0.71 . . .
(–2.02)**
Family land (predetermined)b . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.04
(–11.28)***
Age of household head 7.65 0.15 0.17 0.15 –0.05
(2.96)*** (0.35) (1.97)** (0.62) (–0.13)
Year of ﬁrst marriage of household head –0.98 –0.54 0.11 –0.35 –0.39
(–0.55) (–1.15) (1.75)** (–1.30)* (–0.72)
Dummy for household head born 
outside of village 54.39 –27.44 –5.16 9.41 5.96
(2.13)** (–1.66)** (–5.84)*** (2.37)** (2.24)***
Years of schooling of head –6.42 1.90 0.44 0.39 0.21
(–2.02)** (2.69)*** (3.36)*** (1.51)* (0.65)
Dummy for female-headed household –65.08 –18.17 –0.79 –16.98 –10.84
(–2.34)** (–1.34)* (–0.51) (–2.28)** (–1.51)*
Dummy for patrilineal household  –87.20 –13.36 –4.83 0.90 0.01
(–2.66)*** (–1.75)** (–3.52)*** (0.23) (0.002)
Chi-square 30.4 30.0 222.2 30.3 5091.3
p-value .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Number of observations 386 386 386 386 386
Note: Least absolute deviations estimator. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level; one-tailed tests.
a Family land includes allocation, inheritance, and gifts.
b Predetermined landholdings consist of land acquired prior to the ﬁrst date of acquisition of land in the dependent variable category.
c Not included owing to nonconvergence.
43 The patrilineal household dummy and the female headship dummy are not highly correlated; the simple correlation
coefﬁcient is  .17.
44 This estimator is preferred since it is both consistent and asymptotically normal under suitable regularity conditions
and assumes neither a particular parametric form nor homoscedasticity.
45 These equations were also estimated using the household-level data from the intensive survey. The results are quali-
tatively similar and are not reported here.
46 In an earlier version with regional dummies, the coefﬁcient of the migrant dummy was negative but insigniﬁcant.whereas the dummies for a female-headed
household and for a patrilineal household
have negative effects on forest acquisition.
The negative effect of female headship will
reﬂect women’s relative disadvantage in ac-
quiring land through forest clearance, since
forest clearance is a male activity. Patrilineal
households, who are usually long-distance
non-Akan migrants, have no rights to clear
forests, unlike short-distance Akan migrants.
The positive effect of the outside dummy is
likely to capture the active forest clearance
activity by Akan migrants.
The next two columns display the esti-
mation results of the function accounting
for the acquisition of family land (including
gifts). In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (where cur-
rent holdings of forestland and family land
are regressors in the subsequent equations),
the coefﬁcient on forestland is not signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero, contrary to ex-
pectations that it would have a negative
coefﬁcient.47 Thus, egalitarian motives do
not appear to offset efforts to clear forests. In
both the ﬁrst speciﬁcation and the second
(which imposes a more rigorous deﬁnition of
predetermined forest and family landhold-
ings), patrilineal households and those who
have migrated to their current villages of
residence have smaller areas of family land
since they do not inherit family land in the
area of relocation. The coefﬁcient of years
of schooling is positive, which may be taken
to imply that the amounts of schooling and
landholdings of the extended family are
positively correlated. Female heads of house-
holds are also less likely to have acquired
family land, but this effect is not signiﬁcant.
Family allocation mechanisms seem less
biased against women compared with forest
clearing and land market transactions, which
supports Hypothesis 2.
According to the last two columns, forest-
land and family land have negative and sig-
niﬁcant coefﬁcients, which strongly indicates
that households seek additional land through
renting and purchase when the traditional
methods of land transfer are insufﬁcient. In
short, land scarcity stimulates land market
transactions. It is also important to realize
that the negative coefﬁcients of acquired
forestland and family land imply that land
market transactions transfer land from land-
rich to land-poor households, which would
be conducive to the more equitable alloca-
tion of land. The coefﬁcient of the migrant
dummy is positive, indicating that migrants
seek additional land more actively through
renting or purchase. It also appears that
better-educated household heads are able to
acquire land through renting or purchase,
probably because these require previous
savings, managerial ability, and access to
information. In addition, better-educated in-
dividuals may be engaged in nonfarm activ-
ities that provide easier access to cash for
purchasing land. In the speciﬁcation using
current forestland and family land, female
heads of households are signiﬁcantly less
likely to have acquired land through pur-
chase and rental, indicating that they may
be disadvantaged, relative to men, in land
sales and rental markets. Since purchase of
property requires resources, women may be
renting or buying less land because they con-
trol fewer resources than men. Similarly,
renting requires strenuous labor and hard
work in tree-planting, so women seldom rent
in land.
Before proceeding to the efﬁciency im-
plications of different land tenure institutions
(to be examined in Chapter 5), it is instruc-
tive to review brieﬂy the possible effects of
the tenure security of tree-planting. Table 4.3
exhibits the proportion of area planted to
cocoa immediately before land acquisition
and in 1997, by manner of land acquisition.
Although this proportion tends to be higher
in land with strong individual land rights
(that is, acquired village forestland, land re-
ceived as a gift, land purchased from non-
family members) than in land with weak land
rights (that is, inherited and allocated family
land), the differences are not conspicuous.
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47 It was not included in the second speciﬁcation because the estimator did not converge.This observation indicates that incentives
to invest in tree-planting are not simply de-
termined by the strength of land rights or
land tenure security, but are also affected by
expected changes in land rights after tree-
planting. Indeed, without considering the
effect of tree-planting on land rights, it is dif-
ﬁcult to explain the nonnegligible propor-
tions of parcels planted to cocoa in inherited
and allocated lands, which are characterized
by weak individual land rights (see Table 3.4).
The importance of previous tree-planting
as a prerequisite for receiving gifts appears
to differ by gender. For male recipients, only
20–23 percent of the parcel was planted to
cocoa trees before land was transferred as a
gift. In other words, planting cocoa trees on
a small portion of the parcel is often sufﬁ-
cient to obtain permission to transfer land to
male heirs through a gift from the extended
family members according to the current
practice. If so, it is not surprising that trees
are planted on inherited and allocated land
with the expectation that the land parcels
planted to trees may be allowed to be trans-
ferred as gifts in the future. For female re-
cipients, however, some 40–50 percent of
land was planted to cocoa before it was ac-
quired as a gift. This conﬁrms our ﬁeld
observations that inter vivos gifts to wives
are given strictly in return for their helping
their husband plant and cultivate cocoa.
Sumatra Case
This section examines household-level de-
terminants of land acquisition in Sumatra. It
seems that, in Sumatra, young farmers are
able to predict relatively accurately how
much land they will acquire through inheri-
tance in the future because, unlike the case of
Ghana, inheritance and forest clearance occur
during the same period of the life cycle.
Functions explaining the area of land
acquired by forest clearance (deforestation)
and by purchase were estimated. The ex-
planatory variables in the regressions are the
area of inherited land, interaction of inherited
land with two inheritance system dummies
with matrilineal inheritance as the base for
comparison, the percentage of trees planted
at the time of acquisition of inherited land,
age of household head, schooling of head,
owned paddy area, the number of male and
female workers between 16 and 60 years of
age, and an outsider household dummy for
those who were migrants from Java or an-
other areas in Sumatra. The inheritance
system dummies correspond to bilateral in-
heritance and patrilineal inheritance. Because
certain forms of land acquisition do not exist
for a number of sample households, and be-
cause unobservable village characteristics
may affect land acquisition decisions, the
Tobit estimation method with village ﬁxed
effects was implemented. The estimation
results are shown in Table 4.5.
The ﬁrst column shows the determi-
nants of forest areas acquired through forest
clearance or deforestation. As is implied by
Hypothesis 2, inherited land, which is pre-
determined for the household, has a negative
and signiﬁcant effect on deforestation. This
is consistent with the popular belief that in-
creasing population pressure on limited land
is a major cause of deforestation, to the ex-
tent that the declining area of inherited land
is due to an increase in household size. The
interaction terms of inherited land with two
inheritance dummies, however, were not
signiﬁcant. This result shows that incentives
to invest in forest clearance under the tradi-
tional matrilineal inheritance system are as
strong as those under the more recent bilateral
and patrilineal inheritance systems. Owned
paddy area has a positive and signiﬁcant ef-
fect on deforestation, which is consistent with
the fact that wealthier farmers usually employ
laborers to clear forests. The percentage of
area planted to trees on inherited land is not
signiﬁcant, indicating that the development
of proﬁtable agroforestry does not deter
deforestation.
Household demographic characteristics
also affect deforestation. The age of the
household head has a positive and signiﬁ-
cant effect on deforestation. This result is
consistent with Hypothesis 2 that, the older
the household head, the greater would have
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hence, the larger would be the acquired
forestland area. Families with a larger en-
dowment of male family workers also tend
to clear more forestland. Since clearance of
forest requires hard work by male workers,
this result is not surprising.
The second column shows the estimation
results of the determinants of purchased
land. Owned paddy area has a positive and
highly signiﬁcant effect on purchased land,
which indicates that wealthier farmers tend
to purchase larger upland areas. Schooling of
the household head has a positive and sig-
niﬁcant effect on land purchase, implying
that better-educated farmers tend to buy
more land. The coefﬁcient of inherited land
is insigniﬁcant, and the interaction terms of
inherited land with the two inheritance dum-
mies are also insigniﬁcant. The percentage
of area planted to trees on inherited land has
a negative and signiﬁcant effect. It may well
be that the larger demand for labor in agro-
forestry deters purchase of additional land.
The gender composition of the family work-
force does not affect land purchase.
Using brief household survey data, a
tree-planting function in which area planted
to trees is the dependent variable is also es-
timated. The explanatory variables included
the acquired forestland and purchased land
that are considered to be predetermined.48
42 CHAPTER 4
Table 4.5 Determinants of land acquisition and area planted to trees at the household level in
Sumatra: Tobit regression with village ﬁxed effects
Forest clearance Purchase Tree-planted area
Intercept –2.99 –3.97 –0.54
(–1.45) (–1.53) (–1.38)
Forestland . . . . . . 0.77
(25.67)***
Inherited land –0.97 –0.26 0.69
(–2.69)*** (–0.65) (8.63)***
Inherited land × bilateral inheritance dummy –0.12 1.42 –0.17
(–0.12) (1.62) (–0.74)
Inherited land × patrilineal inheritance dummy 0.65 –0.16 0.19
(1.18) (–0.15) (0.76)
Percentage of area planted to trees in inherited land –0.01 –0.02 . . .
(–1.43) (–2.00)**
Purchased land . . . . . . 0.38
(5.43)***
Age of head 0.05 0.03 0.01
(2.50)*** (1.00) (1.00)
Schooling of head 0.09 0.16* 0.03
(1.13) (1.78) (1.50)
Own paddy area 0.97 1.20** 0.19
(2.20)** (2.03) (1.73)*
Number of male workers 0.61 0.42 0.16
(1.74)* (0.98) (2.00)**
Number of female workers –0.26 0.10 –0.14
(–0.76) (0.26) (–2.00)**
Outsider dummy –12.46 –1.16 0.12
(–0.03) (–0.50) (0.29)
Log-likelihood –305.19 –254.00 –223.97
Number of observations 273 273 231
Notes: Two-limit Tobit estimates; ancillary parameter σ and village ﬁxed effects not reported. t-statistics are shown in
parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level; two-tailed tests.
48 We did not include percentage of area planted to trees on inherited land as an explanatory variable in the tree-planting
function, because our interest lies in identifying whether the incidence of tree-planting is lower on inherited land com-
pared with other tenure categories at the present period.The estimation results are also shown in
Table 4.5.
Forestland and inherited land areas have
positive and highly signiﬁcant effects on the
area planted to trees. Purchased land also has
a positive but weaker effect, judging from its
coefﬁcient, which is signiﬁcantly smaller
than the coefﬁcients for forestland and in-
herited land. Thus, the incentive to plant trees
on purchased land is lower, even though land
rights on purchased land are very strong. In-
deed, because of secure land rights, farmers
are in no hurry to plant trees. In contrast, if
land use is limited to food crops grown under
shifting cultivation, individual rights acquired
through forest clearance and inheritance
tend to diminish over time. This explains
why tree-planting, which strengthens land
rights, is more active on forestland and in-
herited land. In other words, land tenure in-
security is an incentive for tree-planting, as
least in systems where investment is rewarded
with strong tenure.
The interaction terms of inheritance
dummies (bilateral inheritance by daughters
and sons and patrilineal inheritance by sons
only) do not have signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
It appears that the incentives to invest in
tree-planting are more strongly affected by
expected changes in land rights after tree-
planting than by the level of land rights be-
fore tree-planting. This result, however, is
quite different from the ﬁndings of Besley
(1995), who uses a data set from western
Ghana to show statistically that stronger land
rights lead to a higher incidence of tree-
planting. It can be argued, however, that
Besley’s methodology of simply counting
the number of rights (for example, rights 
to rent out and to sell) to measure tenure
security without considering the relative
importance of each right leads to biased
estimation.
The number of male workers has a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant effect on the area planted
to trees, whereas the number of female
workers has a negative and signiﬁcant ef-
fect. These results are plausible, since the
establishment of agroforest requires primarily
male labor (Barlow and Muharminto 1982;
Suyanto, Tomich, and Otsuka 2001a, 2001b).
Finally, better-educated farmers tend to es-
tablish agroforestry plots more actively.
Concluding Remarks
Following Boserup (1965), we hypothesize
that increasing population pressure induces
a shift toward more labor-intensive and land-
saving farming systems. Although doing so
requires investment in land, the incentives to
invest are often considered to be weak under
traditional family ownership systems owing
to restricted land rights. This study, however,
has found that customary land tenure institu-
tions have evolved toward individualized
ownership systems in both Ghana and Suma-
tra. Furthermore, it is also found that popu-
lation pressure is an important factor in the
increasing prevalence of gift in Ghana,
which is characterized by strong individual
land rights, and of private land ownership
in Sumatra. These ﬁndings clearly support
Hypothesis 1. The implication is that, so
long as population continues to grow, the
proﬁtability of long-term investment for in-
tensiﬁed land use will further increase, which
will either sustain or accelerate the evolution
of customary land tenure institutions toward
individualized ownership.
The next chapter examines the implica-
tions of more individualized land tenure
systems for the efﬁciency of land use.
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Efficiency of Land Use
W
e have hypothesized that greater individualization of land tenure institutions leads
to more efﬁcient land use. Data from the intensive household survey in selected
communities are best suited to testing this hypothesis. This chapter assesses the
efﬁciency of land use under various land tenure institutions by estimating tree-planting, fal-
low choice, revenue, and profit functions. The major purpose is to test the validity of Hy-
pothesis 3, which argues that, owing to the expected strengthening of individual land rights
as a result of tree-planting, the tree-planting and management efﬁciency of agroforestry are
independent of the initial level of security associated with different land tenure institutions.
This hypothesis is tested in both Ghana and Sumatra. Before proceeding to the statistical
analyses, the chapter presents descriptive statistics from both study sites.
Land Tenure and Land Use in Ghana
Land Tenure and Land Use
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of all ﬁelds and selected ﬁelds by land-use type. Cocoa trees
begin to produce output starting from the fourth to ﬁfth year. Cocoa ﬁelds are classiﬁed into
mature cocoa ﬁelds from which cocoa can be harvested and young cocoa ﬁelds inter-
cropped with food crops. There are fewer mature cocoa ﬁelds than young cocoa ﬁelds,
but mature cocoa fields are much larger. This is because cocoa trees are planted gradually
from one portion of the parcel to the next, with new ﬁelds being merged with other tree-
planted ﬁelds. Although the majority of cocoa ﬁelds are monocrop ﬁelds, some cocoa ﬁelds
are intercropped with other perennials. Fallow land occupies a large area, whereas land de-
voted entirely to food crops is less common. Food crops and cocoa are traditionally grown
in an intercropped farming system: food crops are planted while the cocoa trees are still
young; once the cocoa trees are too tall to let in adequate sunlight for food crops, food is no
longer grown as an intercrop. Growing food as an intercrop also takes advantage of weeding
labor, because the ground around young cocoa trees has to be kept free from weeds. Since
cultivators often do not know the length of the fallow period on all their parcels, the data on
the duration of the fallow period for the selected sample ﬁelds are incomplete. However,
available information indicates that the fallow period commonly ranges from 5 to 10 years.Food crop ﬁelds were over-sampled for
the collection of detailed production data.
Various food crops are usually intermingled
in the same ﬁeld and 12 crop types, includ-
ing maize, plantain, cassava, and yams, were
identiﬁed. Although production data were
collected for one year, a few crops, such as
plantain, need more than a year to bear fruit
and are continuously cultivated for two to
three years in the survey area. Thus, in esti-
mating the net revenue function of food
crops, in order to control for the effects of
crop mix, estimates of the proportions of
various crops were used as explanatory vari-
ables, assuming that the various crops grown
together in multiple-crop ﬁelds account for
equal proportions of land area. As may be
expected, there are only a small number of
mixed fallow/crop ﬁelds.
Table 5.2 describes the distribution of
land use according to prevailing land tenure
categories. Among the sample villages, seven
are indigenous villages inhabited primarily
by Akan people subject to matrilineal inher-
itance, and three are villages inhabited mostly
by migrants, who generally follow patrilineal
inheritance. The sample households are 85
percent matrilineal, 9.4 percent patrilineal,
and 5.6 percent mixed. According to this
table, temporarily allocated family land is
more important than inherited land. Renting
has become a common way for migrants to
obtain access to cultivable land. Tenants are
contracted to plant and establish cocoa trees.
Migrants, as well as young Akan men, also
work as caretakers in mature cocoa ﬁelds,
for which they commonly receive one-third
of the harvested crop output. A non-negli-
gible number of ﬁelds are borrowed from
non-relatives.
As in the extensive survey villages, the
weakest land rights are observed in relation
to temporarily allocated family land, on
which even tree-planting is not allowed.
Thus, if land tenure security at the time of
tree-planting determines investment incen-
tives, one would expect to observe that cocoa
trees are seldom planted on allocated family
land. Land rights are also weak in relation to
inherited land among matrilineal Akan house-
holds. Yet about one-half of allocated and in-
herited areas are planted to cocoa according
to Table 5.3. These observations are consis-
tent with Hypothesis 3—that not only tenure
security but also expected changes in tenure
security affect tree-planting decisions. Al-
though data on land rights on borrowed land
were not collected, ﬁeld interviews indicate
that borrowed land has even weaker rights
than allocated and inherited land. In fact,
usufruct rights are well established in the
case of family land, so long as ﬁelds are used
for crop cultivation, but this is not the case
for borrowed land. Such rights tend to be
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Table 5.1 Distribution and size of operational landholdings for all sample ﬁelds and selected
sample ﬁelds by land-use type in Ghana
All ﬁeldsa Selected ﬁeldsb
Land use Number Size (ha) Number Size (ha) Number of households
Mature cocoa 504 1.85 276 2.02 213
Young cocoa 701 0.60 218 0.67 187
Food only 197 0.52 112 0.53 106
Fallow only 548 2.37 0 n.a. n.a.
Food and fallow 12 0.54 6 0.43 6
Othersc 39 1.65 0 n.a. n.a.
Total 2,001 1.42 612 1.25 249
Note: n.a. = not available.
aAll ﬁelds of sample households. Aﬁeld is deﬁned as a portion of a parcel characterized by the same cropping pattern.
b Fields selected for the detailed input and output survey.
c Fields entirely planted to kola or palm oil trees.stronger for inherited land than for temporar-
ily allocated family land.
Patrilineal households are endowed with
fairly strong rights on inherited land. Strong
land rights are also observed in relation to
former village forestland, whether appropri-
ated by indigenes or purchased by migrants.
Equally strong land rights are observed for
tree-planted land received as a gift. Gifts are
usually made by a man to his children and
sometimes to his wife, after seeking agree-
ment from members of the extended family.
Actually, the transfer of land to a man’s wife
and children as an inter vivosgift is not a new
phenomenon. According to Figure 5.1, which
shows the changing relative importance of
different modes of land transfer over time
based on retrospective survey data, gift trans-
fers were already practiced in the 1960s. It is
also important to point out that there was no
noticeable increase in the incidence of gifts
after the enactment of the Intestate Succes-
sion Law in 1985. This strongly indicates
that the evolution of land tenure institutions,
rather than the law, led to the increasing in-
cidence of gifts as a mode of land transfer.
Table 5.3 shows cocoa ﬁelds as a pro-
portion of the total area in 1997, compared
with land-use patterns before acquisition. In
1997 cocoa trees were planted on 45 percent
of allocated parcels and 53 percent of inher-
ited parcels, which suggests that the level of
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Table 5.2 Distribution of all sample ﬁelds under different land tenure regimes by land-use type in
Ghana (number of ﬁelds)
Mature Young Food Fallow Food/
Land tenure cocoa cocoa only only fallow Others Total
Allocated family land 42 62 42 83 3 6 238
Inherited family land 29 27 5 43 2 3 109
Appropriated village land 52 74 18 64 0 8 216
Purchased village land 26 19 7 24 0 2 78
Received as a gift 188 293 72 202 5 16 776
Privately purchased 12 25 5 19 0 0 61
Acquired through renting 16 8 0 7 0 0 31
Currently renting 78 185 23 88 0 3 377
Caretaking 61 5 8 10 1 1 86
Borrowing from nonrelatives . . . 3 17 8 1 . . . 29
Total 504 701 197 548 12 39 2,001
Table 5.3 Distribution of land use before acquisition and in 1997 by land tenure type in Ghana
In 1997
Before acquisition (% of shifting
(% of total land area) cultivation area)
Land tenure Forest Cocoaa Othersb Cocoaa Fallow
Allocated family land 10.8 3.25 86.1 44.8 64.8
Inherited land 11.4 25.2 63.3 52.8 86.0
Appropriated village land 92.8 0.9 6.3 60.6 78.0
Purchased village land 87.2 1.9 10.9 59.2 77.4
Received as a gift 17.9 5.6 76.5 63.3 72.4
Privately purchased 14.5 9.1 76.4 60.7 79.2
Acquired through renting 42.3 15.4 42.3 77.4 100.0
Currently renting 19.0 6.3 74.7 70.3 79.3
Caretaking 0.0 90.7 9.3 77.6 52.6
Borrowing from nonrelatives 0.0 0.0 100.0 10.3 30.8
a Including both mature and young cocoa ﬁelds.
b Including food production and fallow ﬁelds.tenure security alone does not determine the
incidence of tree-planting. However, the
proportion of cocoa ﬁelds in 1997 is some-
what higher on parcels with stronger land
rights, such as appropriated and purchased
village land. The proportions are also high in
the case of renting and caretaking, because
tenants are assigned to plant trees and work-
ers are employed to take care of mature trees.
On land received as a gift, the proportion of
cocoa ﬁelds prior to acquisition was very
small, because tree-planting on non-cocoa
ﬁelds is a prerequisite for transferring land as
a gift. Most of the parcels without trees that
were transferred as gifts were given to sons
by their fathers, especially in Akan house-
holds (45 percent). This conﬁrms that gifts
are being used as a way to transfer land to
designated heirs rather than to let it revert to
the matriclan after death.
Net Revenues from Mature Cocoa
Data on gross revenue, paid-out costs, and
the net revenue or cash income per hectare
of mature cocoa ﬁelds, together with data on
labor hours and the relative contribution of
women and children within the household,
are shown in Table 5.4. Since dried cocoa is
sold only to the village ofﬁce of the state
cocoa marketing board, the revenue data are
expected to be highly accurate. Three visits
to the respondents were made over a one-year
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Figure 5.1 Proportion of area acquired by type and year, ﬁve-year
moving averages
Table 5.4 Gross revenue, paid-out costs, net revenue, and labor inputs for mature cocoa production at the ﬁeld level, 
by average age of cocoa trees, in Ghana
Gross Paid-out Net
revenue costs revenue
Average age Number of (thousands (thousands (thousands Total labor hours Percent women
of cocoa trees observations of cedis/ha) of cedis/ha) of cedis/ha) per hectare and children
4 15 402 62 325 460 27
5 21 636 56 564 669 34
6 19 534 59 452 695 36
7 14 515 36 464 314 32
8 19 658 49 584 602 35
9 18 488 43 423 627 30
10 96 74 37 614 468 33
11 12 531 69 447 571 34
12 12 674 126 531 451 32
13 10 341 43 286 458 34
14 6 497 26 451 398 23
15 7 338 47 273 503 34
16 7 564 60 486 582 35
17 6 319 39 267 446 43
18 7 412 51 344 362 29
19 5 408 88 306 432 25
20–24 23 343 58 273 378 27
25–29 13 396 37 350 328 22
30+ 18 381 54 319 467 33period to obtain accurate labor data. Paid-out
costs account for roughly 15 percent of gross
revenue and consist mainly of payments to
hired labor. Chemical fertilizers were not ap-
plied, and only a few farmers utilize pesti-
cides, albeit in small amounts. Net revenue,
deﬁned as total revenue less paid-out costs,
represents the return to land and family
labor. There is no strong association be-
tween average age of trees and revenue, even
though there appears to be some declining
trend.
For mature cocoa, the major task is har-
vesting, which may start as early as October
and is completed in March. Cocoa farming
is highly labor intensive: if a person works
for 7 hours per day, the average labor input
amounts to 70 days per hectare. Similarly to
revenue, there is no strong trend in labor
requirements associated with aging of trees.
Family labor of women and children, partic-
ularly the wife, accounts for about one-third
of labor total inputs. The labor market for
harvesting is relatively active and hired
labor contributes roughly 40 percent of total
labor inputs.49
Net Revenues from Food Crops
There seem to be few, if any, investment op-
portunities in food crop ﬁelds, so there is no
theoretical reason to assume that land tenure
security affects the intensity of cultivation.
Yet will it be of interest to examine whether
women manage food crop ﬁelds differently
from men.
According to Table 5.5, both gross rev-
enue and net revenue from pure food crop
fields are much higher than those from mixed
crop/cocoa ﬁelds, except in the ﬁrst two years
of cocoa cultivation. The relatively high rev-
enue from young cocoa ﬁelds clearly explains
the advantage of cocoa and food intercrop-
ping. Paid-out costs and labor hours, how-
ever, are much higher in the initial year of
cocoa cultivation, owing to the high labor
requirement when establishing cocoa ﬁelds.
Although total labor input and net revenue
per hectare are higher in pure food cultiva-
tion than in cocoa cultivation (see Tables 5.4
and 5.5), the intensity of cultivation is much
higher in cocoa cultivation. This is because
food crops are typically produced in two
consecutive seasons under shifting cultiva-
tion and land is left fallow for nearly eight
years on average. Therefore, roughly speak-
ing, the average net revenue per year in shift-
ing cultivation is 90 cedis and the average
labor input is 220 hours, both of which are
far smaller than the annual revenue and labor
hours in cocoa cultivation. Thus, the shift
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Table 5.5 Gross revenue, paid-out costs, net revenue, and labor inputs for young cocoa and pure food crop ﬁelds in Ghana
Gross Paid-out Net
Type of crop revenuea costsa revenue Total Percent Average
and years Number of (thousands (thousands (thousands labor hours women and fallow
of cultivation observations of cedis/ha) of cedis/ha) of cedis/ha) per hectare children perioda
Young cocoa
Less than 1 year 52 253 79 171 1,401 41 15.60 (5)
1st year 40 489 32 452 1,894 51 9.96 (72)
2nd year 49 443 36 397 1,616 35 11.91 (54)
3rd year 28 271 66 189 1,687 32 7.87 (24)
4th year 14 207 46 142 1,274 15 7.86 (7)
Food crops 98 494 38 456 1,106 48 7.73 (56)
a We obtained information on fallow periods prior to the current cultivation from only a limited number of cases, shown in parentheses.
49 Wages, however, are substantially different among the 10 villages, even for the same tasks, which indicates segrega-
tion of local labor markets due to labor market imperfections or high transaction costs. These 10 villages are located
fairly far apart and it would take several hours by motor vehicle to go from one remote village to another remote vil-
lage in different directions. Because of the non-comparability of wages, we did not impute the cost of family labor
using prevailing wages to estimate proﬁts.from shifting cultivation to cocoa cultiva-
tion is consistent with the evolutionary view
of farming systems postulated by Boserup
(1965) and the view of induced innovation
formulated by Hayami and Ruttan (1985).
Note that the variations in the gross and net
revenue as well as paid-out costs are rela-
tively small, as indicated by the standard
deviation, which suggests that resource allo-
cations are largely equalized across ﬁelds.50
Land Tenure and Land Use 
in Sumatra
Land Tenure and Land Use51
According to Table 5.6, the sampled house-
holds in Rantau Pandan operated 550 upland
ﬁelds, of which 27 were planted to upland
rice in the wet season of 1995/96. The rest
of these plots comprised 177 young rubber
ﬁelds (dominant tree age52 of one to seven
years), 198 mature rubber ﬁelds (dominant
tree age of eight years and above), and 148
bush/fallow ﬁelds.53The rubber farming sys-
tem under investigation is sometimes called
“jungle rubber” because wild woody species
are allowed to grow among the rubber trees,
which may help protect the rubber from grass
weeds (Gouyon, de Foresta, and Levang
1993). The plant biodiversity of the jungle
rubber is half to two-thirds that of natural
forest (Michon and de Foresta 1995). The
production technologies have changed little
since rubber was introduced a century ago,
despite the availability of seemingly proﬁt-
able alternative technologies (Barlow and
Jayasuriya 1984). Bush/fallow areas are gen-
erally located in areas far away from village
centers and were planted to food crops in the
distant past. At present, some of them are
secondary forests. All these sample plots are
used for the probit analysis of tree-planting.
Because of the increase in cinnamon
prices relative to rubber in recent years, some
farmers have experimented with intercrop-
ping some cinnamon in young rubber ﬁelds.
Thus, only 33 young rubber ﬁelds were pure
rubber ﬁelds, whereas most mature rubber
ﬁelds were pure stands (aside from the natu-
ral regeneration of wild species described
above). By and large, cinnamon occupies
only small areas, as the elevation is too low
for commercial cinnamon production. For
this study, all the ﬁelds planted exclusively
to rubber were included in the surveys con-
ducted during the wet and dry seasons of
1996/97 (December 1996 and June/July
1997). The altitude and slope of the rubber
plots were measured to serve as indicators
of land quality. The quality of land may be
affected not only by these physical charac-
teristics but also by the extent of competition
with weeds and the fertility of the soil, which
are signiﬁcantly affected by previous land
use (Gouyon, de Foresta, and Levang 1993).
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Table 5.6 Distribution of sample plots by land use in upland area of
villages in Sumatra
Land use Number of plots Number of households
Total 550 162
Upland rice ﬁelds 27 27
Young rubber ﬁeldsa 177 111
Subsampleb 3 3 ...
Mature rubber ﬁeldsc 198 122
Subsampled 128 . . .
Bush-fallow 148 102
a Dominant tree age of zero to seven years.
b Selected for the assessment of costs of production.
c Dominant tree age of eight years and above.
d Selected for the assessment of revenue and costs of production.
50 The standard deviations for gross revenues and net revenues are lowest at 306.8 and 305.6 cedis/ha, respectively, for
cocoa ﬁelds under one year old and are highest at 555.5 and 565.5 cedis/ha for second-year cocoa ﬁelds. The standard
deviation for paid-out costs is lowest for four-year-old cocoa ﬁelds at 50.3 cedis/ha and highest for cocoa ﬁelds under
one year old at 115.6 cedis/ha. The standard deviations for gross revenues, net revenues, and paid-out gross costs for
food crop ﬁelds are 460.9, 463.4, and 70.7 cedis/ha, respectively.
51 This section draws from Suyanto, Tomich, and Otsuka (2001a). A similar analysis for cinnamon can be found in
Suyanto, Tomich, and Otsuka (2001b).
52 The age of trees is measured using the “dominant” age because gap-ﬁlling and natural regeneration of tree growth result
in a distribution of rubber trees of various ages in older rubber plots.
53 In addition, there are lowland paddy ﬁelds. The management of paddy ﬁelds is not analyzed in this study.Thus, attention was also given to the types of
land cover (primary forest, rubber ﬁelds, or
bush/fallow) on these plots before the current
cohort of trees was planted.54 Among these
three land cover types, land previously under
forest cover is likely to have the highest soil
fertility and the fewest weed problems.
The prevailing land tenure institutions
were markedly different among upland rice,
rubber, and bush/fallow ﬁelds. Table 5.7
shows the land tenure distribution of all
sample plots by land-use type. In the case of
upland rice ﬁelds, communal/lineage owner-
ship still dominates. Strictly speaking, use
of this communal area is controlled by the
village chief, who allocates land for shifting
cultivation. After one season of cultivation
of upland rice, ﬁelds are put into fallow. The
average bush/fallow period now is 5.8 years,
which is much shorter than the previously
common fallow periods (15–20 years) con-
sidered sufﬁcient to restore soil fertility
(Gouyon, de Foresta, and Levang 1993).
Under this system, individuals are prohibited
from planting trees on the communal area
and they have no rights to rent out land.
Although there is no formal rule of access
rights to this communal area, villagers obey
the implicit customary rule on fallow periods
and access rights assigned to various lineage
groups. Usually lineage members work to-
gether in contiguous ﬁelds in order to protect
rice crops from wild pigs, a serious pest in
this region.
Aside from communal land, which is lo-
cated on a relatively ﬂat and fertile plain,
there are a small number of upland rice ﬁelds
owned jointly by daughters, individually by
daughters or sons, and privately by individ-
uals who cleared their plots from forestland,
as well as rice ﬁelds borrowed from relatives.
Generally, these upland ﬁelds are scattered
and susceptible to attack by wild pigs.
Land tenure on rubber ﬁelds is much more
individualized. Private purchase is dominant,
and there is no communal and joint family
ownership of this type of land. In fact, there
are only a few cases of single family owner-
ship by daughters alone. Interviewed respon-
dents replied, almost without exception, that
rights to rent out under leasehold and share
tenancy contracts, to pawn, and to sell exist
not only under private ownership but also
under single family ownership and that in
neither system is permission required from
any other members of the extended family or
lineage group. Strong property rights are
necessary to provide incentives for the effort
to plant and grow trees. Indeed, the act of
planting trees traditionally has been rewarded
by strong individual property rights in Suma-
tra and was recorded by European visitors in
the late eighteenth century (Marsden 1811).
There also is some share tenancy in trees, in
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Table 5.7 Land tenure distribution of sample plots by land-use type in Sumatra (percent)
Land tenure Upland rice Young rubber Mature rubber Bush/fallow
Communal/lineage 67 0 0 0
Joint family 4 0 0 4
Single family 11 35 24 37
Daughter only 7 4 1 8
Private (purchase) 0 44 53 21
Private (forest clearance) 4 15 10 37
Renting 0 0 9 0
Borrowing 11 6 5 0
Others 4 0 0 0
54 Investigation of previous land use was difﬁcult and time consuming because present cultivators often did not possess
the relevant information, either because they had acquired land relatively recently or because the acquired ﬁelds had
been planted to rubber for long periods.which output is shared one-third for the owner
and two-thirds for the tenant, as well as bor-
rowing from relatives. On average, tenants
and borrowers operated plots for 2.1 and 6.0
years, respectively.
The prevailing land tenure institutions
on bush/fallow land are not so different from
those on rubber ﬁelds, though renting and
borrowing are not practiced on bush/fallow
land. Compared with neighboring areas of
Sumatra, land tenure arrangements for bush/
fallow ﬁelds are more clearly individualized
in this study area (Otsuka et al. 2001).
We would like to examine how different
land tenure institutions and past land-use pat-
terns affect tree-planting decisions and the
proﬁtability of rubber production at present.
Before they were acquired by the current
operator, about one-ﬁfth of our sample of
rubber and bush/fallow plots were primary
forests, two-ﬁfths were rubber ﬁelds, and
two-ﬁfths were bush/fallow ﬁelds (Table 5.8).
Although virtually all forested land in In-
donesia ofﬁcially is classiﬁed as state land,
from a local perspective these primary forests
are communally owned and under the control
of the village chief. In practice, these forests
are open access to community members, so
that very few easily accessible primary forests
remain in the study area.55Roughly speaking,
about half of both cleared forest plots and ac-
quired bush/fallow plots are planted to rub-
ber trees at present. The productive life span
of a rubber tree can be 50 or 60 years or
more.56Moreover, once established, rubber
trees generate seedlings and, with proper
thinning and other management, the rubber
forest can be sustained over extended periods.
Hence, with very few exceptions, acquired
rubber ﬁelds remain planted to rubber either
through replanting or through regeneration.
As shown in Table 5.8, 88 percent of the
present rubber ﬁelds in our sample were
rubber ﬁelds before the current cohort of
trees was planted, which indicates that many
rubber ﬁelds were cleared and replanted
after trees became unproductive. More re-
cently, however, farmers may have been less
inclined to replant rubber since wild pigs eat
the roots of young rubber trees and the
problem of depredation by pigs appears to
be worsening.
Revenues and Costs
Labor, particularly family labor, is the main
input of rubber production. In order to esti-
mate the total cost of production, the cost of
family labor by activity and by season was
imputed using the relevant prevailing wage
rates for hired labor. Daily wage contracts are
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Table 5.8 Land use before acquisition and before last planting of rubber trees of upland plots
currently planted to rubber trees or under bush/fallow in Sumatra
Land use
at present (%) Land use before planting (%)a
Land use Number Bush/ Bush/
before acquisition of plots Rubber fallow Forest Rubber fallow
Forest 103 46 54 100 0 0
Rubber ﬁelds 202 99 1 4b 88 9
Bush/fallow 218 59 41 . . .c ... c ... c
a Before planting of rubber trees of currently dominant age.
b Pertaining to 128 mature rubber plots selected for the assessment of revenue and costs of production.
c No data were collected.
55 See the model of Anderson and Hill (1990), which describes how unused open-access land would be exploited when
property rights are conferred on those who have cleared the land.
56 The average life of rubber trees in these sites seems signiﬁcantly longer than that reported by Barlow and Muharminto
(1982) of 15–25 years for regular tapping, after reaching the tappable age of about 10. Barlow and Muharminto point
out, however, that the productive life of rubber trees is negatively related to the intensity of tapping.common for forest clearance, land prepara-
tion, and crop care (mostly weeding). Wage
rates are quite uniform across crop care ac-
tivities in rubber and upland rice cultivation,
but there are marked differences between
wage rates for men and women: the aver-
age daily wage was Rp 4,600–4,800 (about
US$1.50) for men and Rp 3,000 for women.
Wages for clearing natural forest, which re-
quires heavy labor and entails signiﬁcant risk
of injury, typically are Rp 8,000 per day. Be-
cause of the nature of the work, forests are
usually cleared by men.
The labor requirements of rubber pro-
duction change dramatically as trees mature.
Table 5.9 presents the statistics on labor use
per hectare by activity, gender, and age of
rubber trees compared with labor use for
upland rice cultivation. Several observations
can be made. First, labor by men predomi-
nates in most rubber production activities.
This may explain, at least partly, why the
matrilineal inheritance system, which for-
merly covered all asset classes, gradually has
been replaced for rubber plots by the patri-
lineal system, thereby providing incentives
to the males who do much of the work on
these plots. Second, there are large differ-
ences in labor costs in the ﬁrst year between
clearance of primary forest and of bush or
old rubber ﬁelds, owing partly to the higher
costs of felling big trees and partly to higher
labor requirements for harvesting annuals
intercropped with rubber seedlings. Because
of the higher fertility of soils in plots recently
cleared from natural forest, annual crops are
more frequently planted on these plots, re-
sulting in higher yields. In contrast, annual
crops are seldom intercropped with rubber
seedlings on plots cleared from bush/fallow.
Third, labor requirements for rubber produc-
tion change over the years. Requirements are
high in the ﬁrst year; then they decline for sev-
eral years when trees are immature. Labor
requirements rise again when trees are old
enough to be tapped and they increase until
trees are about 30 years old. Finally, they
decline with decreases in harvesting labor
for the oldest trees. In contrast with rubber,
women provide most of the labor for upland
rice. This is consistent with the existence of
joint- and single-family ownership of upland
ﬁelds by daughters and also conforms to so-
cial norms regarding women’s role in the
household food supply. Finally, it is impor-
tant to point out that rubber production is
highly labor intensive. Although labor use
per cultivated hectare during the cropping
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Table 5.9 Labor use for rubber production by activity, gender, and dominant age of trees,
compared with labor use for upland rice production in Sumatra (person-days/year/hectare)
Land preparation Harvesting
and planting Crop carea and hauling
Age range Men Women Men Women Men Women Total
Rubber 
1 (Forest clearance) 53.3 28.6 6.9 4.1 9.4b 25.0b 127.4
1 (Bush clearance) 19.6 12.2 17.8 7.7 1.0b 1.0b 59.3
2–3 2.9 0.0 24.2 6.3 0.0 0.0 33.4
4–7 0.0 0.0 9.8 4.2 0.0 0.0 14.0
8–10 0.0 0.0 4.8 4.6 62.2 6.2 77.8
11–15 0.0 0.0 4.8 1.4 90.5 4.5 101.2
16–20 0.0 0.0 3.2 2.6 78.9 3.1 87.8
21–25 0.0 0.0 4.0 11.5 94.3 0.0 109.8
26–30 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 109.3 0.0 113.5
30+ 0.0 0.0 4.8 4.2 81.7 0.0 90.7
Upland rice 29.2 53.6 10.1 38.5 11.5 29.8 172.7
a Mostly weeding.
b Including small amount of labor for harvesting annual crops intercropped with rubber seedlings.season was higher for upland rice than for
rubber, upland rice requires a fallow period
of ﬁve years or more. Thus, if the fallow pe-
riod is also included, the average labor inten-
sity for the land-use systems taken as a whole
is much greater for rubber production than it
is for upland rice. Thus, the shift from upland
rice production under shifting cultivation to
rubber production ﬁts Boserup’s (1965) gen-
eralization about agricultural intensiﬁcation
as the extensive margin closes.57
Output sharing is the dominant form of
labor contract for tapping latex from rubber
trees and the sharetapper receives two-thirds
of the revenue. Tapping in dense stands of
“jungle rubber,” as well as hauling of coag-
ulated slabs, is done primarily—but not ex-
clusively—by men (Table 5.9; Barlow and
Muharminto 1982; Barlow and Jayasuriya
1984; Gouyon, de Foresta, and Levang 1991).
Production costs and gross revenue over
time for rubber plots were estimated using
average wages to impute the costs of family
labor, actual wage payments for hired labor,
and actual costs of current inputs (seeds,
seedlings, and chemical inputs for latex co-
agulation) (Table 5.10). Residual proﬁt, de-
fined as gross revenue minus the costs of labor
and current inputs, was calculated in order to
estimate returns to land and management ef-
fort and efﬁciency. We assume that the age
proﬁle of revenue and cost closely mirrors
their time proﬁle, to the extent that output
and factor prices are stable. It is clear that the
cost in the ﬁrst year is much higher for for-
est clearance compared with conversion of
bush/fallow or replanting old rubber. Resid-
ual proﬁt is negative for the ﬁrst seven years,
though its magnitude declines as trees ma-
ture and labor costs decrease. Most if not all
trees begin to produce latex in the eighth year,
and consequently the residual proﬁt turns
positive. Subsequently, the growth rate of
gross revenue exceeds that of cost, thereby
producing annual increases in residual prof-
its until around age 30, beyond which the
productivity of rubber trees declines under
this management system. Note that the vari-
ation in residual proﬁt as measured by the
standard deviation is relatively small, which
suggests that resource allocations are largely
equalized across ﬁelds.58
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Table 5.10 Gross revenue, production costs, and residual proﬁt per hectare of rubber production, by dominant age of trees,
in Sumatra (thousands of Rp in 1996)
Labor cost
Age range Sample size Gross revenue Familya Hired Total costsb Residual proﬁt
1 (Forest clearance)c 10 197 655 51 745 −548
1 (Bush clearance)d 14 23e 197 46 362 −339
2–3 6 0 113 36 193 −193
4–7 13 0 24 36 60 −60
8–10 30 728 392 161 564 165
11–15 40 1,007 418 358 790 217
16–20 22 1,017 473 249 739 278
21–25 8 1,166 118 701 838 328
26–30 14 1,303 436 472 924 378
30+ 14 964 470 195 681 284
a Imputed costs of family labor from prevailing wages.
b Sum of labor cost and cost of current inputs (seeds, seedlings, and chemical inputs).
c The total cost of forest clearance, land preparation, and tree planting.
d The total cost of bush clearance, land preparation, and tree planting. Cost of clearance may be underestimated.
e Small amount of food crops harvested.
57 An added advantage of rubber agroforestry is the largely uniform labor requirement throughout the year. Tapping is
carried out throughout the year and there are only slight seasonal differences in labor requirements.
58 The mean and standard deviations for the whole sample are Rp 181,000/ha and Rp 212,000/ha, respectively.Since rubber trees are established and
managed primarily by labor effort, the resid-
ual proﬁt from mature trees will be higher, the
larger is the work and management effort.
As the simple model of Besley (1995) clearly
indicates, it is reasonable to postulate that
work effort is critically affected by land tenure
security, which inﬂuences the expected future
beneﬁts to those who plant and grow trees.
Thus, if one can successfully control for the
quality of land, the difference in residual
proﬁt among different land tenure institu-
tions, if there is any, can be attributed to the
incentive effects of land tenure institutions
on work effort.
To assess the scarcity value of land, it is
useful to estimate the proﬁtability of upland
rice production, which presently is the main
alternative to rubber production (Table 5.11).
Current inputs consist mostly of seeds, and
only one farmer applied a small amount of
chemical fertilizer and another farmer applied
a little pesticide. Manure was not used, in part
because most ﬁelds are far from farmers’
dwellings (on average, it took about an hour
to travel to upland rice ﬁelds). In any case, it
is clear that the proﬁtability of upland rice
production is very small, despite the large in-
puts of family labor. The residual proﬁt per
hectare of upland rice grown on communal
land is positive but far smaller than the proﬁt
from mature rubber trees. It is negative in the
case of non-communal ﬁelds, which may be
explained partly by the less favorable loca-
tion of these ﬁelds, including greater expo-
sure to attacks by wild pigs. Another factor
affecting the low proﬁtability of upland rice
is the shortening of fallow periods as a result
of increasing population pressure and limited
access to new forestland. The low proﬁtabil-
ity of upland rice with a ﬁve-year bush/fallow
rotation has been independently conﬁrmed in
an unpublished study in the same area by
Bustanul Ariﬁn and Agus Hudoyo with ad-
ditional analysis by Suseno Budidarsono.
The average residual proﬁt of all 27 up-
land rice plots was almost identical to zero.59
Considering that upland rice ﬁelds are lo-
cated in ﬂat upland areas, unlike the sloping
areas planted to rubber, the low proﬁtability
indicates that annual crop farming is not
proﬁtable on uplands where rubber trees are
currently grown. In other words, the oppor-
tunity cost of land in the case of rubber pro-
duction is small. The higher proﬁtability of
planting rubber compared with the upland
rice–bush/fallow system explains the trend
toward conversion from the latter land use.
The question is whether tenure security, par-
ticularly under single family ownership, is
sufﬁciently well established to ensure the
realization of the potential pay-off.
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Table 5.11 Gross revenue, production costs, and residual proﬁt per hectare of upland rice cultivation, by land tenure, 
in Sumatra (thousands of Rp in 1996)
Communal/lineage Others Average
Rp % of gross revenue Rp % of gross revenue Rp % of gross revenue
Gross revenue (1) 617 100 632 100 622 100
Cost of current inputs (2) 19 3 24 4 21 3
Cost of labor (3) 550 89 690 109 597 96
Men 210 . . . 279 . . . 233 . . .
Women 340 . . . 411 . . . 364 . . .
Residual proﬁt: 47 8 −81 −13 4 1
(1) − (2) − (3)
59 The residual proﬁt function of upland rice production, using previous fallow periods and a communal land tenure
dummy as explanatory variables, among others, was estimated. Although the coefﬁcients of both variables have the
expected signs, none of them were signiﬁcant, partly because of the small sample size.Determinants of Land Use
and Proﬁtability in Ghana
Cocoa Tree Planting
It is assumed that land tenure institutions are
predetermined for each household but may
differ within each household, depending on
the gender of the parcel owner, the mode 
of land acquisition, and, consequently, the
tenure status of ﬁeld managers. In order to
control for a possible correlation between
land tenure variables and unobservable
household characteristics, a Tobit with house-
hold ﬁxed effects is estimated, with the
proportion of area planted to cocoa as the
dependent variable.60 The estimated func-
tion corresponds to equation (6) developed
in Chapter 2.
In explaining the proportion of area
planted to cocoa, 10 land tenure dummies
representing the manner of land acquisition,
with matrilineal inheritance as the base of
comparison, were included.61 Other regres-
sors included parcel characteristics such as
the distance from house to parcel, parcel size,
years since acquisition, and its squared term.
In the cocoa-planting function, years since
acquisition and its squared term capture ef-
fects related to the timing of investment. The
characteristics of the parcel at the time of
acquisition are controlled for by using dum-
mies for previous land use (forest or cocoa)
and the real farm-gate cocoa price. Accord-
ing to our informal interviews with farmers,
the slope of cocoa ﬁelds does not affect cocoa
yield and the most important parcel-speciﬁc
factor affecting yield is the previous use of
land. It is expected that, because virgin for-
est is more fertile than previously cultivated
fallow land, parcels that were previously
covered by forest may induce tree-planting.62
Cocoa prices at the time of acquisition con-
trol for the possibility that the surge in cocoa
prices in the 1980s stimulated a conversion
of land to cocoa. Finally, the educational at-
tainment of the parcel manager and a dummy
variable for the gender of the parcel owner
are included among the regressors.
The estimation results are shown in the
ﬁrst column of Table 5.12. Parcel size has a
negative and signiﬁcant effect on the pro-
portion planted to cocoa, implying that an
inverse correlation exists between parcel
size and tree-planting. This indicates that the
transactions undertaken through the land
rental market, not to mention the land sales
market, are imperfect, because some por-
tions of the parcel could have been rented for
tree-planting if the land rental market were
perfectly competitive (Hayami and Otsuka
1993). Although one might expect more se-
cure land rights to have a positive and sig-
niﬁcant effect on tree-planting, the results
are not wholly consistent with such expecta-
tions. Trees are more likely to be planted on
land received as a gift as compared with
inherited and allocated land. This is largely
explained by the fact that tree-planting is a
prerequisite for transferring land as a gift.
The coefﬁcient on privately purchased land
is positive but insigniﬁcant, and that on
patrilineal gift and inheritance is negative
and insigniﬁcant. This is surprising, because
these categories have the strongest individu-
alized rights. Thus, although tenure security
may have a positive effect on tree-planting,
as argued by Besley (1995), its effect is not
dominant, as postulated by Hypothesis 3. One
also ﬁnds positive and signiﬁcant effects of
land under caretakership, rented land, and
land acquired through renting, because cocoa
planting or harvesting is the major task under
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60 Since the proportion of area planted to mature cocoa is censored upwards at 100 percent and downwards at 0 percent,
a two-limit Tobit procedure with household dummy variables was applied.
61 Owing to the small number of observations in the patrilineal categories, allocated family land in patrilineal villages
was aggregated with allocated family land in matrilineal villages; patrilineal gifts and inheritance, having the same de-
gree of strength of land rights in the Wassa region, were aggregated into a single category.
62 López (1997) found that biomass had a positive effect in his estimation of production functions using regional data
from western Ghana. Whereas he attributes this effect to the positive production externality arising from the effect of
biomass on protection from soil erosion and ﬂooding, it is perhaps more plausible to interpret it as the positive corre-
lation of biomass with soil fertility.56 CHAPTER 5
Table 5.12 Determinants of current land use at the parcel level in Ghana: Tobit and logit
regressions with household ﬁxed effects
Proportion of parcel Probability shifting
planted to cocoa cultivation area is fallow
(Tobit with (ﬁxed effects
household dummies) logit)a
Current parcel characteristics
Distance to parcel 0.04 0.78
(1.94) (2.71)***
Parcel size (hectares) −0.01 2.35
(−2.35)*** (6.53)***
Years since acquisition 0.12 0.05
(2.09)** (0.74)
(Years since acquisition)2 −0.00  −0.00
(−1.50) (−0.09)
Woman-owned parcel 0.17 1.93
(1.66)* (1.78)*
Schooling of parcel owner 0.01  0.34
(0.59) (1.32)
Characteristics of parcel at acquisition
Dummy for forest 0.01 . . .
(0.13)
Dummy for cocoa 0.23 . . .
(2.54)***
Real cocoa farmgate price −0.00 . . .
(−0.23)
Land tenure dummiesb
Allocated land −0.22 −2.38
(−1.56) (−2.16)**
Land received as gift  0.34 −1.50
(2.80)*** (−1.59)
Patrilineal gift or inheritance −0.23 0.32
(−1.13) (0.28)
Appropriated village land 0.26  0.41
(1.54) (0.32)
Purchased village land  0.30 1.71
(1.47) (0.79)
Privately purchased  0.14 1.38
(0.72) (0.90)
Rented in  0.43 0.18
(3.23)*** (0.19)




Borrowed from nonrelatives −0.71  −4.43
(−3.29)** (−2.70)***
Constant 0.07  . . .
(0.19)
Log-likelihood −438.91 −110.29
Chi-square 503.98  168.35
p-value .00  .00
Number of observations  688  483
Notes: Two-limit Tobit estimates; ancillary parameter σand household dummies not reported. t-statistics are shown in paren-
theses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
a Estimated using ﬁeld-level data for all ﬁelds, for households with more than one ﬁeld devoted to shifting cultivation.
b Owing to the small number of observations in the patrilineal categories, allocated family land in patrilineal villages was
aggregated with allocated family land; patrilineal gifts and inheritance, having the same degree of strength of land rights,
were aggregated into a single category.these contractual arrangements. The dummy
for a female parcel owner has a positive but
insigniﬁcant effect on the proportion of area
planted to cocoa. Since women receive land
only after it has been planted to cocoa, sub-
sequent observations will not reveal any dif-
ference between male and female parcel
owners in the probability of planting cocoa.
Fallow Choice
This section examines the choice to keep a
ﬁeld fallow on land solely devoted to shift-
ing cultivation, that is, land either devoted to
food crops or left fallow, using data from all
ﬁelds enumerated by respondents.63Close to
three-quarters of all shifting cultivation area
is left fallow (Table 5.3). A smaller propor-
tion of ﬁelds is left fallow on land borrowed
from nonrelatives (31 percent) and allocated
family land (65 percent). Since it is difﬁcult
to measure the proportion of fallow area ac-
curately, and given that almost three-quarters
of all ﬁeld area under shifting cultivation is
fallowed, a conditional (ﬁxed effects) logit
model was estimated, where the dependent
variable is the probability that a parcel under
shifting cultivation will be totally devoted to
fallow. The regressors are identical to those
in the cocoa-planting regression, with the
exception of the dummies for previous land
use, cocoa price, and ownership through
renting. Since land acquired through renting
would already have been planted to cocoa
trees, sample ﬁelds in the current analysis do
not include this tenure type.
Results are shown in the second column
of Table 5.12. Larger and more distant ﬁelds
are signiﬁcantly more likely to remain fal-
low. Consistent with our hypothesis that land
with insecure tenure is less likely to remain
fallow, the dummies for allocated family land
and borrowed land are negative and signiﬁ-
cant. That is, individuals holding allocated
family land have a stronger incentive to con-
tinue cultivating it, rather than face the risk
of losing use rights to another member of the
extended family. Likewise, individuals who
borrow land from nonrelatives have very
little reason to keep it fallow, because bor-
rowing is usually undertaken to obtain land
on which to raise subsistence crops.
However, the data do not provide clear
evidence that stronger land tenure security
results in less frequent fallow periods. One
reason may be the strong security of use
rights on inherited land compared with other
land tenure categories. Moreover, we were
not able to control for the effect of soil fer-
tility, which would be critically determined
by the fallow periods before the current
cultivation.
Net Revenue from Mature Cocoa
In order to identify the effects of land tenure
institutions on the intensity of cocoa farm-
ing, net revenue and labor-use functions per
hectare, which correspond to equations (7)
and (8) in Chapter 2, respectively, were esti-
mated using household-level ﬁxed effects and
plot-level random effects models. Since ran-
dom effects are the preferred speciﬁcation,
indicating the importance of plot-level het-
erogeneity, only these results are presented
in Table 5.13.64
The random effects speciﬁcation includes
both plot-level and household-level charac-
teristics, as both are sources of heterogeneity.
In addition to the land tenure dummies, char-
acteristics of the parcel at acquisition, and
current parcel characteristics found in the
tree-planting and fallow choice regressions,
regressors included the age of trees and the
number of kola, oil palm, and other trees per
hectare on the parcel. It is possible that the
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63 Information on all ﬁelds, not just the sample ﬁelds, is used in this regression. Although this equation could have been
estimated using parcel-level data, ﬁelds are a ﬁner level of disaggregation. The number of observations is larger using
data for all ﬁelds, but information on previous uses of the ﬁeld was collected only for the sample ﬁelds. Regressions
that included information on previous land use, for those ﬁelds for which information was available, showed that these
variables were insigniﬁcant.
64 AHausman test does not indicate that fixed effects are significant (χ2(24) = 15.44; p = .91) and the Breusch–Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test (χ2(1) = 3.31; p = .07) shows that plot-level heterogeneity is important.presence of other trees may affect labor use
as well as net revenue from cocoa, if com-
petition exists among different tree species
owing to overcrowding. It is remarkable to
ﬁnd from Table 5.13 that no land tenure vari-
ables are signiﬁcant in the net revenue func-
tions.65 These results support Hypothesis 3
that the management intensity of cocoa ﬁelds
tends to be equalized owing to the establish-
ment of secure land tenure after tree-planting,
regardless of the manner of land acquisition.
The insigniﬁcant effect of renting is also
interesting, because it suggests that share
tenancy arrangements are efﬁcient not only
in Asia but also in some parts of Africa (see
Hayami and Otsuka 1993 for the case of
Asia). Although ﬁeld size has a negative
effect on net revenue, the coefﬁcient is in-
signiﬁcant. It may appear that women enjoy
lower net revenues from cocoa, but these
effects are not signiﬁcant.
Some household-level variables do af-
fect revenues from mature cocoa: older heads
of households appear to earn less revenue
from cocoa, and patrilineal households
enjoy greater revenues than do matrilineal
households. Finally, female-headed house-
holds (as distinguished from female parcel
managers) do not earn signiﬁcantly more or
less revenues from cocoa than their male
counterparts.
The estimation results of the labor-use
function provide added support for the hy-
pothesis that resource allocation is equalized
across ﬁelds with different land tenure. Again,
no land tenure variables are signiﬁcant. Field
size has a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient,
which suggests that, owing to the imperfec-
tion in factor markets (for example, labor
markets), large ﬁelds are less intensively
cultivated. The presence of other trees on the
parcel also increases labor input per hectare,
and new cocoa varieties, particularly Ama-
zonia and hybrid varieties, appear to use
less labor. Although labor use is higher on
woman-owned ﬁelds, indicating that women
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Table 5.13 Determinants of net revenue from mature cocoa production
and total labor use per hectare at the ﬁeld level in Ghana: Random
effects estimates
Net revenue Labor use
Current ﬁeld characteristics
Distance to ﬁeld −17.61 −12.30
(−0.55) (−0.48)
Field size (hectares) −30.99 −72.51
(−1.02) (−3.04)***
Years since acquisition  38.45 22.20
(1.79)* (1.30)
(Years since acquisition)2 −0.85 −0.33
(−1.83)* (−0.89)
Woman-owned ﬁeld −38.06 119.31
(−0.44) (1.75)*
Schooling of ﬁeld owner −8.98 −40.53
(−0.31) (−1.72)*
Number of kola trees per hectare 2.75 2.93
(0.40) (0.56)
Number of oil palm trees per hectare 3.89 −0.24
(0.24) (−0.20)
Number of other trees per hectare 4.37 31.76
(0.33) (2.97)***
Characteristics of parcel at acquisition
Dummy for forest −68.67 −150.91
(−0.45) (−1.28)
Dummy for cocoa 449.58 −89.20
(2.11)** (−0.52)
Tree characteristics
Amazonia dummy −122.79 −472.89
(−0.56) (−2.73)***
Hybrid dummy −242.60 −517.45
(−0.98) (−2.67)***
Average age of trees −10.05 3.49
(−0.49) (0.21)
(Age of trees)2 0.01 −0.27
(0.02) (−0.80)
Land tenure dummiesa
Allocated and matrilineal 147.51 −257.72
(0.42) (−0.93)
Land received as gift 190.70 −84.83
(0.58) (−0.32)
Patrilineal gift 234.57 168.40
(0.49) (0.44)
Appropriated village land 695.05 37.11
(1.77)* (0.12)
Purchased village land 35.45 −248.17
(0.08) (−0.75)
Privately purchased . . . . . .
Rented in 176.69 −34.83
(0.53) (−0.13)





Gender of head (1 = male) −232.53 134.62
(−0.74) (0.57)
65 This ﬁnding is robust to the choice of estimation method, whether ﬁxed or random effects.tend to apply more labor to their own plots,
this effect is only weakly signiﬁcant at 10
percent. Interestingly enough, higher educa-
tion of the household head is associated with
greater labor use per hectare, perhaps indi-
cating better access to resources to hire labor,
if needed. Lastly, the number of adult males
in the household is also associated with higher
labor use per hectare.
Net Revenue from Food Crops
In order to identify the effects of land tenure
institutions on net revenue and total labor
use in young cocoa and pure food crop
ﬁelds, net revenue and labor-use functions
per hectare were estimated using household-
level ﬁxed effects and plot-level random
effects models. Since cocoa is intercropped
with a variety of food crops in different com-
binations, regressors included the proportion
of area planted to each of the food crops
present in the ﬁeld (for example, the propor-
tion devoted to cocoyam in 1997) as well as
their interactions with a dummy variable in-
dicating that young cocoa is grown in the
ﬁeld. Also included were dummy variables
for the age of the cocoa trees, with trees less
than a year old as the reference category.
Since 34 percent of the sampled food crop
ﬁelds have a female cultivator other than the
male or female manager, a dummy variable
for the presence of another female cultivator
or ﬁeld manager was also added. This person
is typically the wife of the male ﬁeld man-
ager, or a co-wife in the case of a female
manager. All other regressors are identical to
those in Table 5.13.
The results, not reported here, are very
similar to those for mature cocoa ﬁelds. Net
revenue per hectare and labor use are not sig-
niﬁcantly different in ﬁelds under different
land tenure regimes. The difﬁculty of iden-
tifying crop mix may be partly responsible
for the failure to obtain signiﬁcant effects of
land tenure systems. However, tree age dum-
mies signiﬁcantly affect labor use, as would
be expected. Relative to trees less than a year
old (the excluded category), labor use per
hectare in succeeding years is signiﬁcantly
lower. Consistent with the earlier ﬁnding that
land under allocated family tenure is less
likely to be left fallow, the coefﬁcients of the
family allocation dummies are negative in
the net revenue function, even though they
are not signiﬁcant. None of the household-
level characteristics is signiﬁcant.
Given that a major proportion of labor
input is provided by women and children, it
is not surprising that gift transactions have
evolved to increase their incentive to provide
labor in establishing cocoa. Note that there
are no signiﬁcant differences in either net
revenue or labor use per hectare depending
on whether or not a ﬁeld is managed by a
woman. Thus, the transfer of land to women
through gifts has improved gender equity
without sacriﬁcing production efﬁciency.
Determinants of Land Use
and Proﬁtability in Sumatra
In this section, the gross revenue, total cost,
and residual proﬁt functions are estimated
using data from mature tree plots. Since
residual proﬁts can be zero or negative, a
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Table 5.13 (continued)
Net revenue Labor use
Age of head (years) −14.35 3.71
(−2.47)** (0.84)
Schooling of head (years) 18.69 47.53
(0.63) (2.03)**
Patrilineal household 371.50 340.09
(1.99)** (2.37)**
Total landholdings (hectares) 9.77 1.10
(1.65)* (0.24)
Number of adult males in householdb 60.27 85.26
(1.39) (2.72)***




Breusch–Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 3.31 0.06
p-value .07 .81
Hausman speciﬁcation test 15.44 19.29
p-value .91 .74
Number of observations 105 105
Note: Z-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; * signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
a Dummies for allocated patrilineal land, borrowing, and inherited patrilineal land were
dropped owing to collinearity with the ﬁxed effects.
bAdults are those aged 15–65 years and those older than 65 but who list their main occu-
pation as farming.linear rather than a logarithmic speciﬁcation
is used. The Heckman two-step estimation
procedure was applied to correct for the en-
dogeneity of the choice to grow rubber. First,
the tree choice function was estimated as a
probit regression model using observations
from the entire sample of 523 rubber and
bush/fallow plots. In the tree choice func-
tion, the dependent variable is unity if trees
were already planted at the time of the sur-
vey in 1996. The second-stage regressions
were estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS) over the subsample of 128 mature rub-
ber plots, with the inverse Mill’s ratio as a
regressor.
Explanatory variables used in the re-
gressions in Table 5.14 include plot-speciﬁc
characteristics, household characteristics, and
characteristics of the household head. Bush/
fallow ﬁelds were acquired in the earliest
year of 1981 on the average and were located
generally in the most remote areas measured
in terms of walking time. In contrast, young
and mature rubber ﬁelds were located nearer
to home. In terms of altitude and slope, there
was no difference between young and ma-
ture rubber ﬁelds.
Total lowland paddy area and the rubber
area owned by the household are used as
proxies for the wealth of these farm house-
holds. Of course, the area of land owned also
affects the demand for labor. Paddy and rub-
ber areas at the time of plot acquisition were
also used in the regression analysis of tree
choice. One interesting question is whether
wealthy people acquire and establish dispro-
portionately larger rubber areas and obtain
higher proﬁts from rubber production. How-
ever, differences in the owned area and the
number of family workers among different
types of ﬁelds were not large.
The supply of family labor is proxied by
the number of family workers between 16 and
60 years of age. Most children go to junior
high school and the lower age bound co-
incides with the age of graduation from that
school level. The upper age bound is some-
what arbitrary. Male and female workers are
separated because of the gender division of
labor by task. The number of family workers
between 26 and 70 years of age is also in-
cluded, because this age bracket would be
more appropriate for the potential supply of
family workers at the time when uplands
were acquired, which was a little more than
10 years earlier on average. Although the
land–worker ratio may be more appropriate
to represent the balance of supply of and de-
mand for family labor, it is difﬁcult to use
here because two types of land and family
labor are speciﬁed.
The average age of household head at the
time of land acquisition and at the time of
the survey (1996) and the average years of
schooling are also included as regressors.
Because of the effect of the household’s life
cycle, owners of young rubber ﬁelds were
among the youngest at the time of the survey.
These younger households had received the
longest period of schooling largely because
of the cohort effect arising from the spread of
education opportunities in rural Indonesia.
The estimation results of the ﬁrst-stage
probit function are shown in column 1 of
Table 5.14, while the second-stage estimation
results of the gross revenue, total cost, and
residual proﬁt functions for mature rubber
fields are shown in columns 2–4. With respect
to the land tenure institutions, three dummy
variables are used in the tree-planting func-
tion (joint family tenure, purchased land, and
land obtained by clearing forest), whereas
four dummies are speciﬁed in the other func-
tions (purchased land, forest clearance, land
borrowing, and land renting). In both cases,
the base of comparison is single family own-
ership. Joint family ownership appears only in
the former regression because it did not exist
in mature rubber ﬁelds. Borrowing and rent-
ing dummies were not included in the tree-
planting function because only ﬁelds already
planted to trees were rented and borrowed.
Thus, the decisions to plant trees on these two
types of land are predetermined and this is
captured by the dummy variable for rubber
fields at the time of acquisition. In the rev-
enue, cost, and proﬁt regressions, we included
the dominant age of trees and its squared term.
60 CHAPTER 5As expected, estimation of the tree
choice function produces a highly signiﬁcant
dummy variable for plots that were already
planted with rubber at the time of land ac-
quisition. Walking time has a positive effect
on tree-planting, which is unexpected be-
cause it is more costly and, hence, less prof-
itable to cultivate distant plots (as argued by
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Table 5.14 Two-stage regression of rubber tree choice function, and gross revenue, total costs,
and residual proﬁt of rubber productions in Sumatra
Tree planting Gross revenue Total costs Residual proﬁt
(Probit) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
Intercept 43.53 −36.408 326.95 −363.36
(3.19)*** (-0.09) (0.99) (−1.86)*
Dominant age of trees . . . 35.87 14.03 21.84
(2.25)** (1.05) (2.73)***
(Dominant age of trees)2 ... −0.56 –0.238 –0.319
(−2.07)** (−1.04) (−2.35)**
Slope . . . −2.29 −0.37 −1.92
(−0.59) (−0.11) (0.98)
Altitude . . . 1.20 1.47 −0.27
(1.63) (2.39)** (−0.73)
Bush (before planting) . . . −216.93 –174.13 –42.81
(−1.33) (−1.27) (−0.52)
Forest (before planting) . . . 644.20 260.80 383.39
(1.24) (0.60) (0.147)
Dummy for rubber ﬁelda,b 1.64 . . . . . . . . .
(8.55)***
Walking time 0.01 −0.25 −0.70 0.45
(3.00)*** (−0.24) (−0.81) (0.87)
Age of heada,b 0.01 0.89 −0.59 1.48
(1.50) (0.22) (−0.17) (0.73)
Schooling of head −0.01 –17.57 –18.09 0.52
(−0.50) (−1.37) (−1.67)* (0.08)
Year of acquisition −0.02 . . . . . . . . .
(−3.33)***
Paddy area owned 0.04 30.69 30.74 −0.06
(0.43) (0.61) (0.72) (−0.02)
Rubber area owned −0.05 –35.65 –41.54 5.89
(−1.62) (−2.26)** (−3.14)*** (0.75)
Number of male workers 0.02 92.51 95.47 −2.96
(0.13) (1.51) (1.85)* (−0.10)
Number of female workers 0.01 148.52 66.12 82.40
(0.04) (2.17)** (1.15) (2.40)**
Joint family ownership −2.91 . . . . . . . . .
(−0.55)
Purchased land −0.03 108.32 29.43 78.89
(−0.20) (1.07) (0.34) (1.55)
Forest clearance −0.12 –468.30 –374.81 –93.50
(−0.71) (−0.99) (−0.95) (−0.40)
Borrowed land . . . 341.94 161.11 180.83
(1.65) (0.93) (1.74)*
Rented land . . . 36.08 –177.93 214.00
(0.25) (−1.44) (2.90)***
Inverse Mill’s ratio . . . 350.22 155.66 194.57
(1.21) (0.64) (1.34)
Log-likelihood −218.80 . . . . . . . . .
R2 . . . .29 .26 .26
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
aAt the time of land acquisition.
bAt the time of acquisition for the tree-planting function and at present or in 1996 for other functions.Angelsen 1995). It may be that newly planted
rubber plots were located far from residen-
tial areas because closer areas had already
been planted. Another possible explanation
is that monitoring to prevent losses from
pests and theft is more difﬁcult for isolated
plots and that rubber may be relatively less
susceptible than upland rice to these risks.
Another signiﬁcant variable is the year
of land acquisition, which has a negative co-
efﬁcient, suggesting that the availability of
ﬁelds suitable for rubber production has de-
creased over time. Neither the coefﬁcient of
the area of rubber plots owned nor that for
area of paddy owned is signiﬁcant, which in-
dicates that wealthier households (those own-
ing larger areas) do not necessarily plant more
rubber trees. The lack of signiﬁcance of
these proxies for wealth may also result from
the relative lack of social stratiﬁcation within
this community.
None of the land tenure variables is sig-
niﬁcant. The coefﬁcient of joint family own-
ership is negative but far from signiﬁcant,
partly because there are only four such cases
(see Table 5.7). The fact that the two private
ownership variables are not signiﬁcant sug-
gests that the lower tenure security of single-
family ownership status does not distort
incentives to invest in trees. These results
support Hypothesis 3.
The coefﬁcients of the inverse Mill’s ratio
are insigniﬁcant in all three second-stage
regressions, which indicates that selectivity
bias is not a serious problem. As expected,
age of rubber trees and age squared have
positive and negative coefﬁcients, respec-
tively, and both coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant in
the gross revenue and residual proﬁt func-
tions. Judging from the estimated coefﬁcients,
the peak ages of trees are 32 and 34 years
for the gross revenue and residual proﬁt,
respectively.
Whereas ownership of paddy land does
not affect the gross revenue and cost func-
tions, ownership of rubber ﬁelds has a nega-
tive and signiﬁcant effect on gross revenue
and costs. It seems that the effect of wealth
on management efﬁciency in rubber ﬁelds
is not particularly strong in this context,
whereas the size of rubber ﬁelds reduces
both costs and revenue. Yet, judging from
its insigniﬁcant effect on the residual proﬁt,
ﬁeld size does not appreciably affect pro-
duction efﬁciency.
Since tapping is mainly men’s work
under the customary division of labor (see
Table 5.9), the positive and signiﬁcant effect
of the number of female workers on gross
revenue and residual proﬁt was somewhat
unexpected (Table 5.14).
Several important results were obtained
regarding the effects of land tenure institu-
tions. First, private ownership, acquired
through either purchase or forest clearance,
has no signiﬁcant effect, which supports Hy-
pothesis 3. This indicates that there is no dif-
ference in the incentive structure between
single-family ownership and these types of
private ownership. The implication is that
the advent of the single-family ownership
system is an institutional innovation in these
indigenous communities to establish de facto
private property. Qualitatively the same re-
sults are obtained from the estimation of
fixed-effect regression models applied to cin-
namon production in Sumatra-based intensive
household survey data (Suyanto, Tomich, and
Otsuka 1998b).
Second, both borrowing and renting
through share tenancy have positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in the residual proﬁt
regression. The signiﬁcance of renting in this
case runs counter to the familiar Marshallian
argument of the inefﬁciency of share tenancy
arising from tenants’shirking, because shirk-
ing ought to reduce gross revenue, costs,
and residual proﬁt before rent payments (see
Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami 1992; Hayami
and Otsuka 1993). Recall, however, that
both borrowing and renting tend to be short-
term arrangements in the study area. As a
result, temporary operators may seek to
squeeze as much output from rubber trees
as possible in the short run. Unlike the case
of annual crops, such behavior (known as
“overtapping”) can have detrimental effects
on proﬁtability over time, since tapping in-
62 CHAPTER 5tensity is negatively related to future latex
production. Indeed, Binswanger and Rosen-
zweig (1986) presented a theoretical argu-
ment that rubber share-tapping should be rare
because of this incentive incompatibility.
In reality, however, this institutional
arrangement is common in Sumatra. The
first part of the explanation of this puzzle
rests with social relations within the study
villages. Although incentives for overtap-
ping exist, monitoring and enforcement are
apparently easy enough within the context
of these close-knit village societies to pre-
vent serious effects on long-term proﬁtabil-
ity (after all, borrowing usually is among
relatives). The second part of the explanation
may lie with the suitability of a cross-section
of rubber plots to estimate a yield curve over
time. This data set is probably not well suited
to capturing the long-term effects of bor-
rowing and share tenancy because it is likely
to pick up the current productivity-enhancing
effects of overtapping under borrowing or
share tenancy without their offsetting effects
on future yields. The long-term effects can
probably be observed only in a longitudinal
study.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis of intensive household survey
data consistently ﬁnds that the incidence of
tree-planting and tree ﬁeld management are
unaffected by land tenure regimes in both
Ghana and Sumatra. These ﬁndings imply
that the incentives to invest in tree-planting
and to carry out subsequent management are
equally strong between traditional family
ownership and more individualized owner-
ship systems. In all likelihood, this is due to
the expected strengthening of land rights
after tree-planting on family-owned land. In
this way, the family ownership system does
not deter the development of agroforestry.
It is interesting that, in Ghana, women
farmers who planted trees on their husbands’
plots were able to acquire ownership rights
to land through gift transfers. Gifts therefore
can be regarded as a reward for the work ef-
fort of women in cocoa. In Sumatra, in con-
trast, land tenure institutions not only have
become individualized but also have been
transformed from matrilineal to bilateral or
even to patrilineal systems. Here, too, such
changes would reﬂect the fact that men often
carry out the clearance of ﬁelds and the
planting of trees.
This study also ﬁnds that the cultivation
of upland rice in the traditional bush/fallow
rotation in Sumatra is much less proﬁtable
than planting rubber. Similarly in Ghana,
fallow periods are shorter on allocated fam-
ily land and borrowed land, owing to inse-
cure land rights. Continuation of upland
rice farming in Sumatra and of shifting cul-
tivation in Ghana will be inefﬁcient. To-
gether with population pressure, however,
the greater proﬁtability of agroforestry will
drive the transformation from more com-
munal forms of tenure to quasi-private
arrangements in the process of the shift
from land-using farming systems to land-
saving systems.




he previous chapters have shown that individualization of land rights has increased
efﬁciency of land use. However, Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997) has argued that such evo-
lutionary changes toward individualized rights have detrimental effects on women’s
traditional land rights. Although this may be true in some societies, one cannot generalize
that individualization of land rights necessarily leads to weaker rights for women. In Chapter
4, we found that women are disadvantaged in the acquisition of forestland in both Ghana and
Sumatra. Since easily cultivable forestland has disappeared, however, the more relevant issue
for women is how individualization of the ownership of cultivated land affects ownership by
women.
Using inheritance survey data, this chapter explores how the individualization of land
tenure institutions may have affected parental allocations of land between sons and daugh-
ters. Our basic hypothesis is that the proportions of land transferred to sons and daughters
depend on the relative amount of labor men and women contribute to agriculture, or the gen-
der division of labor. More speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that the increase in the demand for
women’s labor in cocoa production induced an increase in the amount of cocoa land that
women receive in Ghana, whereas the growing importance of men’s labor in agroforestry has
led men to receive more agroforestry land in Sumatra. Because land transfers and investments
in the schooling of children are the major alternative ways of transferring wealth from one
generation to another, we expect that investments in the schooling of sons and daughters will
adjust when the gender distribution of land inheritance changes.
Ghana Case
Sample Description
This section examines the distribution of education (represented by years of schooling) and
land among potential heirs. The deﬁnition of inheritance sources and potential heirs is slightly
more complicated in Ghana owing to the uterine matrilineal system and the practice of
polygyny. Under the matrilineal system, a person can inherit from a number of matrilineal
relatives, depending on the order of succession. As a result of polygyny and the practice ofserial marriage, an individual may have
several sets of maternal and paternal half-
siblings. Rights on land received from the
extended family differ markedly depending
on the manner of acquisition—whether by
inheritance, allocation, or gift.
Based on the above considerations, and
after extensive pre-tests in the ﬁeld, the in-
heritance retrospective was designed to
capture the possibility of acquiring land from
four sets of matrilineal relatives: mother,
maternal uncle, maternal grandmother, and
other matrilineal relatives. Only one source
of paternal inheritance was identiﬁed: the
father. Respondents (heads of households)
were also asked to list all their paternal and
maternal full- and half-siblings. Interestingly
enough, individuals were often uncertain how
many half-siblings they had, particularly if
one of their parents had moved to another
village upon remarriage. Since not only sib-
lings but also cousins, nieces, and nephews
can inherit from the matriclan, the number of
heirs can potentially be very large. To sim-
plify matters, the analysis is conﬁned to the
siblings and half-siblings whom the respon-
dent can name, and thus parental landhold-
ings are not divided by the number of
potential heirs to capture the effects of pop-
ulation pressure. The type of inheritance—
paternal or maternal—is also distinguished
according to the mode of transfer: inheri-
tance per se (usually given at the time of the
parent or relative’s death, technically a be-
quest), allocation, or gift.
Table 6.1 presents summary statistics re-
garding the education and landholdings of
the parent and respondent generations in the
Wassa study site. Only households for which
parental information is complete are included
in the analysis, and only children 21 years of
age and over are included in the regressions.
The age cut-off is imposed so that schooling
decisions will have been completed in the
respondent generation, although, in practice,
children leave school much earlier. The
general level of education in the parents’
generation is low—84 percent of fathers and
94 percent of mothers had never been to
school—and fathers have more years of
schooling than mothers (1.4 years compared
with 0.3 years). At the time of marriage or
independent farming, fathers had 9.1 hectares
of land; mothers had only 1.7 hectares. This
is consistent with the household-level analy-
sis of land acquisition: men typically start
farming independently by clearing forests,
whereas women heads of household are less
likely to acquire forestland.
Schooling attainment has increased in
the children’s generation, but it is still low:
38 percent of sons and 64 percent of daugh-
ters have never attended school. The mean
completed years of schooling for sons is 5.7,
whereas that of daughters is 2.9 years. Al-
though the land transfer questionnaire dis-
tinguished among four types of matrilineal
inheritance, in practice, there were very few
observations in each of the separate cate-
gories, so the analysis aggregated all the
matrilineal categories.66 Sons received 0.86
hectares from matrilineal relatives, whereas
daughters obtained 0.37 hectares. Sons re-
ceived more than daughters did in all four cat-
egories. Sons received 1.13 hectares, on the
average, from their fathers, whereas daugh-
ters received 0.49 hectares. Again, sons re-
ceived more than their sisters did in each of
the paternal transfer categories. Although
these simple descriptive statistics do not con-
trol for the complexities of family structure
in Ghana, they do reveal that gender gaps are
large in both schooling and land inheritance.
The gaps, however, seem to have narrowed
over time, if they are measured by the dif-
ference across successive generations.
Regression Analysis
Because sources of inheritance differ between
maternal and paternal half-siblings, separate
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66 Distinguishing among the different sources of matrilineal inheritance greatly improved survey response, however,
since it was easier for respondents to identify a piece of land as coming from a speciﬁc relative, say a maternal uncle,
than from a larger category called the matriclan.analyses were conducted for the respondent
and his or her paternal siblings, and for the
respondent and his or her maternal siblings.
The ﬁrst set of regressions consists of levels
estimates for all families, while ﬁxed effects
estimates comprise the second set. The spec-
iﬁcation of the regression equation corre-
sponds to equation (9) in Chapter 2.
Table 6.2 presents levels estimates on ed-
ucation and land received by the respondent
and his or her maternal siblings. Because all
dependent variables are censored—a large
proportion has never attended school or re-
ceived transfers—the Tobit estimation pro-
cedure is used. Village characteristics are
controlled for, using village dummies (not
reported). Four land transfers equations are
presented: the total received from maternal
relatives, inheritance, allocation, and gifts.
To test whether half-siblings are treated dif-
ferently from full siblings, a dummy for a
half-sibling is included, in addition to con-
trols for birth year and its square, and eldest
and youngest dummies.
Among the respondent and his or her ma-
ternal siblings, daughters receive signiﬁcantly
less education than sons. Field interviews
reveal that parents think that investment in
daughters is useless, because they will marry
early and have children. Secular trends favor
later-born children, as evidenced by the sig-
niﬁcant coefﬁcients on birth year and its
square. Both father’s education and father’s
land positively affect schooling attainment
by children. Turning now to total land in-
herited from maternal relatives, none of the
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Table 6.1 Education and landholdings of parent and respondent generations, Wassa study site 
in Ghana
Generation Mean Standard deviation
Parent generation 
Father
Years of schooling 1.40 3.29
Land at time of marriage (hectares) 9.08 13.38
Mother
Years of schooling 0.32 1.42
Land at time of marriage (hectares) 1.67 3.88
Respondent generation 
Sons
Year of birth 1951 14.83
Years of schooling 5.74 5.19
Total land inherited from maternal relatives 0.86 2.90
Inherited land 0.41 2.35
Allocated 0.14 0.90
Gift 0.31 1.39
Total land inherited from father 1.13 4.66




Year of birth 1951 14.80
Years of schooling 2.88 4.25
Total land inherited from maternal relatives 0.37 2.21
Inherited land 0.23 1.94
Allocated 0.05 0.59
Gift 0.09 0.59
Total land inherited from father 0.49 0.91
Inherited land 0.29 0.71
Allocated 0.08 0.38
Gift 0.12 0.54
Note: Number of households = 167; number of potential heirs = 1,475.parental land or education variables, or their
interaction with child gender, are signiﬁcant.
However, the levels estimates do not control
for family-level unobservables, which are
dealt with more satisfactorily using the ﬁxed
effects estimates. The daughter dummy is
insigniﬁcant in the total land transfer equa-
tion, as well as in each of the transfer cate-
gories. Thus, it is possible that matrilineal
inheritance does not discriminate against
daughters, although, again, family-level un-
observables need to be controlled for.
Parental landholdings are signiﬁcant de-
terminants of education, total land transfers,
and inherited land for the respondent and his
or her paternal siblings (Table 6.3). Whereas
father’s land and education positively affect
years of schooling, mother’s education has a
negative effect. This result should be taken
with caution because it is possible that father’s
and mother’s education are correlated. Fa-
ther’s land does not signiﬁcantly affect the
amount of land allocated to children, since al-
locations seem to be more closely associated
with the practice of matrilineal inheritance.
However, daughters with better-educated fa-
thers receive more allocated land than their
brothers do. The dummy for a daughter has
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Table 6.2 Education and land received in Ghana, by mode of transfer, respondent and maternal siblings: 
levels estimates, Tobit
Education All land Inheritance Allocation Gift
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant −32,014.09 −5.36*** −7,403.58 −1.53 –25,825.36 −1.90* –979.19 –0.24 −4,725.11 –1.34
Daughter −5.32 −6.33*** 0.86 1.20 −0.67 −0.45 −0.33 −0.45 0.03 0.04
Half-sibling 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.48 0.36 1.58 1.98** 1.35 2.05**
Birth year 32.65 5.33*** 7.54 1.51 26.34 1.89* 1.07 0.25 4.87 1.35
(Birth year)2 −8,323.92 –5.30*** −1,918.68 −1.50 –6,720.26 −1.88* –293.87 –0.27 −1,253.97 –1.35
Eldest 0.76 0.69 1.69 2.06** −0.92 −0.47 −1.40 −1.43 −0.60 −0.76
Youngest −0.44 −0.45 0.14 0.19 −1.17 −0.76 0.52 0.60 0.22 0.32
Father’s 
education 0.37 2.82*** 0.07 0.66 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.94 0.18 1.84*
Mother’s 
education −0.35 –1.07 0.11 0.46 −12.11 . . . –13.50 . . . –0.28 –1.04
Father’s land 0.08 2.62*** −0.01 −0.17 0.03 0.48 0.04 1.69* 0.03 1.29
Mother’s land 0.10 1.16 0.03 0.41 0.22 2.05** 0.04 0.61 0.11 1.82*
Daughter ×
father’s 
education 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.36 −0.15 –0.42 0.07 0.38 0.05 0.36
Daughter ×
mother’s 
education 0.53 1.01 −15.89 . . . 0.93 . . . 1.44 . . . –21.63 . . .
Daughter ×
father’s 
land −0.06 –1.18 −0.10 −1.48 –0.02 −0.14 –0.02 –0.52 –0.03 –0.76
Daughter ×
mother’s 
land 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.26 –0.07 –0.43 0.02 0.20 –0.03 –0.31
Number of 
observations 954 954 954 954 954
Uncensored 
observations 426 203 116 39 69
Log-likelihood −1,787.86  −859.05 −519.62 −206.42 −330.73
Chi-squared 263.52 51.57 84.71 62.31 48.19
p-value .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Note: Village dummies included but not reported. Sigma not reported.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.negative coefﬁcients, even though its signif-
icance level is low. This indicates that, across
family members, daughters are not strongly
disadvantaged with respect to land transfers.
However, these results can be questioned in
the light of the ﬁxed effects results.
As mentioned earlier, the levels esti-
mates do not control for unobservable char-
acteristics of families that may make them
prone to have more children (and thus
smaller amounts transferred per heir) or to
favor one type of transfer over the other.
Fixed effects estimates do control for these
family-level unobservables, so these are im-
plemented in the next two sets of regres-
sions. For the ﬁxed effects estimates, the
samples used in the estimation were re-
stricted to those families who had more than
two children aged 21 years and above, and,
more importantly, to those families who ac-
tually made a particular type of land transfer
to their children. If a family did not transfer
any land at all to a child, it was excluded
from the ﬁxed effects estimation. This re-
duced the number of families included in the
estimation from 167 in the levels estimates
68 CHAPTER 6
Table 6.3 Education and land received in Ghana, by mode of transfer, respondent and paternal siblings: 
levels estimates, Tobit
Education All land Inheritance Allocation Gifts
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant −27,614.59 –5.14*** 5,080.38 1.20 5,768.15 0.85 1,042.42 0.32 −8,528.95 −1.48
Daughter −3.67 −3.42*** −0.34 –0.35 –0.45 −0.28 −1.66 −1.81* −1.96 −1.64
Half-sibling 1.38 2.07** 0.07 0.12 −0.71 −0.74 0.65 1.35 −0.42 −0.60
Birth year 28.16 5.11*** −5.24 −1.20 −5.95 −0.85 −1.07 −0.31 8.68 1.47
(Birth year)2 −7,178.62 –5.07*** 1,349.16 1.21 1,530.32 0.86 273.28 0.31 −2,209.14 −1.46
Eldest −0.31 −0.27 −0.77 −0.80 −0.02 −0.01 −0.29 −0.41 −0.90 −0.79
Youngest −0.57 −0.57 −1.64 −1.74* −0.60 −0.40 −1.02 −1.26 −1.92 −1.76*
Father’s 
education 0.41 3.66*** 0.07 0.65 –0.16 −0.73 0.02 0.23 0.08 0.70
Mother’s 
education −0.56 –2.30** −0.42 –1.85* −2.05 –2.31** 0.04 0.30 −0.16 −0.73
Father’s land 0.07 3.08*** 0.17 8.72*** 0.22 7.57*** −0.02 −0.85 0.04 1.60
Mother’s land 0.07 0.97 −0.10 −1.28 −0.08 −0.79 −0.01 −0.16 −0.12 −0.82
Daughter ×
father’s 
education −0.06 –0.25 0.25 1.17 –0.88 –1.32 0.36 2.52** −0.16 −0.47
Daughter ×
mother’s 
education −0.44 –0.82 –0.54 –0.92 –4.67 . . . −0.42 −1.23 −3.70 . . .
Daughter ×
father’s 
land 0.03 0.33 –0.02 –0.22 –0.02 –0.13 0.02 0.25 0.22 2.81
Daughter ×
mother’s 
land 0.07 0.23 –0.04 –0.16 0.81 1.72* −0.10 –0.40 −0.45 −1.22
Sigma 7.38 5.97 7.63 3.14 4.12
Number of 
observations 796 796 796 796 796
Uncensored 
observations 452 341 181 96 75
Log-likelihood −1,794.09  −1,304.24  −773.59 −385.87 −333.81
Chi-square 184.66 122.03 191.78 88.51 93.05
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Village dummies included but not reported.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.to as few as 17 for some transfer categories.
However, there were sufﬁcient observations
for estimation because family sizes are large.
In addition, because father’s and mother’s
land and education are family-level variables,
they are included as interaction terms with
the daughter dummy, and thus appear only
so far as they impact differently on daughters
and sons.
Table 6.4 presents the ﬁxed effects results
for the respondent and his or her maternal sib-
lings, while Table 6.5 shows the correspond-
ing results for the paternal sibset. Consistent
with the levels results, daughters are dis-
advantaged relative to their maternal broth-
ers in education (Table 6.4). Contrary to the
levels results, once family-level unobserv-
ables are controlled for, daughters are also
discriminated against with respect to mater-
nal allocations of land. Sons are advantaged
if their fathers have more land: this is shown
in the total maternal land transfer equation
and the inheritance equation. Half-siblings
also get less than full siblings, which is con-
sistent with the expectation that biological
children are treated better than stepchildren.
Turning now to the distribution of land
and education among paternal siblings (Table
6.5), the results for education are similar in
that daughters complete fewer years of
schooling than their brothers do. Secular
trends in schooling also appear more impor-
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Table 6.4 Education and land received in Ghana, by mode of transfer, respondent and maternal siblings, within maternal
sibset estimates: Tobit with household dummies
Education All Land Inheritance Allocation Gifts
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant −8,457.90 −1.20 −5,678.16 –1.29 4,830.17 0.96 −232.06 −1.28 −17,706.92 −3.21***
Daughter −6.09 −7.70*** 0.43 0.61 1.23 1.48 −5.65 −2.48** −0.98 −0.96
Half-sibling −2.49 –2.22** −3.90 –4.29*** −4.07 –4.16*** −3.51 −1.74* −2.01 −1.55
Birth year 8.71 1.20 5.90 1.31 −4.84 −0.94 0.12 1.31 18.22 3.22***
(Birth year)2 −2,238.70 –1.21 –1,534.58 –1.32 1,212.74 0.91 . . .a ... −4,685.49 −3.22***
Eldest 2.09 1.86* 1.49 1.67* −0.30 −0.28 −0.17 −0.07 2.39 2.61***
Youngest −0.65 −0.74 −0.58 −0.85 −0.38 −0.47 −4.03 −2.09** 0.15 0.20
Daughter ×
father’s 
education 0.27 1.55 0.03 0.22 –0.18 –0.91 0.63 0.93 0.25 1.49
Daughter ×
mother’s 
education 0.19 0.46 –2.19 . . . . . .a ... a −2.00 . . .
Daughter ×
father’s 
land −0.02 –0.36 –0.14 –2.33** −0.20 –2.96*** 0.20 1.28 −0.06 −0.51
Daughter ×
mother’s 
land 0.04 0.29 0.16 1.12 0.53 2.27** −0.12 −0.48 0.23 0.51
Sigma 5.56 2.97 2.70 3.06 1.92
Number of 
observations 681 327 166 69 140
Uncensored 
observations 426 203 116 39 69
Number of
families 139 69 32 17 33
Chi-square 338.50 159.04 98.04 26.64 75.38
p-value .00 .00 .00 .27 .00
Note: Household dummies included but not reported.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
a Variable was dropped from the estimation because of nonconvergence.tant for paternal sibsets. Half-siblings receive
less allocated land and gifts.
The gift equation deserves special atten-
tion among the land transfer equations for
both paternal and maternal sibsets. We pre-
dicted that gifts may become more prevalent
as population pressure increases and incen-
tives exist for land tenure institutions to
evolve to more individualized forms. Consis-
tent with this hypothesis, later-born children
are more likely to receive gifts from maternal
relatives, but not from paternal relatives. Such
secular trends in birth year are insigniﬁcant in
the other land transfer equations. Moreover,
the coefﬁcient for daughters, although nega-
tive, is only weakly signiﬁcant (at 10 percent)
in the gift equation from paternal relatives.
Thus, gifts may actually be more gender neu-
tral than allocations in terms of transfers from
the matriclan. This supports Hypothesis 4.
There are indications of parental gender pref-
erence with respect to gifts from fathers.
Daughters are favored if their fathers have
more land, whereas sons are favored if moth-
ers have larger areas of land (Table 6.5).
It seems, therefore, that daughters are dis-
advantaged in terms of both education and
land transfers, particularly allocations, once
family-level unobservables are controlled for.
Gifts, however, are found to be more gender
neutral. The general discrimination against
females is borne out by the signiﬁcantly
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Table 6.5 Education and land received in Ghana, by mode of transfer, respondent and paternal siblings, within paternal
sibset estimates: Tobit with household dummies
Education All Land Inheritance Allocation Gifts
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant −15,139.36 –2.49** 2,197.12 0.36 –5,466.77 –0.48 5,743.56 1.35 230.22 3.25***
Daughter −5.16 −5.12*** −1.71 –1.36 –1.42 −0.46 −2.29 −1.60 −1.51 −1.84*
Half-sibling −0.79 –1.28 –1.45 −1.96* −1.28 −0.93 −1.49 −2.76*** −0.99 −1.99**
Birth year 15.47 2.48** −2.25 −0.36 5.51 0.47 −5.87 −1.34 −0.12 −3.24***
(Birth year)2 −3,949.89 –2.47** 575.95 0.36 –1,387.50 –0.46 1,497.61 1.33 . . .a ...
Eldest 0.10 0.09 −1.54 −1.30 0.16 0.07 −1.34 −1.64 −2.89 −3.42***
Youngest −0.57 −0.63 −1.33 −1.13 −1.89 −0.92 −0.69 −0.73 −0.82 −1.11
Daughter ×
father’s 
education 0.19 1.01 0.25 1.05 –0.37 –0.31 0.28 1.22 0.25 0.83
Daughter ×
mother’s 
education −0.27 –0.66 –0.77 –1.11 . . .a ... −0.16 –0.42 −1.05 . . . 
Daughter ×
father’s 
land 0.06 0.73 0.05 0.59 0.23 0.86 −0.05 −0.30 0.09 2.10**
Daughter ×
mother’s 
land −0.23 –0.93 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.66 0.77 −1.02 −2.88***
Sigma 5.22 5.31 6.92 1.99 1.57
Number of 
observations 648 503 235 162 124
Uncensored 
observations 452 341 181 96 75
Number of 
families 128 93 45 27 29
Chi-square 321.83 169.54 69.45 64.58 105.83
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Note: Household dummies included but not reported.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
a Variable was dropped from the estimation because of nonconvergence.higher incidence of poverty of both females
and female-headed households in rural
Ghana, estimated from a nationally represen-
tative data set, the Ghana Living Standards
Survey (Quisumbing, Haddad, and Peña
1998). With such large gender disparities,
efforts to improve women’s land rights and




Table 6.6 presents the distribution and aver-
age size of the owned and/or cultivated land
of 120 subsample households in the Middle
and Low Regions. In the Middle Region, most
of the households own or cultivate both low-
land rice ﬁelds and upland cinnamon ﬁelds.
Consistent with the relatively low proportion
of bush/fallow in this area, only 28 house-
holds (around 47 percent) report having bush/
fallow land. In the Low Region, on the other
hand, 88 percent of the households also have
lowland rice ﬁelds, and a smaller percentage
(17 percent) have upland rice ﬁelds. Around
90 percent of the households have plots de-
voted to mature rubber, and around three-
quarters have bush/fallow land.
In the Middle Region subsample, Table
6.7 shows that 40 percent of owned/cultivated
lowland rice ﬁelds is owned under the joint
family system, with ownership by daughters
and sons as the predominant category. Around
27 percent of owned/cultivated plots is under
single family ownership, with ownership by
daughters and sons again the major category.
Thus, it seems that, even in the category of
“ancestral land,” in which paddy land has
traditionally been classiﬁed, the inheritance
system seems to have evolved to include both
daughters and sons. Both young and mature
cinnamon ﬁelds are more likely to be owned
by a single family (by both daughters and
sons) or to be acquired privately, whether
through purchase or forest clearance.
In the Low Region (Table 6.8), lineage
land is found only in upland rice, accounting
for 70 percent of upland rice plots. Most joint
family land is found in lowland rice ﬁelds,
accounting for 55 percent of lowland rice
plots. Almost 50 percent of lowland rice plots
are owned jointly by daughters, with the re-
mainder jointly owned by daughters and sons.
Only 7 percent of lowland rice ﬁelds are
under single family ownership. In contrast,
ownership of rubber plots is more individu-
alized. Single family ownership and private
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Table 6.6 Number and average size of owned/cultivated plots by land use, Middle Region and Low
Region subsamples in Sumatra
Middle Region Low Region
No. of Average No. of No. of Average No. of
Land use plotsa size (ha) households plotsa size (ha) households
Total 370 1.18 60 180 1.35 60
Lowland rice ﬁelds 136 0.49 59 96 0.64 53
Young cinnamon ﬁeldsb 96 1.33 52 . . . . . . . . .
Productive cinnamon ﬁeldsc 154 1.25 53 . . . . . . . . .
Upland rice ﬁelds . . . . . . . . . 10 0.73 10
Young rubber ﬁeldsd . . . . . . . . . 30 0.75 25
Mature rubber ﬁeldse . . . . . . . . . 79 1.45 55
Bush/fallow 30 1.66 28 61 1.58 46
a Owned under joint family ownership, owner-cultivated under other ownership systems, and cultivated under tenancy and
borrowing arrangements.
b Those with trees of age one to three.
c Those with trees of age four and above.
d Those with dominant tree age of zero to seven years.
e Those with dominant tree age of eight years and above.purchase are the dominant tenure categories
for young and mature rubber plots. Rubber
plots have also been acquired by forest
clearance, accounting for 13 percent of young
rubber plots and nearly 9 percent of mature
rubber plots. Finally, bush/fallow area is
mostly under single family ownership (41
percent of plots), followed by forest clear-
ance (31 percent) and private purchase (23
percent). For both rubber and bush/fallow
areas, single family ownership is dominated
by ownership by sons.
The distribution of plots by land tenure
status in the Middle Region seems to indi-
cate that more traditional inheritance systems
prevail, but are gradually shifting to a more
egalitarian system whereby both sons and
daughters inherit. In the Low Region, on the
other hand, the evolution of inheritance sys-
tems seems to have gone further, with women
specializing in paddy land and sons in agro-
forestry and bush/fallow areas. Note that the
evolution has taken place in both locations
based on the traditional ruling that earned
property (such as ﬁelds obtained by purchase
and forest clearance) can be disposed of at
will to children of either sex.
The relative contributions of men and
women to labor in lowland and upland rice
and in the two major tree crops, cinnamon
and rubber, may provide an explanation for
the different evolutionary paths of land
tenure institutions in these two regions (see
Table 6.9).67 In the Middle Region, wet rice
and cinnamon use male and female labor rel-
atively equally. In wet rice cultivation, male
family labor accounts for 57 percent and fe-
male family labor for 43 percent. Whereas
young cinnamon uses slightly more male
family labor—males contribute 55 percent
and women 45 percent—women are more
involved in mature cinnamon cultivation,
accounting for 70 percent of family labor
input. The proportions are slightly different
when both hired and family labor are con-
sidered. Wet rice and young cinnamon cul-
tivation continue to use relatively equal
amounts of male and female labor, but the
male labor share in mature cinnamon pro-
duction is much higher (61 percent) when
hired labor is included.
In the Low Region, on the other hand,
upland rice is very intensive in female family
labor: women contribute 68 percent of family
labor input, and men only 32 percent. How-
ever, both young and mature rubber plots
utilize substantial inputs from male family
members: men contribute 83 percent of
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Table 6.7 Land tenure distribution of owned/cultivated plots by land-use type, Middle Region
subsample in Sumatra (percent)
Land tenure Lowland rice Young cinnamon Productive cinnamon
Joint family 41.9 0.0 0.0
Daughters 4.4 0.0 0.0
Daughters and sons 37.5 0.0 0.0
Sons 0.0 0.0 0.0
Single family 27.2 33.3 37.7
Daughters 1.5 1.0 0.6
Daughters and sons 22.8 27.1 35.1
Sons 2.9 5.2 2.0
Borrowing 5.1 11.5 11.7
Private (purchase) 6.6 25.0 18.2
Private (forest clearance) 0.7 18.7 22.1
Share/ﬁxed-rent tenancy 18.4 11.5 10.4
67 The labor input data come from the sampled ﬁelds used for the computation of net revenue from food crops and agro-
forestry discussed in Suyanto, Tomich, and Otsuka (2001a, 2001b). In the Middle Region, wet rice, young cinna-
mon, and mature cinnamon ﬁelds were sampled. In the Low Region, upland rice, young rubber, and mature rubber
ﬁelds were included. Since the focus of the study in the Low Region was the relative proﬁtability of upland
rice and agroforestry (rubber), we do not have data on labor input and net revenue in lowland rice ﬁelds.family labor in young rubber and 91 percent
in mature rubber. The relative proportions
of male and female labor input do not change
substantially when both family and hired
labor are considered. The relatively high use
of male labor arises from the “jungle rubber”
farming system, in which woody species
are densely grown among the rubber trees
(Gouyon, de Foresta, and Levang 1993), so
that it is difﬁcult for women to work. In
contrast, cinnamon trees are grown in rows
and cinnamon ﬁelds are easily accessible for
women. Such differences in working condi-
tions seem to explain the division of labor
between men and women in the cultivation
of wet rice and tree crops in the two regions.
Table 6.10 presents the average land-
holdings, by type, and years of schooling of
the parent and respondent generations in the
Middle and Low Regions. In both regions,
fathers are better educated than mothers, by
at least one year of schooling. Years of com-
pleted schooling increase in the respondent
generation: in contrast to their fathers, who
had 2.9–3.7 years of schooling, sons have
7.1–8.9 years of schooling. Daughters have
lower educational attainments than sons—
6.3 years on the average. This is, however, a
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Table 6.8 Land tenure distribution of owned/cultivated plots by land-use type, Low Region
subsample in Sumatra (percent)
Lowland Upland Young Mature Bush/
Land tenure rice rice rubber rubber fallow
Communal/lineage 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Joint family 55.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3
Daughters 49.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Daughters and sons 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3
Sons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Single family 7.2 0.0 33.3 29.1 41.0
Daughters 1.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 8.2
Daughters and sons 1.0 0.0 3.3 2.5 6.6
Sons 5.2 0.0 23.3 26.6 26.2
Private (purchase) 10.4 0.0 33.3 49.4 22.9
Private (forest clearance) 0.0 0.0 13.3 8.9 31.2
Renting 14.6 0.0 0.0 8.9 0.0
Borrowing 11.5 20.0 13.3 3.8 0.0
Others 1.0 10.0 6.7 0.0 1.6
Table 6.9 Labor use in food crops and agroforestry in Sumatra (person-days/hectare)
Middle Region Low Region
Young Mature Young Mature
Wet rice cinnamon cinnamon Upland rice rubber rubber
Labor use Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean %
Family labor
Men 37.0 57.5 25.8 54.7 5.1 30.2 47.7 31.8 32.3 82.6 48.4 90.6
Women 27.4 42.5 21.4 45.3 11.8 69.8 102.5 68.2 6.8 17.4 5.0 9.4
Total 64.4 100.0 47.2 100.0 16.9 100.0 150.2 100.0 39.1 100.0 53.4 100.0
Total labor
Men 120.0 54.2 32.0 47.3 15.2 61.3 53.6 30.5 35.1 67.9 87.6 92.3
Women 101.6 45.8 35.7 52.7 9.6 38.7 121.9 69.5 16.6 32.1 7.3 7.7
Total 221.6 100.0 67.7 100.0 24.8 100.0 175.5 100.0 51.7 100.0 94.9 100.0
Note: Data obtained from sampled ﬁelds.substantial gain in comparison with their
mothers, who had an average of only 2.2
years. Educational attainments are lower for
both generations in the Low Region, and
the gender gap in education is much larger
in the Low than in the Middle Region. To
some extent, the lower schooling attain-
ment of women in the Low Region seems
to be compensated for by their larger hold-
ings of owned paddy land. It is also impor-
tant to note that there has been a declining
gender gap in schooling over the genera-
tions as measured by the ratio of completed
schooling years between men and women.
In the parents’ generation, mothers’ in-
herited landholdings tended to be larger than
their husbands’. This pattern no longer holds
in the respondents’generation. In the Middle
Region, daughters and sons have approxi-
mately equal inherited areas of paddy land,
but daughters have larger inherited agro-
forestry areas and smaller inherited bush/
fallow areas. In the Low Region, daughters
maintain the matrilineal custom of inheriting
paddy, having larger areas than their brothers,
but receive less agroforestry land and bush/
fallow area. Thus, a gender-differentiated pat-
tern of inheritance seems to be emerging that
is different from the traditional matrilineal
system.
Regression Analysis
In the regression analysis, parental wealth
is deﬁned as human capital (as proxied by
years of schooling) and each parent’s inher-
ited holdings of paddy land, agroforestry
land, and bush/fallow area. These different
types of land are not aggregated because
they are associated with different degrees of
land tenure security and ownership regimes.
In the Sumatra case study, each parent’s in-
herited land is deﬁned as the sum of inher-
ited land at the time of marriage, plus
inherited land received after marriage. Be-
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Table 6.10 Education and landholdings of parent and respondent generations, Middle and Low
Regions in Sumatra
Middle Region Low Region
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Parent generation
Father
Years of schooling 3.67 2.95 2.90 1.70
Inherited paddy (ha) 0.61 1.10 0.11 0.26
Inherited agroforestry land (ha) 0.44 1.02 0.57 1.60
Inherited bush/fallow area (ha) 0.03 0.23 0.42 1.14
Mother
Years of schooling 2.77 2.59 1.73 1.61
Inherited paddy (ha) 0.67 1.07 0.47 0.57
Inherited agroforestry land (ha) 0.40 0.96 0.41 1.45
Inherited bush/fallow area (ha) 0.06 0.34 0.51 1.85
Respondent generation
Number of potential heirs 4.87 2.56 4.17 2.30
Sons
Year of birth 1956 15.58 1957 13.96
Years of schooling 8.92 4.23 7.07 3.39
Inherited paddy (ha) 0.23 0.30 0.07 0.20
Inherited agroforestry land (ha) 0.23 0.64 0.33 0.86
Inherited bush/fallow area (ha) 0.12 0.75 0.39 0.96
Daughters
Year of birth 1958 12.97 1956 14.83
Years of schooling 8.02 4.04 4.57 2.78
Inherited paddy (ha) 0.21 0.31 0.20 0.29
Inherited agroforestry land (ha) 0.28 0.74 0.18 0.82
Inherited bush/fallow area (ha) 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.39cause inheritance decisions are generally
public knowledge in this closely knit matri-
lineal society, expected inheritance is likely
to be correctly anticipated and to affect each
spouse’s bargaining power within marriage.68
Interaction terms with the daughter dummy
reveal whether or not parents exhibit gender
preferences associated with their landhold-
ings and education.
Table 6.11 presents levels estimates of
education and land inheritance functions of
the respondent and his or her siblings in the
Middle Region subsample, while Table 6.12
shows similar results for the Low Region
subsample. Education equations were esti-
mated using ordinary least squares, with
standard errors corrected for household clus-
tering, and land inheritance equations were
estimated using Tobit. Family ﬁxed and ran-
dom effects regression results for the Middle
and Low Region subsamples are presented
in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 respectively.
Although daughters in the Middle Region
obtain less schooling than sons, this difference
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Table 6.11 Determinants of education and land inheritance by respondent and siblings, levels estimates, Middle Region 
in Sumatra
Educationa Paddy landb Agroforestry landb Bush/fallow landb
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant −1,524.63 −0.35 −747.88 –3.35*** −1,471.38 –1.42 –3,499.40 –0.53
Daughter −1.30 −1.35 0.14 2.35** 0.38 1.47 6.28 2.04**
Birth year 1.47 0.33 0.77 3.36*** 1.49 1.41 3.69 −0.54
(Birth year/1,000)2 −350.04 –0.31 –197.14 –3.37*** −379.54 –1.40 –973.45 –0.56
Eldest −0.45 −0.78 0.02 0.56 0.07 0.47 −0.06 −0.07
Youngest −0.84 −1.46 0.08 2.16** −0.06 −0.36 1.20 1.23
Father’s education −0.07 −0.30 0.03 2.57** 0.07 1.57 0.76 2.65***
Mother’s education 0.11 0.42 −0.00 −0.25 0.00 −0.05 −0.73 −1.97**
Father’s paddy land 0.69 1.34 0.16 7.62*** 0.09 0.99 −0.04 −0.08
Mother’s paddy land 1.10 2.82*** 0.16 8.49*** −0.01 −0.08 −0.69 −1.01
Father’s agroforestry land 0.26 0.42 –0.02 –0.67 0.43 4.93*** 0.51 0.88
Mother’s agroforestry land 0.18 0.21 –0.12 –2.86*** 0.22 1.43 –0.25 –0.32
Father’s bush/fallow land −3.12 –4.09*** 0.10 0.77 0.61 1.26 3.42 2.04**
Mother’s bush/fallow land −0.52 –0.40 0.17 1.76* −0.10 –0.30 2.14 1.44
Daughter × father’s education −0.05 –0.22 –0.03 –2.08** −0.07 –1.17 –1.54 –1.75*
Daughter × mother’s education 0.43 1.50 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.16 −0.36 −0.32
Daughter × father’s paddy land −0.92 –2.59*** −0.07 –2.13** −0.24 –1.60 –21.29 –1.56
Daughter × mother’s paddy land −0.69 –1.47 0.01 –0.22 –0.18 –1.20 1.11 1.07
Daughter × father’s agroforestry land 0.36 0.70 –0.02 –0.67 0.10 0.85 –69.81 . . .
Daughter × mother’s agroforestry land −0.48 –0.53 0.09 2.01** 0.22 1.27 –6.11 –1.63
Daughter × father’s bush/fallow land 1.79 2.29** −0.10 –0.65 –0.42 –0.70 –1.32 –0.57
Daughter × mother’s bush/fallow land 0.70 0.35 –0.28 –2.18** −0.03 –0.07 7.34 1.30
Sigma . . . 0.24 0.81 2.43
Number of observations 292  292 292 292
Uncensored . . . 254 160 19
Log-likelihood . . . −9.23 −248.30 −63.95
F-statistic 32.03 . . . . . . . . .
Chi-square . . . 220.07 134.26 59.79
R2 . 2 9 ... ... ...
Pseudo R2 . . . .92 .21 .32
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
a Ordinary least squares with standard errors corrected for clustering.
b Tobit estimator.
68 Indeed, many couples start married life by farming a piece of the woman’s family’s paddy land, which is technically
not “inherited” while her parents (or, more likely, her mother) are still living. However, that land is considered to be
that woman’s property, together with other properties she expects to inherit from her family.is not statistically signiﬁcant. Mother’s paddy
land has positive and signiﬁcant effects on
schooling; however, larger bush/fallow area
of the father is associated with lower educa-
tional levels. This may reﬂect the relatively
low returns to education when ample areas of
uncultivated land exist. There is an indication
of parental gender preference, however:
daughters do less well than sons if mothers
have more paddy land, whereas fathers with
more bush/fallow area favor daughters.
In the Low Region, daughters are clearly
more disadvantaged with respect to educa-
tion, receiving almost two years less than their
brothers. However, daughters are preferred
with respect to inheritance of paddy land,
consistent with traditional practices in these
matrilineal communities, whereas sons in-
herit bush/fallow areas preferentially (both
effects are signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent
level). Larger paddy areas held by the mother
increase the schooling attainment of all chil-
dren, whereas holdings of bush/fallow areas
by both the mother and father reduce it. This
implies that the availability of uncultivated
land reduces parents’investments in school-
ing, suggesting that education and land be-
quests are substitutes. In all likelihood, this
is because ownership of uncultivated land,
which would require labor input from family
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Table 6.12 Determinants of education and land inheritance by respondent and siblings, levels estimates, Low Region 
in Sumatra
Educationa Paddy landb Agroforestry landb Bush/fallow landb
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant −3,508.25 −0.78 −574.56 –1.17 197.66 –0.06 –4,184.13 –1.53
Daughter −1.83 −2.02** 0.29 1.78* −0.77 −0.52 −2.37 −1.94*
Birth year 3.53 0.76 0.59 1.12 0.21 −0.06 4.29 1.53
(Birth year/1,000)2 −886.74 –0.75 –151.49 –1.12 54.64 0.06 –1,101.23 –1.54
Eldest −0.63 −1.44 0.07 0.92 0.28 0.63 0.11 0.36
Youngest −0.29 −0.68 0.21 3.22*** 1.07 2.43** −0.08 −0.22
Father’s education 0.29 1.89* 0.02 1.06 0.09 0.77 0.22 2.49*
Mother’s education 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.85 0.25 1.72* 0.04 −0.37
Father’s paddy land −0.63 –0.64 0.47 3.45*** 0.57 0.78 −0.27 −0.37
Mother’s paddy land 1.42 2.36** 0.22 2.11** −0.89 −1.66* −0.79 −2.16**
Father’s agroforestry land 0.15 1.44 –0.01 –0.34 0.48 6.06*** −0.25 –1.62
Mother’s agroforestry land 0.01 0.09 –0.03 –0.99 0.34 2.65*** 0.38 3.36***
Father’s bush/fallow land −0.66 –3.76*** −0.06 –1.12 0.14 0.53 0.84 5.43***
Mother’s bush/fallow land −0.26 –3.37*** 0.05 2.89*** −0.08 –0.54 0.36 5.12***
Daughter × father’s education −0.14 –0.66 –0.01 –0.30 –1.25 –1.49 0.26 1.54
Daughter × mother’s education −0.01 –0.04 –0.03 –0.89 –12.45 –1.18 0.13 0.59
Daughter × father’s paddy land 0.32 0.26 0.43 1.99** 11.93 1.37 0.43 0.25
Daughter × mother’s paddy land −1.66 –2.01** 0.40 2.73*** 1.20 0.60 –0.53 –0.61
Daughter × father’s agroforestry land 0.16 0.43 0.00 0.01 1.06 0.94 0.32 1.40
Daughter × mother’s agroforestry land 0.32 1.63 –0.01 –0.31 0.78 1.60 0.28 1.12
Daughter × father’s bush/fallow land 0.23 0.64 0.01 0.10 . . .c 0.11 0.33
Daughter × mother’s bush/fallow land 0.36 1.65* −0.24 –1.24 . . .c 0.05 0.14
Sigma . . . 0.33 1.48 1.31
Number of observations 247 247 247 247
Uncensored . . . 93 44 51
Log-likelihood . . . −85.28 −113.58 −129.15 
F-statistic 25.38 . . . . . . . . .
Chi-square . . . 142.30 128.79 123.39
R2 . 3 6 ... ... ...
Pseudo R2 . . . .45 .36 .32
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
a Ordinary least squares with standard errors corrected for clustering.
b Tobit estimator.
c Variable was dropped from the estimation because of nonconvergence.members if it were to be developed, in-
creases the children’s opportunity cost of
schooling. Larger areas of land also con-
tribute to larger areas inherited by children.
Similarly to the schooling equation in the
Middle Region, mothers with more paddy
land invest preferentially in sons’schooling,
whereas fathers with more bush/fallow area
favor daughters. In contrast, parents prefer
daughters in the bestowal of paddy land rel-
ative to sons: larger holdings of paddy land
by the mother or the father increase areas
preferentially bestowed to daughters.
The different inheritance patterns of
paddyland, agroforest, and bush/fallow land
by gender are consistent with work differen-
tiation between men and women in cultiva-
tion of different ﬁelds, which suggests that
land inheritance institutions have evolved so
as to provide proper work incentives to men
and women. These ﬁndings are consistent
with Hypothesis 4, which argues that the dis-
tribution of land among sons and daughters
is tending to become more egalitarian.
We also examined the within-family dis-
tribution of education and land. Both family
fixed effects and random effects models were
used; the results reported in Tables 6.13 and
6.14 are the preferred speciﬁcations, judging
from the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier
test for the signiﬁcance of random effects
and the Hausman test for the signiﬁcance of
ﬁxed effects. Although the results are con-
sistent with the levels results, individual
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Table 6.13 Family ﬁxed effects and random effects estimates of education and land inheritance of respondents and siblings,
Middle Region in Sumatra
Education Paddy land Agroforestry land Bush/fallow land
Random effects Fixed effects  Random effects Fixed effects
Coef. z Coef. t Coef. z Coef. t
Constant −1,255.11 –0.36 –660.94 –2.75*** −330.89 –0.65 –369.52 –0.50
Daughter −1.85 –2.25** 0.09 1.90* −0.00 –0.04 –0.01 –0.06
Birth year 1.19 0.33 0.68 2.77*** 0.34 0.65 0.38 0.50
(Birth year/1,000)2 −276.23 –0.30 –174.97 –2.79*** −88.01 –0.66 –96.14 –0.50
Eldest −0.41 –0.76 –0.04 –1.10 –0.07 –0.88 0.00 0.03
Youngest −0.80 –1.48 0.03 0.91 –0.01 –0.19 –0.05 –0.51
Father’s education −0.08 –0.36 . . . 0.03 1.06 . . .
Mother’s education 0.19 0.85 . . . 0.01 0.29 . . .
Father’s paddy land 1.17 1.03 . . . −0.10 –0.67 . . .
Mother’s paddy land 2.87 1.90* ... −0.00 –0.01 . . .
Father’s agroforestry land −3.25 –2.51** . . . 1.02 5.76*** ...
Mother’s agroforestry land 0.82 0.30 . . . 0.07 0.18 . . .
Father’s bush/fallow land −10.70 –1.62 . . . 0.32 0.35 . . .
Mother’s bush/fallow land −3.20 –0.33 . . . −0.32 –0.24 . . .
Daughter × father’s education 0.02 0.11 –0.01 –1.12 –0.01 –0.38 –0.03 –1.03
Daughter × mother’s education 0.23 1.17 –0.00 –0.19 –0.01 –0.29 0.03 0.97
Daughter × father’s paddy land −2.20 –1.69* 0.02 0.27 –0.35 –1.70* −0.22 –0.99
Daughter × mother’s paddy land −2.70 –1.61 –0.09 –0.94 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.57
Daughter × father’s agroforestry land 3.98 2.75*** −0.03 –0.38 0.83 3.51*** −0.04 –0.15
Daughter × mother’s agroforestry land −0.96 –0.34 0.15 0.67 0.88 2.15** −0.25 –0.36
Daughter × father’s bush/fallow land 6.59 1.00 –0.14 –0.38 –0.48 –0.44 –0.03 –0.03
Daughter × mother’s bush/fallow land 1.67 0.19 –1.29 –2.61*** −0.37 –0.26 –1.32 –0.86
Wald chi-square (p-value) 71.68 (.00) . . . 193.94 (.00) . . .
F-test (p-value) . . . 2.49 (.00) . . . 0.48 (.93)
Breusch–Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
(p-value) 40.70 (.00) 26.79 (.00) 11.67 (.00) 0.19 (.66)
Hausman speciﬁcation test (p-value) 9.88 (.70) 161.30 (.00) 6.89 (.91) 41.52 (.00)
Number of observations 292 292 292 292
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.heterogeneity rather than family unobserv-
ables characterize the education and agro-
forestry regressions, and ﬁxed effects are
important in bestowals of paddy and bush/
fallow land.
In the Middle Region, sons receive
more education than daughters, but daugh-
ters whose fathers have more agroforestry
land receive more schooling. Contrary to the
levels results, sons and daughters inherit all
types of land equally. This is consistent with
the relatively equal use of male and female
labor in paddy and cinnamon production.
However, daughters whose fathers and moth-
ers have larger agroforestry areas tend to
inherit more than their brothers. This is con-
sistent with the more traditional matrilineal
practice in the Middle Region compared with
the Low Region.
In the Low Region, the random effects
results conﬁrm that daughters are disadvan-
taged with respect to schooling. Schooling
attainment does increase with birth year. Un-
like the levels results, in the land inheritance
regressions the gender dummy is, in itself,
insigniﬁcant, but mothers and fathers treat
sons and daughters differently. Larger paddy
areas of both father and mother are associ-
ated with larger areas inherited by daughters.
In contrast, sons receive more agroforestry
area when their fathers have larger holdings;
daughters have larger inherited agroforestry
holdings when their mothers have larger areas
of this type of land. However, both fathers
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Table 6.14 Family ﬁxed effects and random effects estimates of education and land inheritance of respondents and siblings,
Low Region in Sumatra
Education Paddy land Agroforestry land Bush/fallow land
Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects
Coef. z Coef. t Coef. z Coef. t
Constant −6,498.73 –2.01** −310.51 –1.16 –4.26 –0.01 –1,306.52 –1.63
Daughter −2.53 –2.73** 0.04 0.64 –0.01 –0.05 0.07 0.35
Birth year 6.59 1.99** 0.31 1.15 0.00 0.01 1.33 1.63
(Birth year/1,000)2 −1,669.79 –1.97** −79.84 –1.15 –0.64 –0.00 –337.98 –1.62
Eldest −0.55 –1.21 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.52
Youngest −0.24 –0.56 0.00 0.10 0.18 1.74* −0.26 –2.20**
Father’s education 0.36 2.26** . . . 0.02 0.54 . . .
Mother’s education −0.13 –0.65 . . . 0.03 0.97 . . .
Father’s paddy land −1.68 –0.50 . . . 0.42 0.62 . . .
Mother’s paddy land 3.36 1.63 . . . −0.36 –0.85 . . .
Father’s agroforestry land 1.31 1.71* . . . 1.25 9.14*** ...
Mother’s agroforestry land 0.41 0.47 . . . 0.47 2.74*** ...
Father’s bush/fallow land −1.48 –1.62 . . . 0.04 0.21 . . .
Mother’s bush/fallow land −0.85 –1.43 . . . 0.07 0.62 . . .
Daughter × father’s education −0.15 –0.87 0.01 0.55 –0.00 –0.09 –0.05 –1.40
Daughter × mother’s education 0.16 0.77 –0.01 –0.63 –0.05 –0.99 0.06 1.20
Daughter × father’s paddy land −1.60 –0.34 1.75 4.76*** −1.54 –1.37 0.46 0.42
Daughter × mother’s paddy land −1.12 –0.40 0.94 4.41*** 0.79 1.17 –0.96 –1.51
Daughter × father’s agroforestry land 1.60 1.29 0.04 0.42 –1.11 –3.76** 0.20 0.73
Daughter × mother’s agroforestry land 0.36 0.30 0.11 1.23 1.46 5.16** −0.00 –0.01
Daughter × father’s bush/fallow land 0.52 0.43 –0.06 –0.70 –0.10 –0.33 –1.21 –4.44**
Daughter × mother’s bush/fallow land 1.42 0.95 –0.04 –0.38 –0.12 –0.36 –1.61 –4.56**
Wald chi-square (p-value) 117.66 (.00) . . . 239.79 (.00) . . .
F-test (p-value) . . . 10.33 (.00) . . . 4.99 (.00)
Breusch–Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
(p-value) 65.95 (.00) 1.84 (.17) 14.74 (.00) 0.07 (.79)
Hausman speciﬁcation test (p-value) 19.43 (.11) 22.04 (.05) 4.91 (.98) 86.98 (.00)
Number of observations 242 242 242 242
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.and mothers with larger bush/fallow holdings
favor sons.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have examined how wealth
is transferred from parents to children, fo-
cusing on the differences in land inheritance
and schooling between sons and daughters.
The evidence suggests that schooling and
land are substitutes in the sense that greater
availability of unused land reduces parents’
incentives to invest in children’s schooling.
Thus, increasing levels of schooling in Suma-
tra can be explained partly by the increasing
scarcity of cultivable land area. It may well
be that schooling will continue to increase in
Ghana as land becomes more scarce.
It is encouraging to observe that in the
Middle Region of Sumatra, which is more
developed than the Low Region, sons and
daughters are equally educated. Although
daughters are less educated than sons in the
Low Region, the gender gap in schooling has
signiﬁcantly narrowed over the generations.
In Ghana, the gender gap in schooling is
wider and the schooling levels are lower
than in Sumatra: in Ghana, sons received
5.7 years of schooling on the average, which
is much lower than the corresponding aver-
age of 8.5 years in Sumatra; the ﬁgures for
daughters are 2.9 years in Ghana and 5.8 years
in Sumatra. Thus, the average schooling at-
tainment of daughters is only one-half that
of sons in Ghana. Their mothers, however,
were far less educated than their fathers, in-
dicating that the gender gap may have nar-
rowed over time in Ghana as well.
Contrary to the widely held belief that
women’s access to land tends to be weak-
ened in the process of individualization of
land tenure institutions, women in Ghana,
who traditionally did not inherit land from
their husbands and fathers, are now acquir-
ing land through gift transfers. According to
the results of the regression analysis of land
transfers, the gifts are gender neutral. This
ﬁnding is consistent with Hypothesis 4 that
the contribution of female labor to the estab-
lishment of agroforestry ﬁelds is rewarded by
the acquisition of land rights. Women, how-
ever, own only 20 percent of land, and
whether or not they will acquire signiﬁcantly
more land of their own remains to be seen.
Interesting changes in the ownership of
land by men and women are also observed
in the matrilineal societies of Sumatra,
where only women used to own land. In
the Middle Region, where men and women
work more or less equally on both cinna-
mon and paddy ﬁelds, sons and daughters
inherit land equally. In the Low Region, in
contrast, where men work primarily on rub-
ber ﬁelds and women work primarily on
paddy ﬁelds, sons inherit larger areas of up-
land ﬁelds and daughters inherit larger areas
of lowland paddy ﬁelds. It seems clear that
the division of labor in farm work between
men and women is closely mirrored in the
division of inherited land between sons and
daughters, which provides additional sup-
port for Hypothesis 4.
In conclusion, we want to emphasize
that gender equity is not necessarily incom-
patible with economic development. In par-
ticular, our study suggests that the gender
gap in schooling tends to become smaller
with an increase in the level of develop-
ment. Our study also suggests that it is pos-
sible for the intergenerational transfer of
land to move toward a more egalitarian sys-
tem. In order to substantiate such conjec-
tures, however, further research is needed
to identify the economic and sociocultural
forces that promote more equitable changes
in the gender distribution of schooling and
land inheritance.




This study has attempted to identify, systematically and quantitatively, the factors affecting
the evolution of land tenure institutions and their effects on the use of land for agroforestry
and annual cropping, and on management efﬁciency. Indeed, although massive deforestation
has been taking place in the developing world, resulting in ecological deterioration, a sign of
hope is the signiﬁcant and often growing adoption of agroforestry. The study also paid spe-
cial attention to differences in land rights between men and women and between family and
individual ownership, and to the consequences of such differences on the rate of deforesta-
tion and tree-planting and on the management of tree resources. In-depth attention was also
given to gender equity in the distribution of land inheritance and educational investments.
We wanted to draw generalizable conclusions by making a comparative study between Ghana
and Sumatra, where cultural, natural, and policy environments are vastly different. We de-
liberately chose sites where traditional matrilineal regimes—the uterine matrilineal system of
the Akans in western Ghana and the matrilineal system in western Sumatra—were evolving
in the process of individualization.
This ﬁnal chapter attempts to summarize the major ﬁndings of the two country studies so
as to draw policy implications. Discussions in this overview will be organized around the
major issues addressed in this study. First, we characterize the common types of property
rights institutions and explore how they are evolving. Second, we summarize how land tenure
institutions and their differences by gender affect the incidence of planting commercial trees
and management efﬁciency, as well as the efﬁciency of annual crop farming. Third, we dis-
cuss the effects of the different tenure systems on gender equity. The ﬁnal section discusses
the policy implications of this study.
Major Findings
Characteristics of Property Rights Systems
Under the communal tenure system, population pressure has led to the privatization of land
rights on land converted and utilized for agriculture or agroforestry. Strong individual landrights are granted to cultivated land con-
verted from forests, though such rights are
weakened when the land is left fallow for
long periods. Rights have been further in-
dividualized through long-term investment,
most notably in tree-planting, which was
clearly demonstrated in the case studies of
both Ghana and Indonesia. There has also
been evidence that, during this process, land
markets have strengthened and that they fur-
ther contribute to the process of individual-
ization of land rights. All of these trends have
caused traditional land acquisition methods
to erode. In the matrilineal inheritance sys-
tems of Ghana and Indonesia, matrilineal
customs have given way in part to patrilineal
or egalitarian systems, through gifts or out-
right sales of land.
Communal Land Tenure and Deforestation
Field observations indicated that uncultivated
forest areas under the communal tenure sys-
tem are open access, at least for members 
of the community. In Ghana and Sumatra,
the village chief readily allowed villagers to
clear the forest for cultivation, even if he was
supposed to be the custodian of the commu-
nal forest. It appears that the major respon-
sibilities of the village chief are to approve
the clearance of forests and to record land
ownership so as to avoid possible land dis-
putes in the future.
Although it is difﬁcult to prove rigorously
that primary forests have been operating
under open access over an extended period
of time, there is no question that forest areas
under communal ownership have easily been
cleared as population increased. In fact, the
age of the household head is a critical vari-
able explaining the area of acquired forestland
in both Ghana and Sumatra. The positive
relationship reﬂects the fact that cultivable
primary forests have gradually disappeared
owing to their clearance on a ﬁrst-come/ﬁrst-
served basis.
The major factor accounting for the
decrease in forestland is identiﬁed as popu-
lation pressure. The household surveys in
Sumatra ﬁnd that reduction in inherited land,
due primarily to an increased number of
family members relative to family-owned
land, resulted in larger clearance of forest-
land. Although the effect of inherited land
on forest area in Ghana was insigniﬁcant, the
fact that migrants from land-scarce areas
actively sought newly cleared forestland
strongly indicates that population pressure
has also resulted in deforestation.
An important factor affecting deforesta-
tion is the conventional rule of communal
land tenure, which honors ownership rights
on cleared forestland. In other words, the
work effort of clearing forests is rewarded
by strong individual land rights. It is clearly
reported from the case studies in Ghana 
and Sumatra that those who have cleared vil-
lage forestland are granted strong individual
rights.
Gender considerations have some im-
plications for the rate of forest clearance as
well as the subsequent development of agro-
forestry. In Ghana, female-headed house-
holds are less likely to have acquired land
through forest clearance, since this has tradi-
tionally been a male task. Although women
can and do hire male laborers, female heads
of household typically have less access to the
resources to do so. In Sumatra, on the other
hand, where husbands and wives cultivate
family farms jointly, the number of male
workers in the household increases forest
clearance as well as the area planted to trees
(see also Suyanto and Otsuka 2001).
The most important conclusion is that
there is no built-in mechanism under the
communal ownership system to protect forest
area and forest resources. Halting the trend
of deforestation will not be simple.
Communal Land Tenure,
Gender, and the Development 
of Agroforestry
Land in our study sites is marginal for agri-
culture and some parcels are very steep. It
would be socially desirable to promote agro-
forestry systems on such land to mimic many
of the forest functions and to provide income-
earning opportunities for the rural population.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 81Many of the farmers plant and grow trees,
such as commercial trees and shade trees,
which provide positive environmental bene-
fits. Commercial tree farming is usually more
sustainable and often more efﬁcient than food
crop farming in marginal areas, partly be-
cause of the low yields of pure food crop
enterprises on these lands, and partly be-
cause of the ease of shipping tree products
that are storable.
It is widely believed, however, that, be-
cause of weak individual land rights or
tenure insecurity, trees are not planted and
well managed under communal ownership
regimes in which the extended family often
has inﬂuence over use rights in cultivated
land (for example, Johnson 1972; Besley
1995). In particular, matrilineal systems have
been criticized because they do not keep the
beneﬁts of investment within the patriarchal
family, and so provide weaker incentives to
invest. If, indeed, this is the case, it will be
difﬁcult to promote agroforestry in marginal
areas, even though agroforestry has compar-
ative advantage over food production under
shifting cultivation. In this study, we ex-
plored in depth whether communal tenure
institutions provide insufﬁcient incentives
to plant and manage trees. If tree-planting is
not deterred, the incidence of poverty in mar-
ginal areas can be reduced by enhancing the
efﬁciency of land use in such areas. Further-
more, the establishment of agroforestry on
sloping land will help reduce soil erosion
and siltation and contribute to the partial
restoration of tree biomass and biodiversity.
This is reported to be the case in cocoa ﬁelds
with big shade trees (Gockowski, Nkamleu,
and Wendt 2000) and in the so-called jungle
rubber forest mixed with non-rubber trees
(Tomich et al. 2000).
In matrilineal communities of Sumatra,
cultivated land was traditionally owned by
lineage members consisting typically of three
generations descended from the same grand-
mother. Gradually, joint ownership by sisters
became common. However, agroforestry
plots are more likely to be bequeathed from
a mother to daughters and even to sons indi-
vidually. Private ownership acquired through
land market transactions and forest clearance
is also common. An important observation is
that individual land rights are stronger under
single family ownership than collective
family ownership. Since sons carry out the
bulk of forest clearance and tree-planting,
inheritance of agroforestry plots and bush/
fallow areas by sons rewards their work ef-
fort. Daughters continue to inherit paddy land,
which has traditionally been considered an-
cestral property to be inherited by women. In
this way, the matrilineal inheritance system
in Sumatra has been evolving toward a more
egalitarian system. Strengthened land rights
under the single family ownership regime
also promoted land market transactions.
In indigenous Akan villages in western
Ghana, uterine matrilineal inheritance has
been practiced: land is bequeathed from the
deceased man to his uterine matrilineal rela-
tives, for example, his brother or his nephew.
Although those who clear forests are granted
strong land rights, the cleared land eventu-
ally becomes the property of the extended
family and may be temporarily allocated to
those family members in need of land or be-
queathed in accordance with the traditional
rule. As was demonstrated in this study, in-
dividual land rights on these family-owned
plots under the Akan matrilineal system are
very weak. The individual rights of inherited
land in non-Akan households are much
stronger. Since non-Akans generally follow
patrilineal inheritance, individualization was
facilitated by the small number of family
members, typically a father and his sons, in-
volved in the inheritance decision. It is im-
portant to observe that the current share of
allocated and inherited land is relatively low.
Allocation and inheritance are giving way
to gifts and acquisition of land via land mar-
kets, such as purchase and rental.
Although the proportion of women’s land
accounts for around 20 percent in Akan
households in these areas of western Ghana,
the inheritance system has been evolving in
favor of women. Plots planted with trees,
which confer strong individual rights, are
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inter vivosgifts, with the permission of mem-
bers of the extended family. The transfer to
the wife and children represents a reward for
their efforts in helping the husband or father
to plant cocoa trees. Once land has been
transferred to women as a gift, there are no
signiﬁcant differences in the probability of
tree-planting between male and female farm
managers. This ﬁnding is similar to those
from studies on cocoa and coffee adoption
in Côte d’Ivoire (Appleton et al. 1991). This
is probably because the transfer of land to
women is conditional on the previous plant-
ing of cocoa. The regression results sug-
gested that women are as likely as men to
plant cocoa and manage cocoa ﬁelds efﬁ-
ciently. That is, women parcel managers are
equally efﬁcient as men, which is consistent
with the empirical evidence on male–female
differences in agricultural productivity (Qui-
sumbing 1996).
There is no strong statistical evidence to
support popular arguments that customary
land tenure in Ghana and Sumatra discour-
ages commercial agroforestry. Indeed, com-
mercial trees have been planted under the
communal ownership system as widely and
actively as under the private ownership sys-
tem. This occurs because land rights have
become highly individualized as a result of
the investment in trees and the continuous
cultivation of tree ﬁelds by farmers neces-
sitated by high population pressure. Even
where land rights are relatively weak, tree-
planting is stimulated by the expectation of
strengthened individual land rights.
Given the positive and signiﬁcant effect
of tree-planting on individual land rights, it
is no wonder that sufﬁciently strong incen-
tives to plant commercial trees exist under
the communal ownership system. Once trees
are planted, the land ownership system is
converted to de facto private ownership
within a community. Thus, the management
efﬁciency of commercial tree ﬁelds under
the communal system is generally compara-
ble to other ownership systems in the study
sites, according to the estimation results of
proﬁt or net revenue functions. In other
words, the communal system is evolving to-
ward an individualized system and does not
impede the development of agroforestry.
Land Tenure, Gender, and 
Cropland Management
Land tenure rules affect expected future
beneﬁts accruing to those who invest in land
improvement, including tree-planting. There-
fore, land tenure affects long-term but not
short-term management incentives. In sup-
port of this, land tenure institutions did not
have any impact on the production efﬁciency
of paddy ﬁelds in Sumatra, which do not
require much investment. However, some
differences in the management efﬁciency of
annual crop production under different land
tenure institutions can be observed in Ghana,
where cropland owned and allocated by the
extended family, with less secure land rights,
is less frequently fallowed than land with
more individualized rights. Land-use rights
are fairly well established under extended
family ownership so long as land is continu-
ously used for cultivation. Once land is put
into fallow, however, individual rights are
substantially weakened. Thus, the less fre-
quent fallow periods under extended family
ownership can be explained by weaker tenure
security, which forces farmers to continue
to cultivate the land to secure use rights. Al-
though customary land tenure institutions
are not signiﬁcantly inefﬁcient for the man-
agement of tree ﬁelds, they are likely to be
inefﬁcient for the management of crop ﬁelds
under shifting cultivation.
In neither Ghana nor Sumatra are there
any signiﬁcant managerial efﬁciency differ-
ences in cropped land depending on the
gender of the parcel manager (in Ghana) or
the gender composition of family labor (both
Ghana and Sumatra).
Land Tenure and Gender Equity
A second type of equity concerns the distri-
bution of assets by gender. One of the trends
observed in Ghana—the erosion of traditional
uterine matrilineal systems—indicates that
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strengthened under the transformation of
communal tenure systems. If labor-intensive
agriculture increases the demand for women’s
labor, as in the case of cocoa in Ghana (Okali
1983; Awusabo-Asare 1990), women’s labor
on their husbands’plots may represent a form
of “sweat equity” that confers individualized
land rights to them. The ﬁndings suggest that
gift transactions, usually in return for labor on
a husband’s cocoa plot, are an increasingly
important mode of land acquisition for
women. The positive secular trend in gift
transfers, particularly among the matrikin, is
substantiated by the analysis of the intra-
household distribution of land inheritance.
In contrast, men’s land rights were
strengthened in matrilineal communities 
of Sumatra, when demand for men’s labor
increased with the development of agro-
forestry. The increase in men’s rights is spe-
ciﬁc to areas where agroforestry is intensive
in male labor; where agroforestry uses male
and female labor relatively equally, the in-
heritance system has evolved to beneﬁt both
daughters and sons. The inheritance system
seems to be evolving from a strictly matri-
lineal system to a more egalitarian system in
which sons and daughters inherit the type of
land that is more intensive in their own work
effort. In other words, the newly emerging
customary land tenure institutions, by allow-
ing for inheritance consistent with compara-
tive advantage and work effort, seem to have
built-in incentives for men and women.
We would like to emphasize that agro-
forestry systems, whether on private or on
communally owned land, have a positive in-
direct effect on equity. This is because agro-
forestry is more favorable and proﬁtable than
food crops in marginal areas where there are
relatively high levels of poverty, so that sys-
tems that encourage their development also
make a contribution to reducing the welfare
gap between the relatively wealthy and the
poor rural population.
Policy Implications
This section highlights the key policy impli-
cations from the two country case studies for
improving the efﬁciency of natural resource
management while, at the same time, recog-
nizing the importance of equity. Our study
indicates that proﬁt incentives are a strong
economic force underlying institutional
changes in land ownership systems, which,
in turn, suggests that enhancing the prof-
itability of agroforestry will facilitate its wider
diffusion.
This section focuses ﬁrst on property
rights arrangements for both agricultural and
nonagricultural land, second on the develop-
ment and dissemination of agricultural and
agroforestry technologies, and third on mar-
ket development and other issues. All three
areas must be addressed to improve the efﬁ-
ciency of natural resource management.
Property Rights Institutions 
and Policies
Property rights institutions are largely favor-
able to or moving in the right direction to
provide proper incentives for efﬁcient natural
resource management. There are a few note-
worthy exceptions and areas for improve-
ment, however.
Though it seems reasonable that im-
proved management will take place when
there is a closer match between those who
control and those who use resources, direct
intervention in gender-based property rights
policy has proved to be extremely difﬁcult.
It is important that any program that assigns
rights to resources (whether titling laws,
privatization of state or communal holdings,
or allocation of land or water in settlement or
irrigation schemes) be checked for overt or
implicit barriers to women’s obtaining rights.
This applies in both the design and the im-
plementation of programs. Legal systems
need to be developed and adapted to assist
women in obtaining and protecting their
rights.
In addition, one should expect that the
twin forces of commercialization and indi-
vidualization of land rights will lead over
time to a more widespread demand for titling
by smallholder farmers. Although many ti-
tling programs have failed, largely owing to
premature implementation, they have been
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ket and property rights development, such
as central Kenya (Migot-Adholla, Place, and
Oluoch-Kosura 1994). Land titling programs
will become feasible once communal land
tenure institutions have become sufﬁciently
individualized. Yet such programs are costly
and there is always the danger that the rich
and the political elite will grab large areas of
titled land. In fact, Hayami (1999) argues that
the preemption of uncultivated land to the
elite with legal title to land was the major
source of inequality in land distribution and
the development of large plantation sectors
in Southeast Asia.
Implementation of land titling programs
must pay special attention to the gender issue.
If men are traditionally owners of land, as in
western Ghana, land titling may strengthen
their land rights at women’s expense. To be
fair, men and women should be equally qual-
iﬁed to acquire land titles, or titles could be
awarded jointly to men and women. Judging
from the experience of Ghana, the promulga-
tion of the Intestate Succession Law, which
stipulates how property should be bequeathed
to the spouse, children, and other family
members, may be a useful policy option,
which would facilitate less gender-biased
land inheritance systems in customary land
areas. However, the effectiveness of efforts
to strengthen women’s land rights through
legal reform depends on women’s knowl-
edge of the provisions of the law and their
ability to enforce their claims in court. In all
likelihood, improving women’s education
will help strengthen their land rights.
Development and Dissemination of
Agroforestry Technologies
Since strong incentives exist to manage agro-
forestry plots on sloping lands under com-
munal ownership, it makes sense to develop
and disseminate proﬁtable agroforestry sys-
tems, through such means as the develop-
ment of improved species of commercial
trees, improving techniques for selecting
and propagating useful indigenous tree germ-
plasm, improving the ﬂow of information on
these new technologies, and, ﬁnally, provid-
ing proper incentives for germplasm delivery
systems to develop. It is important to involve
both men and women in varietal selection,
because men and women may have different
preferences for tree species.
In addition, research on sustainable tree
management needs to be carried out for the
wide areas of barren land which used to be
planted to coffee, cocoa, and other tree crops.
Farmers in marginal areas are particularly
poor, so the establishment of proﬁtable 
and sustainable agroforestry systems will
contribute signiﬁcantly to the reduction of
poverty by enhancing the efﬁciency of farm-
ing in marginal areas. It will also contribute
to the prevention of soil erosion and the
creation of tree biomass. Moreover, proﬁt-
able agroforestry can help to strengthen in-
dividual land rights where they are weak.
Thus, the development of agroforestry is
expected to be conducive to both efﬁciency
and equity from both private and social view-
points. If so, the development of proﬁtable
agroforestry systems could be a superior
substitute for land titling programs. Further-
more, with the introduction of proﬁtable agro-
forestry systems, shifting cultivation areas,
which tend to be managed inefﬁciently under
communal tenure institutions, will further
decline, reducing the need for land titling
programs.
Note that we are not arguing that land
titling is unimportant. It will become criti-
cally important, when the importance of
credit increases as land use is intensiﬁed and
the use of purchased inputs increases. Be-
cause land without clear titles cannot be used
as collateral in formal credit markets, land
titling programs will beneﬁt cultivators who
need credit, as in the case of Thailand (Feder
et al. 1988). In our observation, however, our
sites have not yet reached the stage at which
purchased inputs and, hence, the availability
of credit play signiﬁcant roles.
In developing technology transfer pro-
grams, care must be taken to provide exten-
sion to women farmers, who have often
been neglected by male-dominated extension
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 85systems (Saito and Spurling 1992). Tech-
nologies to improve food crops intercropped
with young trees may be especially useful
to women, who are responsible for their fam-
ilies’food security.
Market Development and Other
Policy Issues
Market development is critical to generate
the degree of intensiﬁcation required to en-
able rural people to uplift themselves from
poverty without mining their surrounding
resources. Increased expenditure for rural
road construction will be a key component
of such development. This point is well un-
derstood by policymakers. It must be also
clearly understood that, although the devel-
opment of roads may accelerate deforesta-
tion by enhancing the proﬁtability of timber
harvesting, it will also accelerate the devel-
opment of agroforestry where primary forests
have already been cleared.
The lower educational attainment of
women in the study sites is cause for con-
cern, even though there have been signs of
improvement. Even if daughters continue to
maintain control of land in their own right,
lower levels of education would make them
less likely to beneﬁt from nonagricultural
income-earning opportunities. If education is
more important than land in the determina-
tion of income, as is found in the Philippines
(Estudillo and Otsuka 1998), the inequality
in income-earning capacity between men
and women may have widened. Moreover, if
population pressure continues to increase, it
is unlikely that agriculture will be able to ab-
sorb the growing labor force, and this will
create even more pressure on the existing
stock of forest resources. Investing in the
education of both sons and daughters would
thus be part of a long-term solution to rural
poverty and environmental sustainability in
these areas. Increasing women’s educational
attainment will not only increase their op-
portunities in the nonfarm sector, but also,
by increasing the opportunity cost of time,
contribute to smaller family sizes and re-
duced population pressure on scarce forest
resources.
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